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Analysis of Global Nuclear Balance, Probability of Nuclear War

40050378 Beijing MEIGUO YANJIU [AMERICAN STUDIES] in Chinese No 1, 15 Feb 88 pp 35-49

[Article by Wu Zhan: "Nuclear Deterrence"]

[Text] Nuclear weapons, particularly thermonuclear weapons in the form of hydrogen bombs, possess tremendous destructive power unprecedented in history. Reportedly, the explosion of just a few hydrogen bombs would largely wipe out a large city of several million. Furthermore, there is as yet no effective means of defense against a ballistic missile having a nuclear warhead. The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, have stockpiled more than 20,000 nuclear weapons large and small; consequently, should a nuclear war break out, both sides would sustain hundreds of million casualties to say nothing of the damage to property. Destruction would be far greater than in World War II. Who would want to suffer such a catastrophe? It is because people fear nuclear warfare that nuclear weapons play a deterrent role, nations possessing nuclear weapons not daring to start a nuclear war.

The concept of deterrence has existed since ancient times. During the Three Kingdoms period [AD 222-280], [General] Cao Cao's son, Cao Zhi, wrote the following line: "The deterrence of myriad chariots enables China to hold sway." Several hundred years earlier, the great military strategist of the Spring and Autumn Period, Sun Zi, referred to the idea of "subduing the enemy without fighting" in the offensive strategy chapter of his *The Art of War*. Among other things, this included having powerful military forces as a backup force while employing diplomatic means to obtain an enemy's capitulation. Former Prime Minister Helmut Schmidt of West Germany said the following in his book, *The West's Strategy*: "The principle of deterrence is by no means a 20th-century discovery. Both Greece and Rome understood that the use of threats of disaster far surpassing any possible realizable advantage could cow a would-be attacker into submission."

1. America's Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

With the advent of nuclear weapons, the term deterrence came to be widely used in the United States and the West. Nuclear deterrence means the use of powerful nuclear retaliation, that an enemy would find difficult to withstand, to deter him from launching an attack. Naturally, nuclear weapons can be used for more than deterrence. For example, they may be used to provide a protective nuclear umbrella for allies, and when nuclear deterrence fails, they may be used in warfare. However, there is no doubt at all that deterrence is their main role. The concept of a protective nuclear umbrella was advanced by the proponents of deterrence. It is intended to insure that allies will not be attacked. However, should the Soviet Union use its powerful conventional forces to attack Western Europe or even employ nuclear

weapons without directly attacking the United States, whether the United States would risk subjecting itself to nuclear retaliation by using nuclear weapons to attack the Soviet Union is a very good question. The question of whether nuclear weapons would be used in warfare should nuclear deterrence fail is merely speculative. There are no indications of such a failure at the present time. Readiness to use nuclear weapons serves another purpose, namely strengthening the effect of nuclear deterrence, giving the impression that should deterrence fail, they will really be used.

The United States believes that nuclear deterrence depends on the following:

- 1). Possession of dependable powerful nuclear forces.
- 2). Willingness to use these forces.
- 3). A realization on both sides that the only issues to be settled through warfare are those affecting the nation's major interests.

Unless one possesses nuclear weapons having a dependable combat capability, empty threats will serve no purpose. Possession of nuclear weapons without the will to use them renders deterrence ineffective. This has to do with credibility. If others do not believe, deterrence will not work. The United States believes it is necessary to have a sufficient number of reliably performing nuclear weapons, and to openly publicize pertinent data about them. The United States also believes that nuclear weapons should have survivability, meaning that in event of a surprise attack enough nuclear weapons could survive to launch a retaliatory counterstrike. For this reason, the United States has placed intercontinental ballistic missiles in hardened underground silos, maintains ballistic missiles that can be fired from submerged nuclear submarines, and has strategic bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles. This triad strategic force cannot be completely destroyed in a single strike. When an international crisis occurs, the United States frequently resorts to movements of its nuclear armed troops, raises the military alert status, and either announces or hints at the use of nuclear weapons to show it possesses the will to use nuclear weapons.

Nuclear deterrence is a little like a dancing couple. Unless both parties cooperate, the dance cannot go on. The power of nuclear weapons is so vast, and their effects so great, that unless a conflict has to do with interests of life-or-death importance to a country, no matter how much posturing a country may do, others will not believe it really intends to use them. Therefore, it is necessary to exhibit such willingness at certain times and on certain issues, and to use all available means to make the adversary believe. During the Korean war, the United States reportedly threatened China with nuclear weapons. If so, how would the Chinese, who did not fear even death, take this threat! Actually, the United States did not possess many atomic bombs at that time; the

number was insufficient to subjugate a country as large as China. Were they all to be used on China, what would the United States use to deal with the USSR? Some small countries are even less threatened by nuclear weapons because they cannot believe that a superpower would use nuclear weapons to deal with a small country.

3. Evolution of America's Nuclear Strategy

From the end of World War II until the early 1950's, the United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and was clearly superior to the USSR. In a 1954 speech, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared a nuclear policy of "large-scale retaliation." By this he meant that the United States would use large-scale nuclear bombings to retaliate against communist countries. Such retaliation would be all-out. It would be targeted against both military objectives and nonmilitary objectives, and against both factories and cities.

When President John F. Kennedy acceded to power in the early 1960's, his defense secretary, Robert McNamara, proposed the nuclear strategy concepts of "assured destruction," "damage limitation," and "flexible response." America's desire to change policy at that time resulted from the USSR's substantial development of nuclear weapons. America no longer enjoyed absolute superiority. Were "large-scale retaliation" to be employed at every turn, this would inevitably lead to nuclear retaliation against the United States.

By "assured destruction" is meant that following a first strike (in order to avoid retaliation, one must first strike strategic attack forces), the United States must retain sufficient nuclear weapons to carry out destructive retaliation (the second strike) against enemy cities and industrial areas. McNamara maintained that triad strategic forces would be extremely unlikely to sustain complete destruction as a result of a first strike. At least strategic missile nuclear submarines were very likely to survive. Nuclear submarines can remain submerged for long periods of time, and are difficult to spot and attack. Although accuracy of submarine-fired missiles is relatively low, they would be able to strike cities. Since the USSR was readying nuclear forces similar to America's, it could likewise employ mutual destruction against the United States; hence the term "mutual assured destruction." As a result, deterrence of others functioned to deter oneself.

"Damage limitation" is an effort to reduce the destruction caused by nuclear warfare. Initially, McNamara envisioned the use of a nuclear strike to annihilate most of the enemy's nuclear weapons and to prevent reinforcement of his ability to defend himself. However, a nuclear attack is tantamount to the launching of nuclear warfare, so it is not a desirable option. The best defense is active defense, i.e., the use of antimissile systems to bring down missile nuclear warheads (the technology has yet to be perfected), and the use of an air defense system to interdict intruding bombers. Another method is passive

defense, i.e., the building of large numbers of civilian defense shelters. This was not carried out due to the high cost.

"Flexible reaction" entails the division of nuclear counterstrikes into four levels. The lowest level is simply attacking military objectives, and the highest level is all-out nuclear attack. The division of counterstrikes into levels is to allow the American President to select a combat plan on the basis of circumstances. In this regard, the American Department of Defense has correspondingly revised its "single integrated operational plan" (SIOP) in which targets for attack at all levels and combat plans are preplanned.

McNamara laid a foundation for America's nuclear strategy. Except for "damage limitation," which was not taken up because it is unrealistic, his entire strategic thinking has been continued to this day by every American administration. There are two main schools of strategic thinking in the United States. One is the deterrent school, which relies on deterrence to avoid war. The second is the war school, which holds that a nuclear war can be fought, and thus wants plans made to fight it well. Official nuclear strategy has elements of both. The openly publicized policy stresses deterrence, but it also exhibits some warfare ideas. One might say that "assured destruction" is at the heart of America's nuclear deterrence. Without it, no one would be frightened. "Flexible reaction" and SIOP are concrete war plans. The United States cannot destroy others or else it will be itself destroyed. Suicide plans are not convincing. Only a small counterstrike at first, with escalation if that does not work, is fairly credible and able to buttress deterrence. The subsequent "flexible reaction" is a development and improvement of this plan with no change in the main plan.

By the 1970's, the Soviet Union's strategic strength level roughly equaled that of the United States. Most of the USSR's strategic nuclear weapons were land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles whose warheads were large and numerous, posing a serious threat to the United States. Two secretaries of defense at that time, Arthur Schlesinger first, and Harold Brown later, revised the SIOP, refining and adding more levels to it. At that time, America's intercontinental ballistic missile technology was also developing greatly. Not only did it have multi-warhead submissile technology, but hit accuracy had increased markedly. Thus, strikes on military targets developed to include strikes on countersilos. Because of the increase in the number of warheads, the number of targets that could be hit increased, and naturally "flexible response" levels could also be more precisely defined. At the same time, the United States also improved its nuclear weapons command, control, and communications systems, improving their survivability and improving target strike flexibility. Brown put forward the so-called countervailing strategy, meaning a response corresponding to the intensity of the Soviet nuclear attack, hitting single targets, multiple targets, or

making large-scale attacks, going from strikes against military targets to all-out attack.

During the 1980's, after Ronald Reagan became President, the SIOP was further revised. With advances in antiballistic-missile technology, in 1983 he proposed a strategic defense initiative, or SDI. This entailed the building of a huge antimissile strategic defense system to wipe out an overwhelming majority of incoming warheads. He even suggested with great conviction that "assured destruction" would become "assured survival," because the great effectiveness of SDI would make the use of "mutually assured destruction" unnecessary to guarantee peace, and people would not have to live in a "balance of terror." His initiative aroused a great uproar throughout the world, because many people felt that it might lead to a greater nuclear arms race. Western Europe feared that once the United States had solved the problem of its own defense, it would withdraw the protective nuclear umbrella and be unconcerned about Western Europe's defense. Because of its technological backwardness, the USSR feared it would lose out in the strategic defense race; and if it did not take part in the race, it feared being reduced to an inferior position. Reagan's optimistic estimate proved to be a bit premature. SDI research during the past several years has shown that numerous key technologies cannot easily pass muster. Were an incompletely developed preliminary SDI system to be deployed, not only would a great military expenditure be required, but not many problems would be solved. Thus, the U.S. Government announced that for the foreseeable future, "assured destruction" would continue to be the main strategy, and SDI would function to bolster deterrence.

3. The Soviet Response

Since the U.S. nuclear deterrence policy plays mostly on psychological fears, does the USSR hold a similar view? If the USSR does not accept this view, nuclear deterrence is of no use.

Soviet nuclear weapons keep pace with America's. Reportedly, the USSR stole American technology to develop an atomic bomb, and Soviet nuclear strategy is also a reaction to American nuclear strategy.

When the United States held absolute superiority in nuclear forces, the USSR was very worried about being hit with a nuclear strike; consequently, the USSR hastened research and development and the deployment of nuclear weapons. Although Nikita Khrushchev said in 1956 that war can be avoided because the USSR's military forces had grown strong, the USSR always felt that should war occur, it would certainly be a nuclear war. It also believed that under those circumstances, it would be best to gain the initiative with a first nuclear strike in order to reduce the USSR's losses.

Subsequently, the USSR rapidly developed nuclear weapons. In 1957, the USSR patched together some

components to beat the United States in the testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and in 1959 it established strategic rocket forces. Then in January 1960, in a report to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev said: "If any country or group of countries plans to carry out a surprise attack on a power that possess nuclear and rocket weapons...will it be able to render ineffective all the weaponry and all the rockets on the soil of the country attacked? Of course not. If the country attacked is a sufficiently large country, it will be able to retaliate against the aggressor." It was not without a feeling of pride that Khrushchev set forth his view of nuclear deterrence, because the USSR had been first to get intercontinental ballistic missiles. Actually, however, at that time, it was able to deploy only several crude missiles of this type whose technological performance was not fully developed. At that time, the USSR deployed mostly intermediate-range missiles of insufficient range to reach the United States. The United States really felt it had fallen behind and talked about the "missile gap." It later found that this was not the case at all. After 1957, the United States very quickly surpassed the USSR. In 1962, in an adventurous move, Khrushchev transported intermediate-range missiles to Cuba in an effort to threaten the United States. The result was that, under pressure from America's powerful forces, he could only withdraw, crestfallen.

After 1966, its fairly great advances in nuclear weapons increased Soviet confidence. Possibly because of the U.S. "flexible response" strategy, the USSR felt that the United States also feared nuclear war, and it tended to believe that a nuclear war would not necessarily be fought. It no longer mentioned very much gaining the initiative by striking first.

During the strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki during November 1969, the Soviet delegation announced that "even should one side sustain an attack first, it would doubtlessly be able to retain the capability to launch destructive retaliation; therefore, we all agree that a war between two countries would be catastrophic for both. For the party that decided to begin the war, this would amount to suicide."

In 1973, Soviet Fleet Admiral Gershikefu [phonetic and possibly Gershkov] wrote the following in the second issue of "Collected Naval Works": "The survivability of underwater means of delivery is much higher than for land-based launch vehicles, and they are a more effective deterrent. They are a constant threat to aggressors. When an aggressor understands that nuclear retaliation from the ocean is inescapable, he may be forced to halt the initiation of nuclear war."

The above quote shows that the Soviet Union's view of nuclear deterrence is about the same as that of the United States. After the Soviet Union attained parity with the United States in nuclear forces during the 1970's, it constantly reiterated that it did not seek dominance. At the 26th Soviet Party Congress in 1981,

Leonid Brezhnev said that attempts to surpass the adversary in an arms race, or the expectation of winning victory in nuclear warfare is dangerous madness. In 1985, after Mikhail Gorbachev acceded to power, he also said that there could be no victor in a nuclear war. He felt deeply that the Soviet Union's economic problems were grave, and that reform was necessary to effect a change. This required a lightening of the heavy burden of military expenditures and a stable international environment. Thus, the USSR actively pursued nuclear weapons reduction and advocated a slackening of the nuclear arms race.

In the United States many people suspected that the USSR was preparing to fight a nuclear war. Indeed many Soviet writers on nuclear strategy talked about the USSR being able to fight and win a nuclear war. During the 1960's, for example, Marshal Sokolovsky's book, *Military Strategy*, contained a discussion about fighting a nuclear war. The writer felt that this should be neither surprising nor alarming. Most of those who discuss nuclear war in the USSR are military persons. Except for supreme party and government leaders, civilians regard nuclear strategy as a forbidden zone; since they do not understand military matters, they never touch on this realm. Since it is the military who discuss nuclear strategy, quite naturally they study how to fight a nuclear war since this is their function. The situation in the United States is different. In the United States, it is civilians who take the lead in discussing nuclear strategy. Initially, the American military did not touch this topic. Defense Secretary McNamara was a nonmilitary person who relied for his strategy on a group of researchers in the Rand Corporation. In American universities too, quite a few research units studied nuclear warfare. America has a long tradition of civilians deciding military affairs, and it has not been until recently that the military paid attention to strategic studies. You say the USSR is prepared to fight a nuclear war, but hasn't the U.S. Department of Defense also drawn up a SIOP for nuclear warfare? There is not a country in the world in which the defense department does not consider how to fight wars. It is their duty to do so. Whether to fight or not is a decision of the supreme authorities.

4. Nuclear Policy of Secondary Nuclear Nations

Secondary nuclear nations are nations whose overall strength is moderate, but who also possess nuclear weapons. Their nuclear strength is very small ranging between only one-tenth and one-twentieth that of the superpowers, for example. However, they also play a deterrent role. The difference is that the nuclear strength of secondary nuclear nations is markedly of a self-defensive rather than coercive character. Because of the power gap, they cannot launch a first strike against superpowers, because to do so would mean their utter annihilation.

Once a secondary nation has a certain number of nuclear weapons and takes certain actions to conceal and protect them so that they will not be wiped out entirely by a

superpower first strike, a few score or even just 10-odd surviving weapons can be used in a counterstrike. Though the counterstrike would be unable to annihilate the adversary, explosion in large cities could produce serious destruction. Therefore, despite their not very large numbers and their not very high target precision (high precision not being necessary, in any case, when they are not being used to attack hardened underground silos), these weapons are still able to play a deterrent role. In a situation of mutual confrontation between two superpowers, in particular, when they cannot employ a substantial portion of their nuclear weapons to deal with secondary nuclear nations without weakening their capabilities against the main enemy, the deterrent role of secondary nuclear nations is increased.

The term secondary nuclear nations applies specifically to the United Kingdom, France, and China. Let us talk first about the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is a NATO member, and is militarily allied with the United States against the Soviet Union. However, it does not want to rely entirely on America's protective nuclear umbrella, but wants to have an independent nuclear force. The reasons why the United Kingdom wants to do this are as follows: First, nuclear weapons can strengthen the United Kingdom's political and military position. Second, it feels the American nuclear umbrella is not dependable. Should the USSR use superior conventional forces in an attack, the United States would not necessarily risk annihilation by using nuclear weapons to counterattack the USSR. Sooner or later the United States will remove its forces from Europe, and when this happens, possession of some nuclear weapons will provide some security support. The United Kingdom's nuclear weapons consist principally of ballistic missiles launched underwater from submarines (purchased from the United States). They have very strong survivability. France has even less confidence in the United States. Though still a NATO member, it has withdrawn from militarily integrated organizations, and maintains definite independence. France believes that reliance on the American nuclear umbrella will lead to political dependence. Such a relationship would open Western Europe to the effects of United States-USSR relations. Should a nuclear war occur between the United States and the USSR, even though not brought about by European issues, Europe might become embroiled. Consequently, France annually spends approximately one-third of its military expenditures on nuclear weapons. France's nuclear forces include land-based intermediate range missiles, submarine missiles, and nuclear bombers, all of which France itself has developed and produced.

In talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate range missiles, at first the USSR insisted that the United Kingdom and France also dismantle their intermediate range missiles, otherwise the USSR should also retain a like number of these kinds of weapons. Because the United Kingdom and France

insisted that their intermediate range missiles were independent, the USSR finally agreed that the American-Soviet negotiations would not include British and French weapons.

The writer believes that though both the United Kingdom and France are NATO members, their nuclear weapons should not be regarded in the same way as Soviet nuclear weapons. First of all, the United Kingdom's and France's intermediate range missiles are few in number and poor in quality. For the foreseeable future, their might cannot be compared with the Soviet Union's. Reductions should be primarily a matter between the United States and the USSR. Second, the United Kingdom's and France's nuclear forces are defensive. In no case is it possible to imagine that either country would use nuclear weapons in a first strike against the USSR, thereby bringing about their own annihilation. Only in event of a Soviet attack on western Europe might the United Kingdom and France employ nuclear weapons. Therefore, the United Kingdom's and France's nuclear weapons should be separated from the American-Soviet nuclear arms race.

5. China's Nuclear Weapons

China also has a very small nuclear force for the purpose of breaking the superpowers' nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail, to protect its own independence and security, and to maintain world peace. It has been built through 30 years of effort. The writer can only give some of his personal opinions on this subject.

There are similarities between China's nuclear forces and those of the United Kingdom and France. First, both are for defense and not for offense. Second, both are small in number and poor in quality, and China's are of even poorer quality, it is feared.

There are also differences between China's nuclear forces and those of the United Kingdom and France.

1. Both the United Kingdom and France are NATO members. When attacked by the Soviet Union, their nuclear forces might be figured in with America's. By contrast, China conducts an independent diplomatic line of opposition to hegemony, and no participation in any military alliance. In wartime, it can rely only on itself to fight independently.

2. China was the first nation in the world to announce that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but neither the United Kingdom nor France are willing to make such a statement. They reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first should they be unable to stave off a conventional Soviet attack. China's declaration stemmed not only from its unwillingness to ignite a nuclear war, but also because China is a vast land with large numbers of troops that does not fear conventional attack that much.

3. NATO has steadily increased its forces and war preparations, and both the United Kingdom and France have gradually expanded and updated their nuclear weapons. By contrast, China has pursued a disarmament policy, cutting its troop strength by 1 million and converting its ordnance industries to civilian production. For example, nuclear industries have shifted their emphasis from nuclear weapons to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and missile industries have also shifted emphasis from missiles to spaceflight. This does not mean that nuclear weapons are no longer made, but rather that the emphasis has changed. The small number of China's nuclear tests in recent years attests this point.

Although China's nuclear strategy may be said to be a kind of deterrence, it is targeted against deterring hegemonist coercion. It is not itself coercive; consequently it may be also said to be antideterrant.

China's nuclear strength is limited. Though it is unable to deliver to an enemy what the superpowers term an unacceptable counterstrike, it is able to create substantial damage.

From the enemy's standpoint, there is some uncertainty regarding China's limited nuclear strength in that even were the enemy to make a first strike, he could not be sure that all of China's nuclear weapons had been wiped out, and even if the enemy had an antiballistic-missile system (not yet perfected), he could not guarantee ability to intercept all incoming warheads, not to mention that the building of a comprehensive antiballistic-missile system is not in the offing in the near future. Should a single nuclear warhead slip through, this would be a disaster for the enemy. Therefore, in a situation in which the outcome of an attack is uncertain with the possibility of serious consequences, the decision to launch an attack would not be easy.

The situation of parity between the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear strength benefits China more than the United Kingdom and France. This is because China is very large and the extent of its urbanization is also not very high. Even very great force could not bring about China's submission. The greater the spending on the forces, the greater the effect on the parity between the two superpowers; hence, the role that China's limited nuclear strength plays is more marked.

6. Will There Be a Nuclear War?

By so-called nuclear war is meant a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union; no question exists of a nuclear war between other countries. Nuclear deterrence has played a major role in there having been no outbreak of a major war in the 40 years since World War II, because people fear that a conventional war might trigger a nuclear war. How long can the "balance of terror" in nuclear forces between the United States and the USSR endure? It is like sitting beneath a sword of Damocles suspended by a thread no thicker than a

hair, always having one's heart in one's mouth lest the sword drop. Three possibilities for fighting a nuclear war are postulated.

1. A superpower launches a preemptive first strike, substantially wiping out the adversary's strategic weapons. In reality, this is impossible. In 1982, the President of the United States charged General Brent Scowcroft with organization of a special committee to study America's strategic weapons. The commission concluded that triad strategic forces still had survivability; consequently, they could not be completely wiped out by a Soviet first strike. By the same logic, neither could the United States launch a successful first strike against the Soviet Union. Some people said that since the USSR has more strategic weapons than the United States, once the USSR launched a first strike, should the United States make a second retaliatory strike, the Soviet Union could launch a third strike to destroy the United States; thus, the United States would not dare make a second strike, allowing the USSR to win. The possibility of such a scenario is extremely small. How could the USSR determine that the United States would not dare retaliate, and rashly launch an attack?

2. Conventional war could escalate into nuclear war, and a small-scale nuclear exchange could escalate into a major nuclear war. Let us discuss the conventional war issue first. Conventional wars among small nations, particularly in the Third World, have gone on without interruption for years, yet they have not ignited a war between the United States and the USSR. In Europe and in northeast Asia, both the USSR and the United States (and including all the countries of Europe and Japan) have massive forces in confrontation. In Western Europe, in particular, where the United States has established key defense points, NATO might use nuclear weapons first to deter the Warsaw Pact nations. Were a war to break out here, neither side would be likely to win, and both sides would sustain losses. In East Asia, both side's armed forces are not as concentrated as in Europe. The Soviet Union's logistical transportation lines are long and unreliable, not up to supporting large-scale military operations. The possibility of an American attack here is also very small, because it is a very long way from critical areas of the USSR. In other areas, the possibility of a direct clash between the United States and the USSR is also very small. For both sides, caution is the byword in order to avoid armed clashes. Should one side act tough because its important interests have been violated, the other side will give way so that the situation does not enlarge. The aforementioned Cuban crisis was a case in point. Both the United States and the USSR make every effort to keep their forces apart so as to avoid escalation into nuclear war. The possibility of a small-scale nuclear exchange is also very small, because both sides know that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, a steady escalation that cannot be repaired is very likely; therefore they do not lightly cross it. Although both sides have drawn up nuclear warfare plans, this is nothing more than the military discharging

its responsibilities. It also plays a role in increasing the credibility of deterrence. Whether a war will be fought is another matter. Recently both sides, particularly the United States, have devoted very much attention to crisis management, every effort being made to avoid crises escalating into warfare. Both sides realize they cannot go to war.

3. An unexpected event or an accidental mistake that triggers nuclear war. Formerly people worried that mistakes made by computers, or by command, control, and communications systems, radar error, human error, or actions authorized by people not empowered to act might lead to the launching of a nuclear weapon by mistake. Indeed, just such mistakes were made, but they did not create accidents. This is because weapons system control is very complex; a partial error cannot activate the entire system. As a result of fear of accidents, over the years various kinds of safety features have been designed for key systems components, and these have been steadily improved. Therefore, the erroneous launching of a missile by mistake cannot in fact happen. Furthermore, bombers that have been dispatched may be recalled, and missiles that have been fired can be commanded to self-destruct; thus the degree of safety is higher.

Clearly, these possibilities cannot become realities.

Although the United States and the USSR are constantly contending in all aspects of war preparations, and are also in a constant nuclear arms race in an effort to down the other party, they also understand that since neither side can down the other there must be limits in order to avoid a war disaster. Nowadays the word stability occurs frequently in documents, speeches, and discussions. In a large sense, this means stability in the international situation with no escalation of tensions and, best of all, a reduction. In terms of weapons control talks, although no reductions resulted from past agreements setting limits on the number of strategic attack weapons, both sides have certain expectations. They will not go off half-cocked in an arms race, creating an irretrievable situation. Current nuclear arms reduction negotiations, which call for a greater reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons in an effort to make the situation more stable, also have a bearing on the issue of weaponry stabilization. This is because some weapons can easily lead to a greater race or make the other party feel a preemptive strike would be beneficial. For example, multiple-warhead submarine-type intercontinental ballistic missiles have been said to be destabilizing weapons. If they have 10 warheads, and target accuracy is also very high, they are naturally powerful offensive weapons. However, they can also induce the adversary to make a preemptive strike, because a single warhead can knock down 10 of the enemy's warheads. Even hiding missiles in hardened underground silos will do no good, because modern missiles are so accurate they can hit underground silos. The United States has devised a mobile

plan for its 10-warhead MX missiles, namely to construct more than 10 surface emplacements and associated roads for each MX missile, and to frequently shuttle the missiles around among the emplacements, incoming warheads thus being unable to know in which emplacements missiles are located. However, this could not be done because of the too complex systems problems, and overly high construction costs. As a result, the MX remains in underground silos. The United States is currently developing a small single-warhead "Midgetman" missile that can be moved by truck. One enemy warhead can only hit one American warhead, but it will still be difficult to take accurate aim on a target. The aforementioned Scowcroft Commission considers this a stabilizing weapon, and has developed it vigorously. The USSR is also working on similar missiles, developing them seemingly more rapidly than the United States. Antimissile weapons are also considered to be destabilizing. This is because, unless they effectively intercept warheads, they may impel the opposite party to increase offensive weapons in order to cancel out their function.

In the United States some people have proposed a "minimum deterrence" strategy theory. By this is meant that American and Soviet nuclear weapons have reached a state of "overkill," which is to say that they can annihilate each other many times over, and this is certainly not necessary. If the numbers were to be reduced, yet maintained at a level sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on the other party (some say 200 warheads would be sufficient), and if they were well concealed, both a major reduction in nuclear weapons and continued maintenance of a nuclear deterrent would be possible. Consequently, such a plan would be a stabilizing factor. The question is whether both parties will agree to do this, and how many constitute sufficiency. In recent open discussion of sufficiency, Soviet officials have also agreed that "overkill" is no good.

The international situation is tending toward moderation and arms reduction. The United States and the USSR have signed an agreement for the destruction of intermediate range missiles, and some progress has been made in discussions for a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, and in talks on the limitation of strategic defensive weapons. Nuclear weapons can be reduced, but until such time as there is a change in the mutual confrontation between the United States and the USSR and the struggle for hegemony, nuclear weapons cannot be completely eliminated. Thanks to nuclear deterrence, there will be no nuclear war for the foreseeable future; however, so long as warfare remains a method for resolving conflicts, and so long as nuclear weapons remain, the danger of a nuclear war cannot be completely ruled out.

Can the danger of nuclear war be eliminated? Only when countries that consider launching a war understand that war can only create losses and cannot produce benefits will they not go to war. In the past, imperialism went to war to occupy territory, to seize resources, to monopolize

markets, and to exploit slave-like labor in order to accumulate capital for itself. Under modern, industrial, and urban conditions, the occupation of territory not only confers no benefit, but may also become a burden. More and more technology and fewer and fewer raw materials are required in modern production; consequently raw material prices continue to slide on international markets, making it easy to purchase raw materials. Today capitalists can use transnational corporations to find suitable labor and profitable markets. Getting markets is largely a matter of product competitiveness, and product competitiveness depends on superb technology and effective management. Labor can no longer just be cheap; it must also possess a certain amount of education and skill, otherwise it will not be possible to produce commodities that can compete. None of these problems can be solved by occupying territory. Consequently, under these new circumstances, and when there is a high tide of anticolonialism throughout the world, old line colonialist countries have gradually gotten rid of colonies, thereby lightening their load. Naturally, for some backward countries, the seizing of territory and resources still holds certain significance; therefore limited wars continue to exist.

It is also no longer fashionable for capitalist countries to go to war with each other. Take Europe, for example. France, Germany, and Great Britain have fought heaven knows how many wars with each other in their history. Today, they coexist in the European Common Market. There is a tremendous amount of investment and economic exchange among them, and they rely on each other a great deal. Not to mention the present factors in the great enemy, the USSR, which from an economic standpoint alone could only lose and not gain should a war occur. This is because what is in your interest is in my interest, and what is in my interest is in your interest. The same situation applies to other major capitalist nations such as Japan and the United States.

The danger of war today exists mostly between the American and Soviet superpowers. As a result of fundamental differences in ideology and systems, they completely distrust each other, and are irreconcilable. The USSR has always pulled itself up by its own bootstraps, and has been a rather reclusive country. Today it realizes that locking the door will not do. The more it has striven to excel for many years, the more it has fallen behind. It understands that it must institute political and economic reforms, that it must open to the outside world to assimilate capital and technology from abroad, and that it must participate more in international markets and carry on international exchanges, and that in order to do this, there must be a peaceful international environment. Thus, it has proposed "new thinking" diplomatically. Gorbachev has frequently spoken about world interdependence. The writer believes that the Soviet Union's attitude is sincere; otherwise, it will be unable to reform, and its national power will deteriorate relatively. If its reforms are successful, then a situation will also gradually develop between the USSR and the West of "what is

in your interest is in my interest, and what is in my interest is in your interest." When this happens, relations between the United States and the USSR will ease steadily and war will be less and less likely to occur.

In 1950, the Danish physicist Neils Bohr wrote an open letter to the United Nations in which he suggested that an open world was a prerequisite for peace. Possibly his ideal will finally be realized!

Progress in European Conventional Arms Reductions Since January Viewed

OW1505002289 Beijing BAN YUE TAN in Chinese No 7, 10 Apr 89 pp 55-57

[Article by Hua Xia: "The General Trend of Relaxation Is Advancing—A Roundup of the International Situation in the First Quarter of the Year"]

[Excerpts] [passages omitted]

Breakthrough in Conventional Arms Reduction

A new trend of unilateral reduction of conventional arms by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe emerged in the disarmament realm in the first quarter of the year. Following Gorbachev's announcement at the UN General Assembly near the end of last year of a unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze again announced in January this year that the Soviet Union would withdraw a portion of their tactical nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and would cut the military budget by 14.5 percent. Then, other members of the Warsaw Pact successively announced unilateral disarmament. The GDR and Bulgaria announced that each would cut troops by 10,000; Hungary and Poland, each by 15,000; and Czechoslovakia, by 12,000. They also announced military budget cuts ranging from 4 to 15 percent. This is unprecedented in the history of disarmament.

While all this was going on, the talks on reducing conventional arms in Europe progressed without interruption. At the follow-up meeting of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation held in Vienna in mid-January this year, a "final document" was at last adopted after hard bargaining sessions. The document reflects that the meeting participants have reached a consensus on the authorized goal, form, and scope of the talks on conventional military strength in Europe, and have agreed to effect stability and security in Europe through the establishment of an equilibrium of low-level, land-based conventional forces and through effective and strict verification. The document has been called a "major breakthrough in the history of East-West relations in Europe since the war."

In March, the talks on conventional armament in Europe and the first round of talks on adopting trust and security measures in Europe ended in Vienna. The talks were characterized by the following features: First, they were

attended by the most number of countries in the disarmament history of Europe, with the 23 members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact attending the talks, and the 35 members of the European Security Council participated in the discussion on adopting trust and security measures in Europe. Second, without accusing or attacking each other as they did in previous talks, representatives from all participating countries consulted with one another and jointly explored ways to reduce conventional arms in a peaceful atmosphere. Third, in spite of differences, the disarmament proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact and NATO share an identical stand in calling for the elimination of the existing imbalance in conventional armament, drastically reducing troops and conventional arms, and changing the organizational structure of conventional arms to a defensive in nature, thereby breaking the 15-year standstill in disarmament talks in Central Europe.

In spite of all this, differences and contradictions remain between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. According to Bush, it is not an appropriate time for the United States to slacken efforts for national defense construction, nor for the United States and its allies to reduce their arms unilaterally. Therefore, we should not be overoptimistic about the prospects of the talks on reducing conventional arms in Europe. [Passages omitted]

Commentary Sees Bush Administration Turning 'Back to Deterrence'

HK0605082089 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 4 May 89 p 3

["Commentary" by Jing Xianfa: "New Trends of the Defense Policy of the White House"]

[Text] The Bush administration recently made public the "mixed deployment scheme" which mainly consists of the multiple warhead intercontinental missile and the Midgetman mobile missile. President Bush spends great efforts in renewing and expanding land-based strategic nuclear weapons at a time when the government is cutting military expenses. People are thus highly concerned with the trends of the defense policy of the White House.

The aim of the "mixed deployment scheme" is to enable the U.S. strategic nuclear weapons to escape the first attack of the Soviet intercontinental nuclear missiles by deploying MX multiple warhead missiles transported on railroad cars and adding the Midgetman single warhead missiles which are placed on trucks. Adequate nuclear retaliation power can be conserved in this way. This idea basically matches with the traditional nuclear deterrence theory of the United States in its nuclear strategy. At the same time, President Bush cut the expense of the strategic defense plan—the "Star Wars" plan highly commended by Reagan. As a commentary in THE WASHINGTON POST pointed out: Bush's scheme turns the U.S. nuclear strategic theory from the idea of strategic defense stressed by Reagan "back to the path of nuclear deterrence."

Congress and the Pentagon have argued for 13 years about how offensive nuclear weapons should be developed. Bush, who assumed office quite recently, had adopted the proposal of Congress to deploy Midgetman single warhead mobile missiles and at the same time insists on the redeployment of MX multiple warhead missiles, while reconciling and making compromise between the two opinions. Of course, his aim in doing so is to harmonize the relations between the White House and Congress in future. Observing the present situation, Secretary of State Baker is planning to discuss the resumption of the U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons which ended last November during his visit to the USSR this month. In particular, President Bush hopes that the Senate and the House of Representatives in the Congress, where the Democrats hold the majority, can vote for the decision of the White House at that time. In the long run, it is obvious that President Bush hopes to win greater support from Congress on important decisions concerning internal and foreign affairs in the future through this concession.

However, a price must be paid for maintaining this "mixed deployment scheme." President Bush has decided to cut the scale of the Strategic Defense Initiative and delay the production of the B-2 stealth bomber, and is prepared to reduce the amount of conventional weapons and fighters. This practice of "repairing one wall by demolishing the other wall" shows that the United States is impeded by its enormous financial deficits in developing its military forces.

What public opinion is most concerned about is the long-term development of this land-based long-range missile, and whether or not it will cause a series of arms races between the United States and the USSR. Though the number of nuclear warheads of the "mixed deployment scheme" is similar to the amount during Reagan's terms of office, there are breakthroughs in the number of carrier vehicles. A more important point is, that these mobile missiles will greatly raise the deterrent power of the United States. The United States has always been trying to prevent the USSR from deploying its SS-24 multiple warhead mobile missiles because it thinks that such missiles are "particularly threatening in nature." So, as the "mixed deployment scheme" can be created, how can the United States prevent the birth of the SS-24?

Commentary Views Widening 'Crack' in NATO
HK1805082989 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 7 May 89 p 4

[*"Weekly Commentary" by Zhuang Hanlong: "Why Are There Cracks in NATO?"*]

[Text] While jubilantly entering its 40th year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) suddenly found a crack in its body. Moreover, the crack is widening as the

May summit meeting draws near. The blasting fuse causing dissension within NATO is whether or not the short-range missiles in Western Europe should be modernized.

The party headed by the United States stresses the necessity of modernizing NATO's nuclear forces in Europe including tactical air-to-ground missiles, the follow-up system of the 88 Lance short-range missile, and nuclear weapons.

The party headed by the FRG contends: There is no need to modernize short-range missiles; and, moreover, the number of battlefield nuclear weapons, in particular, nuclear guns, should be reduced.

One side favors strengthening and the other side advocates reduction. Hence, there is a contradiction. Why has this situation come about?

First, there are divergent views on the European situation in recent years. As the Soviet Union has taken numerous offensive moves for detente, such countries as the FRG think this is "a historic opportunity" to improve East-West relations. The FRG Government "has 'an attentive peaceful order plan' for uniting the whole of Europe." For this reason, the FRG Government asked the United States to agree to the Soviet proposal and to hold talks with the latter on the question of short-range missiles deployed by both sides in Europe. However, the United States has entirely different views. It contends: With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the main problem in Europe is that the Warsaw Pact's conventional armed forces far exceed those of NATO. This being the case, only when short-range missiles are modernized can this superiority of the Warsaw Pact be offset and a "strategy of flexible response" be pursued whenever necessary. Moreover, though Mikhail Gorbachev has great diplomatic charm, he will never make concessions on matters of vital importance. Therefore, we have to guard against the Soviet Union. If we negotiate with the Soviet Union on the question of short-range missiles, this will surely cause a chain reaction and we will fall into the trap of "a denuclearized Europe" premeditatedly set up by the Soviet Union.

Second, both sides have their own political needs. On the part of the United States, by modernizing short-range missiles, it will have a trump card with which to bargain with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, as long as Western Europe agrees to modernize short-range missiles, the United States will be able to ask Congress for more appropriations and continue to carry out trial manufacturing. On the part of the FRG, the Kohl government maintains: As the yearend general elections are near at hand, more and more people at home have demanded disarmament. If the modernization of short-range missiles is endorsed, this can only invite greater dissatisfaction from voters. Moreover, Lance short-range missiles will not lag behind others for several years to

come. As such, it is not necessary to make a provocative decision at present. There is a deeper meaning in this aspect. The short-range missiles of the Warsaw Pact and NATO are deployed mostly in the GDR and FRG. Once a war breaks out, aren't these the two countries which will go under? Thinking of this, Kohl is unwilling to go ahead with the modernization program with enthusiasm.

To iron out differences, soon after the Bush administration assumed office, it dispatched State Secretary James Baker to Western Europe to go about drumming up support for the idea of modernizing short-range missiles in West Germany and other countries but this accomplished nothing. Later on, the FRG also sent a special envoy to the White House but similarly, it also failed to persuade Uncle Sam. While neither side was willing to budge from its original position, some days ago British Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher personally went to FRG to meet Chancellor Kohl. It turned out that Mrs Thatcher and Kohl admitted that they have "not yet managed to quash the dispute that is apt to cause division over the question of short-range missiles." After seeing Mrs Thatcher off, Chancellor Kohl hurriedly went to Italy. The Italian Government gave its support right away to the FRG Government's position on the question of short-range missiles. Hence, the crack in NATO is evident. The United States and Britain persist in modernizing short-range missiles and those which tend to hold this idea are the Netherlands and Canada. The FRG opposes the modernization of short-range missiles and has the support of most NATO European member-states in this regard. In the face of this fact unseen in the last 4 decades, the United States is both annoyed and unhappy. Nevertheless, just getting angry will not help solve the problems. In the last few days, Chancellor Kohl persistently said: We hope the United States and other countries will consider "our special circumstances." Whether this crack in NATO can be narrowed and even "healed" depends on the result of the summit meeting scheduled to be held at the end of this month.

U.S.-FRG Rift over SNF Issue Seen as Serious
HK1705050989 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO
in Chinese 11 May 89 p 3

[Article by Sai Bei in "International Outlook" column:
"A Rift in NATO"]

[Text] The controversy between the United States and West Germany over modernizing short-range guided-missiles has caused a deep rift within the NATO camp.

On the surface, the rift between the two nations is not serious. West Germany wants to postpone the study of short-range guided-missile modernization problems to 1992, while the United States wants it immediately. West Germany's reasons are: All such missiles are deployed on its land, and as the present East-West relations are easing up, the people of West Germany are opposed to continued deployment of this kind of strategic nuclear weapon, much less increasing their killing

power and their firing range. In view of next year's election in the Bundesrat, the Kohl government is not willing to risk losing votes over its support of the U.S. scheme of modernizing short-range missiles. The United States, however, regards the Soviet Union as still having superiority in conventional armament in Europe and, to maintain nuclear deterrent power against the Soviet Union after the U.S. and Soviet demolition of intermediate-range missiles, feels it is imperative to modernize short-range guided missiles. On this point, however, it does not seem that there is any contradiction between West Germany and the United States. Kohl has said at a West German assembly that he is "opposed to total elimination of strategic nuclear weapons when there is a contrast in the present European military strengths.

Is the divergence between West Germany and United States over modernizing the short-range guided missiles therefore merely a problem that has existed for years, or one that cropped up only in recently? Neither one seems to be entirely the case.

A government announcement made by Kohl at the end of last month at the West German Bundesrat stated that by 1992 a unified, internal market for the European Community will have been established, and "Europe will enter a new era." "The first opportunity since the end of the Second World War for us to shake off the shadow of East-West conflicts." Kohl held that the new Soviet policy will "foster new and wide-ranging opportunities and prospects for creating East-West relations in the future," expressing also the West German government's determination to "cooperate with the Soviet Union," "to build up our bilateral relations" and "prospects for European peace and security" on a long-term basis. Though the announcement made no mention of the problems of short-range guided missiles, in effect it revealed the West German government's attitude and its background concerning this issue.

What the United States is worried about is this new eastern policy of West Germany. Now that the West Germany has the approval of over half the NATO countries, such as Belgium, judging the way things go, by 1992 the U.S.-West Europe partner relations as maintained by NATO will be replaced by the European unified market and competition created by the U.S.-Canadian free trade alliance. 1992 is the year of general elections in the United States. A NATO covered with cracks and a Soviet policy with the support of West Europe will be extremely unfavorable to Bush's re-election. The United States has exerted enormous pressure on West Germany through Britain. But so far West Germany has resisted continuing to "play its role of yes-man" receiving orders from Washington.

How the future unfolds will depend on the 29 May NATO head conference, where it will be seen whether a compromise program which can save everybody's face

can be reached. However, even if a compromise is made, now that the rift is there, it will not be easy to make it disappear.

'News Analysis' on NATO Short-Range Missiles
HK1805093389 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO
in Chinese 12 May 89 p 3

["News Analysis" by staff reporter Zhang Qixin: "A Dispute Over Short-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Dispatch from Washington, 8 May—Over the past 10 days or so, land-based short-range nuclear missiles have become the focal point of a heated dispute among the NATO countries. On 27 April, at a Bundestag session, FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl asserted that he hoped that the United States will soon hold talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear shells. The United States immediately expressed its displeasure with Helmut Kohl's remarks and reiterated its strong opposition to any talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles, saying that as long as the Warsaw Pact maintains its superiority in conventional arms, the United States will not hold talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles. As soon as the dispute between the United States and West Germany came to light, Britain expressed its support of the U.S. position whereas many other NATO countries expressed their support of the FRG proposal. The arguments of the United States and West Germany can be boiled down to the following: While the United States believes that any talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles is a "dangerous trap," which would deprive NATO of its nuclear deterrent and put NATO countries under the constant threat of the Warsaw Pact's superior conventional arms, West Germany believes that talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles will significantly lower the level of the ongoing nuclear arms race between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and win greater safety for NATO.

This dispute between the United States and West Germany is of profound significance. Except for nuclear shells, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two confrontational big military blocs, possess different quantities of short-range nuclear missiles, whose range of fire is less than 500 kilometers. Since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the treaty on dismantling medium-range and medium-short-range nuclear missiles in December 1987, the issue of short-range nuclear missiles has remained an outstanding issue in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on reducing nuclear arms deployed in Europe. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proposed holding talks with the United States to settle the issue of short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe. Nevertheless, there has been disagreement among NATO countries on this issue. Due to various factors, NATO has thus far adopted the following stand: Considering the imbalance in the conventional arms between East and West, NATO should continue to adhere to its traditional

"flexible response" strategy—that is, to build a nuclear deterrent to counter a possible attack of conventional arms and refuse to hold any talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles. In the meantime, in order to maintain the effectiveness of its "flexible response" strategy, NATO has also decided in principle to update its existing short-range nuclear missiles. Nevertheless, over the past few years, changes have taken place in Europe, especially since last December when Soviet Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a unilateral reduction of the Soviet conventional forces deployed in Europe and later proposed cutting the size of the Soviet conventional forces by a large margin. These latest developments have indeed provided a new opportunity for easing tension and alleviating military confrontation in Europe. Therefore, soon after George Bush became the new President of the United States, the new U.S. Secretary of State James Baker started touring NATO countries. During his visit to various NATO countries, the central topic for discussion was whether or not NATO will continue to update its existing short-range nuclear missiles and whether or not NATO should hold talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles. After taking into account the feelings of the West European allies, U.S. President George Bush has made certain readjustments in his policy. For instance, President George Bush has agreed to postpone updating NATO's existing short-range nuclear missiles until 1990, a time when West Germany has completed its next general election. However, President George Bush still insists on not holding talks with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles.

In this internal NATO dispute, West Germany has had its own reasons to bear the brunt. Insofar as West Germany is concerned, public opinion has always been very sensitive toward any type of nuclear deployment on the West German territory, for the West Germans clearly know that any use of the nuclear weapons deployed on the West German territory will doubtlessly and directly threaten the safety of West Germany. Therefore, all the political parties in West Germany have always stood for talks to be held between the United States and the Soviet Union on reducing or even dismantling short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe. Since West Germany will hold its general election in 1990, the West German Government has been compelled to make clear its attitude on the issue of short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe. As a matter of fact, this is not merely a dispute between the United States and West Germany, for a large number of other NATO countries have also become involved in this dispute. One obvious reason is that various NATO countries have thus far failed to reach a consensus in their appraisal of the European situation. Some NATO countries hold that NATO should not hesitate to grasp the new opportunity for European disarmament whereas other NATO countries, the United States in particular, have adopted a more cautious attitude on this issue, believing that so long as the Warsaw Pact still maintains superiority in

conventional arms, short-range nuclear missiles are still a means of maintaining a military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the United States also fears that any talks with the Soviet Union on reducing short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe will give rise to a stronger demand for dismantling all short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe. However, this attitude has already caused controversy in Washington's political circles. Some politicians in Washington have already started criticizing the Bush Administration, saying that it has been over-cautious and has

been lacking in courage and resourcefulness on the question of short-range nuclear missiles.

From 29 to 30 May, all 16 NATO members are scheduled to hold a summit meeting in Brussels. It is widely believed that if the current dispute between the United States and West Germany over the issue of short-range nuclear missiles fails to be settled in the upcoming summit, not only NATO's unity but also NATO's future strategy and negotiation principle will doubtlessly be adversely affected.

NORTH KOREA

South Korea Said Involved in U.S. 'Biochemical Weapons' Research

SK1505151589 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1458 GMT 15 May 89

[Text] Pyongyang May 15 (KCNA)—It has been revealed that the U.S. imperialists have inveigled South Korea into their criminal research and development of biochemical weapons, a report says.

According to an information sent recently by the "Hangyore Publicity Center in Americas" to the "National Alliance of the Movement for the Nation and Democracy" ("Chonminnyon"), the medical research and development headquarters of the U.S. Army department committed to research groups of 21 U.S. universities in top secrecy the research and development of weapons to be used in biological and chemical warfare, in which the surgical college of Koryo University of South Korea is included. Still more intolerable is the fact that the work of "danger item 1" which is the most dangerous of the items assigned was allotted to this surgical college.

The fact that the U.S. imperialists are dragging South Korea into the criminal research and development of biochemical weapons banned by international law shows that they intend to reduce South Korea not only to a hotbed of a nuclear war but also to a hotbed of germ and chemical warfare.

Notably the fact that the U.S. imperialists have allotted to South Korea an item of fatal danger proves that they are seeking the completion of mass destruction weapons at the sacrifice of South Korea, their colony.

MONGOLIA

Reportage on Soviet Troop Withdrawal Beginning 15 May

USSR's General Grinkevich Gives Figures

OW1205192389 Beijing XINHUA in English
1901 GMT 12 May 89

[Text] Moscow, May 12 (XINHUA)—The Soviet Union will begin withdrawing its troops from Mongolia on May 15, a senior officer announced here tonight.

Colonel-General Dmitriy Grinkevich told the official Soviet news agency TASS that next Monday the first tank and air defense units will be heading for the Soviet city of Kyakhta by rail from the Mongolian stations of Erdenet and Choyr.

A tank division will be disbanded, some types of hardware will be used for civilian purposes and weapons, and military hardware will be mothballed, he said.

During the 1989-90 period, the Soviet Union will pull out from Mongolia some 50,000 men, more than 850 tanks, nearly 1,100 infantry vehicles and troop carriers, more than 820 different artillery systems, and 190 planes and 130 helicopters, said Grinkevich, who is also chief of the Soviet Army General Staff.

"We hope that our actions will serve to promote trust, good neighbourly relations and peaceful operation in this large Asian region," he said.

Mongolian Paper UNEN Cited

OW1405005889 Beijing XINHUA in English
1546 GMT 13 May 89

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, May 13 (XINHUA)—The first group of Soviet Army tank divisions and anti-air artillery and rocket units will be pulled out of Mongolia beginning Monday, the Mongolian party's newspaper "UNEN" reported today.

The move is seen as a Soviet gesture to improve Sino-Soviet relations on the eve of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing Monday.

The Soviet Union is expected to withdraw from Mongolia 850 tanks, 1,100 armored personnel carriers and combat vehicles, 820 cannons and guns, some 190 fighter planes and 130 helicopters during 1989-1990, the paper said.

About 75 percent of the Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia will return to their homeland in the next two years.

Withdrawal Begins

OW1505114889 Ulaanbaatar International Service
in English 0810 GMT 15 May 89

[Text] Today, on May 15th, the first detachments of a Soviet tank division and antiaircraft troops are leaving northern Mongolian city of Erdenet and southern city of Choyr. This is the start of the withdrawal of Soviet military contingents from Mongolia.

Altogether more than 50,000 troops will be withdrawn from Mongolia between 1989-1990, together with hundreds and thousands of pieces of military hardware.

Officials Attend Erdenet Send-Off

OW1605074789 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in Russian
1333 GMT 15 May 89

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 15 May (MONTSAME)—A train carrying a tank regiment left Erdenet city today for the Soviet Union. This marked the beginning of the earlier announced withdrawal of a considerable part of the Soviet troops temporarily deployed on MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] territory at the invitation of the Mongolian Government.

The regiment departing today is part of a tank division whose withdrawal from the MPR will be completed in August this year. Overall more than 50,000 Soviet troops will return home from Mongolia during the 1989-90 period. More than 850 tanks, about 1,100 infantry combat vehicles [BMP] and armored personnel carriers, more than 820 various artillery systems, nearly 190 aircraft, and 130 helicopters will be returned to USSR territory.

A friendship meeting and solemn send-off for the Soviet troops was held at the Erdenet city railway station.

The meeting was addressed by Colonel General J. Yondon, MPR minister of defense; Lieutenant General I.T. Rymarev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Order of Lenin Transbaykal Military District; V.I. Sitnikov, USSR ambassador to the MPR; and representatives of the public of Erdenet city and Soviet troops. The speakers emphasized that the decision of the MPR and USSR Governments to withdraw a considerable part of the Soviet troops from the MPR represents a concrete step on the path toward strengthening confidence in the Asian-Pacific Region (ATR) and is a practical result of the new political thinking advocated by the Soviet Union.

Comrade J. Yondon noted in particular that the beginning of the Soviet troop withdrawal is an act of goodwill, an expression of the principled position of the MPR and USSR who strive toward relations of good-neighborliness and confidence and strengthening trust in the ATR. He expressed great gratitude to the Soviet troops who have made a worthy contribution to ensuring the security of Mongolia and strengthening the traditional fraternal bonds of friendship between the people and Armed Forces of the two countries.

The Soviet military doctrine today is organically inscribed in the new political thinking, whose main provisions are directed at eliminating war from the life of mankind, consolidating international security and stability, Lt Gen I.T. Rymarev, chief of the Political Directorate of the Transbaykal Military District stressed.

A commemorative Red Banner of the MPR Ministry of Defense was presented to the Soviet Army tank regiment. The state anthems of the MPR and USSR and "Internationale" were played. The Soviet tank troops and MPA [Mongolian People's Army] soldiers bid farewell. The send-off for the Soviet troops who honorably fulfilled their internationalist duty turned into a vivid demonstration of fraternal friendship between the Mongolian and Soviet peoples and combat cooperation of their Armed Forces.

The solemn send-off for the Soviet troops was attended by T. Namsray, member of the Politburo and secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary party]; Major General L.S. Mayorov, commander of Soviet

troops in the MPR, as well as a group of public observers on the reduction of Soviet Armed Forces and arms.

The train began its journey. Bon voyage.

First Detachments Cross Border into Siberia

*OW1705144689 Ulaanbaatar International
Service in English 0810 GMT 17 May 88*

[Text] The first detachments of Soviet troops withdrawn from the Mongolian People's Republic arrived at the border station of Naushki in Soviet Siberia. Inhabitants of this village and the old Siberian town of Kyakhta gathered at the station to welcome the returning soldiers.

More than a quarter of all Soviet troops plan to be pulled out from Mongolia during 1989 and 1990 would have returned home by the end of this year [as heard]. A partial withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in the Mongolian People's Republic is a demonstration of a new political thinking of Soviet and Mongolian leadership, said chairman of the public observation group of the reduction of Soviet Armed Forces and armaments Rogov in an interview with the MONTSAME News Agency. The implementation of the defensive military doctrine of the idea of the reasonable military sufficiency and the transition over to the insurance of defense capability of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community are impossible without resolute actions, including unilateral reduction and withdrawal of troops, said Rogov. He and the other members of the group were observing the withdrawal of first Soviet military units from the northern Mongolian town of Erdenet.

THAILAND

Further Reaction to U.S. Warning on Workers at Libya Chemical Plant

Prime Minister Sees 'No Problem' for Workers

*BK1305034489 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
13 May 89 p 2*

[Text] Chiang Mai—Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said yesterday he foresaw no problems for Thai workers in Libya.

Thailand and Libya have good bilateral ties, he said, and he was sure problems could be sorted out in discussions.

Gen Chatchai was responding to reports Libya had threatened to expel all Thais if the 300 working on the building the Al-Rabitah factory, accused by the United States of producing chemical weapons, are moved out.

A government official said yesterday that the United States urged Thailand to withdraw the workers in a letter to the Foreign Ministry shortly before the visit of US Vice President Dan Quayle on May 3.

The official said Thailand was resisting the request after Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's government threatened to expel all 75,000 Thais working in Libya if the chemical plant workers were withdrawn.

The official, who did not wish to be named, said the letter accused Thailand of providing equipment as well as manpower for the Al-Rabitah chemical plant. Libya denies the plant makes weapons.

"Our position is to be flexible because our interests are at stake. Libya also warned us that if we evacuate 300 labourers from the plant we have to take all 75,000 workers home," said the official, who denied Thailand supplied equipment to the plant.

Thailand, though a military ally of the United States, condemned the 1986 US bombing of Libya at hitting what the US considered terrorist targets.

The official said Gen Chatchai would take a final decision on how to respond to the US letter but he would probably decide against pulling the workers out.

Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said yesterday the US had only warned the Government of the danger to Thais if the factory was bombed.

ACM [Air Chief Marshal] Sitthi said government agencies are only scheduled to consider what action to take if Thai workers had to leave like the case of Singapore.

He said, however, the situation had not yet reached that stage, and the Labour Department was considering the issue and will discuss the matter with the Foreign Ministry.

After both agencies consider the issue, the matter will be forwarded to the prime minister, ACM Sitthi said.

Meanwhile, Labour Department deputy director Prasong Rannanon said no more than 25,000 Thais work in Libya and not 75,000 as claimed by job placement agencies.

Of the total, said Mr Prasong, 300 Thais work on the Al-Rabitah plant. Mr Prasong said workers evacuated from Libya would face unemployment problems at home.

The chief of the department's Overseas Thai Workers Service Division, Rangsarit Chanthararat, will discuss the evacuation question with Foreign Ministry officials on Monday.

Sources said Libya had given Thai workers high wages and satisfactory welfare benefits and the employees had made no complaints.

Workers at Al-Rabitah May Choose

BK1505030889 Bangkok THE NATION in English
15 May 89 p 2

[Text] Thailand would ask Libya soon to let 300 Thai workers at its alleged chemical arms complex choose between returning home or staying in the area threatened with possible US or Israeli attacks, government sources said yesterday.

Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan would make the request if the Cabinet approves the idea, the sources told THE NATION.

The proposal to allow the Thai workers to decide whether to leave Libya was made during a consultation between Chatchai and his personal aides in Chiang Mai over the weekend, said the sources who requested anonymity.

Chatchai, according to the sources, believed that the Libyan government would accept the request.

High-ranking officials said Thailand has been pressed by the U.S. to evacuate the workers from the chemical complex at Al-Rabitah, 80 kilometres south of Tripoli, the Libyan capital. The complex is identified by Washington as a chemical arms plant which should be destroyed.

The Foreign Ministry had earlier consulted with Libyan authorities on the safety of the Thais in Al-Rabitah, but Libyan authorities, who deny the American allegation, threatened recently to expel all Thai workers in the Middle East country if Thailand evacuates its 300 employees at the chemical plant. Libya claims about 75,000 Thais are working in the country, but Thai figures are much lower—between 20,000-30,000. The conflicting figures were blamed on inadequate information from private agencies exporting Thai labour to Libya.

The sources said the government would also ask Tripoli to ensure that workers who want to stay on at the controversial complex are given appropriate protection, as well as adequate compensation for death and injuries in case the complex is attacked.

Chatchai is expected to discuss the proposal with members of his Cabinet, especially Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila, said the sources. They added that the request might be sent to Libya through both formal and informal diplomatic channels.

The THAI NEWS AGENCY quoted a job placement agency as proposing that Thai workers at Al-Rabitah be moved to other towns in Libya instead of being sent home.

The job agency, which was not identified, was quoted as saying that sending the Thais home would only prompt Libya to order all the Thai workers in the Middle East country to leave.

Meanwhile, Kasit Phirom, director general of the International Organizations Department, will today meet with representatives from the National Security Council and the Labour Department to discuss "technical aspects" of the problem and propose options to the government.

A Foreign Ministry source said that today's meeting will focus on how to evacuate the Thais from Al-Rabitah and possible consequences of the evacuation.

The workers in Libya sent home an estimated Bt [baht]10 billion annually.

Some senior officials said the Libyan government's threat to expel all Thai workers is considered the biggest crisis concerning Thailand's labour export. Another major crisis in last March involved the massive repatriation of more than 9,600 Thai workers from Singapore which had imposed tough penalties on illegal immigrants.

Union Officials Comment

BK1305125489 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
13 May 89 p 23

[Text] Commenting on the U.S. request that Thailand move its workers out of the Libyan plant, Thanong Pho-an, senator and president of the Labor Congress of Thailand, said that the United States was tough and demanding. He wondered whether Thailand could cope with the pressure of bringing back the 78,000 workers. He said that the four labor unions will hold a meeting to adopt countermeasures, and that they also plan to send a letter to the government asking it to make clear Thailand's position. Thanong said that the United States just wanted to prevent Libya from having a weapons plant despite the fact that the factory has been established for years and that it employs workers from other countries, including India and Sri Lanka. Thanong wondered who would take responsibility for the workers if they are moved out.

Aphinan Buranaphong, vice chairman of the Siamese Muslim League, commented during an interview that the U.S. request was a threat to the Thai Government and reflected U.S. intentions of aggression against Libya. The United States does not want Libya to have a weapons factory, but it is Libya's right to set up an arms factory for self-protection. It would be very cruel if anything happened like when the United States attacked Japan. Aphinan said the Siamese Muslim League did not approve the plan that would make the Thai workers unemployed. The league is contacting its agents in Libya for facts and information before sending a protest to the United States.

Libyan Envoy Requests Meeting

BK1405100189 Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai
14 May 89 pp 1, 24

[Text] Following a report on the U.S. warning to Thailand to move its workers out of the chemical weapons complex at Al-Rabitah before the plant is bombed, and Libya's threat to expel Thai workers—claimed by Libya to number some 75,000—from the country if Thailand decided to pull its workers out from Al-Rabitah, our correspondent further reported that a high-level Foreign Ministry official on 13 May said that the Libyan ambassador to the Philippines who also looks after Libya's interests in Thailand, had contacted the Foreign Ministry requesting a meeting this week with Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan. The ambassador did not indicate the purpose of the visit. The Foreign Ministry, however, believes that the ambassador will ask Thailand not to pull its workers out of the Al-Rabitah plant because this would affect operations of the factory.

Kasit Phirom, director general of the International Organization Department, said that on 15 May at 1400 there will be a meeting of officials in charge of Thai workers in Libya at the conference room of the department on Si Ayutthaya Road. These officials will exchange information on Thai workers now in Libya in order to get the facts of the actual situation because, as it stands now, there are conflicting reports about the Thai workers there. For example, reports on the number of workers vary from 25,000 to 75,000. An accurate assessment is therefore necessary for higher authorities to make a decision on the problem. Kasit said that after the meeting on Monday it should be known what direction will be taken.

Prasong Rananan, deputy director general of the Labor Department, told newsmen on the same day that the department will send Rangarit Chantharat, director of the Overseas Labor Management Office, to attend the meeting on Monday. He said that there were a total of about 25,000 Thai workers in Libya during the period from 1976 to 1988. He did not know from which source the 75,000 figure was based on.

Asked whether applications of the Thai workers had been checked prior to leaving for Libya [to see if they were applying to work at the Al-Rabitah factory], Prasong told reporters that workers who initially applied to work at a certain place in Libya are not forbidden to work at other places. This could be prevented if workers were required to sign contracts not to seek jobs elsewhere. Anyway, Prasong said such a practice would be disadvantageous to workers because they would be deprived of the chance to apply for other jobs once the projects they were hired for were completed.

"This is interesting. We should be rather strict regarding contracts to work in a country with a lot of problems like

Libya. I have told the director of the Overseas Labor Management Office to take this point into consideration," Prasong said.

Meanwhile, Siri Kewalinsarit, director general of the Labor Department, declined to make any comment on this issue, saying he would like to have more details on the matter and wait until after the meeting with the Foreign Ministry on Monday [15 May].

Our correspondent reported that, according to a senior Foreign Ministry official, the problem is not new. It is known that the company in charge of sending Thai workers to work at the Al-Rabitah plant in Libya is the S.P.C. Supphachok Company at 1/4 Group 6, Sirapsuk Village, Sichan Lane, Wiphawadi Ransit Road, which is near Lak Si intersection. The owner of the company is Uthai Thiambunkit, a 45-year-old man who on 12 January 1989 was arrested by a police team led by Police Colonel Khamnung Thammakasem. After a search of his house, police confiscated four [as published] items which were later identified by Police Lieutenant Colonel Wanchai Premrudi of the Quartermaster Division as 17 pieces of aerial bomb moldings, 11 pieces of metal, and 1 piece of metal chassis. Pol Lt Col Wanchai said that the 11 pieces of metal could be rocket tails or aerial bombs. The case of Uthai Thiambunkit is still pending.

Paper Criticizes U.S. Warning

*BK1405132789 Bangkok MATICHON in Thai
13 May 89 p 8*

[Editorial: "Thailand, United States, and Libyan Heat"]

[Text] The United States is trying by all means to stop Libya from building the chemical complex at Al-Rabitah. Although Libya says that it is an ordinary chemical factory, the United States insists that it is a chemical weapons plant. The United States said it must prevent Libya from having such a plant because Libya supports international terrorism. The United States has pressured its friendly allies, such as the FRG, to take action against companies or persons found responsible for exporting equipment to the chemical complex in Libya.

The United States has tried everything possible to get what it wants. The strongest measure used was a threat to bomb the chemical complex, the same method once used by Israel when it bombed Iraq's nuclear power plant which Israel claimed was manufacturing nuclear bombs for use against Israel.

Hostility between the United States and Libya caused trouble for Thailand when the United States asked Thailand to evacuate its workers from the plant at Al-Rabitah because they risked being in danger from a U.S. bombing. Libya, meanwhile, told Thailand that it would expel all Thai workers from Libya if Thailand removed its workers from the plant.

According to reports, there are tens of thousands of Thai workers in Libya. The Labor Department said there are 15,000 in Libya, and 300 at Al-Rabitah. Labor sources in the private sector, however, claimed that there are 75,000 Thai workers in Libya. Libya is a major source of income for Thai overseas workers. Can Thailand stand to lose this source of labor export income again, after doing so in Singapore?

The question is, how will the Thai Government deal with this problem? If Thailand evacuates workers from Al-Rabitah, it will have to take all Thai workers out of Libya. This will be a big and costly burden, more costly than the recent evacuation of Thai workers from Singapore since Libya is not as close to Thailand as Singapore is. Will the United States help Thailand evacuate its workers from Libya? The entire burden will fall on the Thai Government as it did during the Singapore incident.

Is it right for the United States to bomb Libya's chemical plant? Certainly the world will not support such a move in which the United States resorts to big power policy. It would be the same as with the protest at the UN General Assembly against the U.S. bombing of military targets in Libya. The United States should stop playing the role of world policeman since nobody ever assigned that job to them.

As for the Thai Government, it should pay attention to the welfare of the Thai people. Thai labor is entitled by right to be employed in Libya. Thailand should not pay too much attention to the U.S. threat. Although it may not want Libya to have a chemical plant, the United States has no right to bomb any people, Libyan or Thai. The United States definitely has no right and no justification for such an action.

Foreign Minister Interviewed

*BK1305093889 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai
0000 GMT 13 May 89*

[Excerpt] Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila granted an interview with reporters at the Chiang Mai Plaza Hotel yesterday regarding the U.S. warning for Thailand to evacuate Thai workers from a chemical plant in Libya because they could be in danger. Sitthi said that there are about 300 to 400 Thai workers at the plant. The United States has warned that the plant may be bombed, and that it may be in violation of a ban on producing chemical weapons. The Foreign Ministry has informed the prime minister of the matter, and the agencies concerned, such as the National Security Council and the Labor Department, will meet to discuss ways to solve the problem. Sitthi said that the evacuation of the workers from the plant would probably not affect the other Thai laborers working in Libya, which total about 25,000. [passage omitted]

Labor Officials Comment

BK1605075189 Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai
16 May 89 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Thanong Pho-an, senator and concurrently president of the Labor Congress of Thailand, has charged that the United States is using its influence to unfairly pressure Thailand [to withdraw Thai workers from the chemical plant in Al-Rabitah, Libya], as it did earlier in the intellectual property issue and the threat to apply Section 301 of the trade act. The U.S. pressure on Thailand to withdraw workers from Libya will deprive Thailand of revenue, Thanong said, adding that the U.S. action is excessive.

Thanong asked: Who would assume the responsibility if tens of thousands of Thai workers have to leave Libya? Would the United States hire these workers? Thailand should not recall workers from Libya because it is the privilege of Thai workers to work anywhere they wish abroad. He added that soon, four Thai labor congresses will submit a protest note to the United States and will lay black wreaths in front of the U.S. Embassy.

Ekachai Ekhanakom, secretary general of a state enterprises employee relations group, said he despised the U.S. method, charging that nobody has appointed the United States as an international policeman, but it is acting like one. Its action is more like international hooliganism. The U.S. intention to bomb the Libyan plant is wrong, but pressuring Thailand is worse. Ekachai said that although he is not involved in labor affairs in the private sector, he condemns the U.S. action and is ready to join other private labor groups in their anti-U.S. demonstrations.

Former Prime Minister on Libyan, U.S. Threats

BK1205155589 Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai
12 May 89 p 9

["Soi Suan Phlu" Column by M.R. Khukrit Pramot, former prime minister]

[Text] Thailand is facing the dilemma of a situation that has come about in Libya which causes Thailand much concern.

The United States has charged that a big plant in Libya, about 80 km from the Libyan capital, is a chemical weapons plant. But Libya has rejected the charges, saying that it is just a big pharmaceutical manufacturing plant. However, the United States does not believe Libya's explanation and has threatened that it will blow up the plant if Libya does not stop its construction.

The Thai people will go to work anywhere if they are offered jobs with good pay so that they can send money back home for their parents or families to repay their debts or can earn money to save to make a living when they return home. They work with a hope for their

future. As overseas jobs are lucrative enough, the Thai people volunteer to work in foreign countries, especially in the Middle East.

Some 75,000 Thais are now working in Libya. At first, the Labor Department said the number of Thai people working in Libya is only 25,000. But now the department seems to accept that the number of 75,000 is correct. Among the Thai workers in Libya, 300 of them are working at the alleged plant. The United States has told Thailand it would give Thailand an advance notice if it decided to bomb the plant so that Thai workers could be evacuated in time and would not be in danger from the U.S. attack which would be devastating. This issue was left at that.

When the United States said that or issued such a threat, Libya, which is an enemy of the United States, also threatened that if Thailand wanted to withdraw the 300 Thai workers from the plant, Libya would expel all the 75,000 Thai workers from the country.

This issue can be considered a big problem at the present time because the Thai Government would have to be responsible for the jobs of the 75,000 overseas Thai workers. At the same time, the government also would have to protect the lives of the 300 Thai workers at the chemical plant. The government would have to take the responsibility if they are in danger because the U.S. Government has already warned that it would blow up the plant and has asked the Thai Government to evacuate the 300 Thai workers. But the government is also facing the threat from Libya that it would expel all Thai workers from its country. What should the Thai Government do?

I felt anxious for the government. I have heard from some government officials that the Thai Government should be as flexible as possible dealing with this issue. It means that it will think of a solution when the problem arises. But, if some are killed or when the 75,000 workers are expelled, I wonder how it can still be flexible.

Another official view is that Thailand should stand opposed to violence and international terrorism. Such an opinion does not seem to be flexible, but only tough, and is identical to the U.S. stand.

It seems that we have to pray the guardian spirit of the country to help solve the problem facing the Thai workers so that nobody will lose his interest and be in danger.

The United States has been in enmity with Libya for a long time because the United States has charged that Libya is the source of international terrorism, such as bombings at various cities and bombings of passenger planes as well as the murders of important persons of foreign countries. But Libya has denied the accusations all the time, saying that it knows nothing about them. For the plant that the United States is thinking to destroy, Libya has said that it is merely a pharmaceutical

manufacturing factory and it does not produce weapons or any harmful products. Who should we listen to? Thailand is friendly with both the United States and Libya. So, it would feel uneasy on this issue. More importantly, Libya is a rich country from selling crude oil and has sent money to help Muslims in other countries. The amount of money that Libya has sent to assist Muslims in other countries is not small. In the eyes of the Americans, the funds are for the purpose of terrorism.

I have known a foreign ambassador who had been based in Libya before coming to Bangkok. One day I invited him to talk about the situation in Libya.

He told me that the general living situation in Libya is very good. The Libyans have very high incomes and have a high purchasing power to buy high-class goods for use. Foreigners working in Libya also benefit from them. He also said that peace and order in Libya is very secure. There are no robberies, only a few violent quarrels. In general, the life of the people in Libya is safe and happy and it abounds with everything.

I told the ambassador out of my curiosity that I had learned that there have always been violence and terrorism in Libya. The ambassador told me that this is not true. Libya is a country in peaceful order. Violence and terrorism are only export products of Libya—they do not commit such things inside the country, but merely export them to other countries.

I could only feel sad after listening to the ambassador. However, Thailand has never imported violence and terrorism from other countries. There is no point of wasting time in thinking about a trade deficit caused by imports of such goods.

Official Says Weapons Produced at Plant
*BK1705062389 Bangkok TNA in English 0453 GMT
17 May 89*

[Text] Bangkok, May 17 (OANA-TNA)—Up till now, Thailand has yet to evacuate about 300 of its workers at an alleged chemical arms complex in Libya, the director-general of the Labour Department Siri Kewalinsarit said here Tuesday.

Siri said the evacuation of Thai workers at Al-Rabitah, 80 kms south of Tripoli, depended on the decision of higher level in the government.

The U.S. authorities want Thailand to remove all of its workers from the alleged chemical plant at Al-Rabitah, which is a possible target of U.S and Israeli air attacks while Libya threatened to send all of Thai workers home if those at the plant were withdrawn.

Siri said the Thai Embassy's labour attache in Athens, Greece, Pakon Amonchiwin, went to Libya to look into the safety of Thai workers there. He quoted Pakon as

saying that there are 25,000 Thais working in Libya. Instead of 75,000 as had been reported earlier.

Thai authorities now could locate the number and towns where Thai workers are working in Libya.

Apart from working at Al-Rabitah, Siri said most other Thai labourers work in road and building construction in that country and they are will recognition of their high craftsmanship. [sentence as received]

Meanwhile, Deputy Interior Minister Watthana Atsawahem confirmed that weapon productions at Al-Rabitah plant but he did not know specific kinds of weapons. [sentence as received] He added that there were many foreign workers in that complex.

Libyan Envoy Denies Expulsion Threat
*BK1705002589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
17 May 89 p 2*

[Text] Libyan Ambassador [title as published] to Manila Salim M. Adam last night implicitly denied that there had been any threats from his country to expel Thais if Thai workers leave the Al-Rabitah factory.

Ambassador Adam made the comment last night in an interview with the BANGKOK POST shortly after arriving at Don Muang Airport.

In response to a briefing by the POST that the United States had asked Thailand to withdraw its workers from the Al-Rabitah factory and that Libya had threatened to expel all Thais if Bangkok complied to American pressure, the ambassador said:

"This is only a question created by the media. I don't know where they got the news from. So far there's no problem with Thai workers in Libya.

"The (Thai workers) are really enjoying their stay and adjust (well) to the environment and culture there," the ambassador said.

The ambassador assured that if there is a threat of the United States or Israel bombing the Al-Rabitah factory or any other part of the country, his government would take care of Thai workers "even better than Libyans."

"They will be in a safe place in case of an American or Israeli attack," he said.

The Libyan envoy said he is visiting Bangkok for the first time and is bringing with him a letter from Libyan leader Mu'amar al-Qadhafi to Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan.

The ambassador is scheduled to meet the premier at Government House tomorrow.

Ambassador Adam said he could not reveal details of the letter to the premier so the Press would have to wait for details from the Thai authorities.

The ambassador said he saw no reason why the issue of Thai workers should be raised during his meeting with the premier.

He also confirmed that there are between 22,000 to 25,000 Thais working in his country.

Meanwhile Government spokesman Suwit Yotmani said yesterday that the Cabinet may discuss safety measures for Thai workers in Libya next week.

Dr Suwit said it was still too early for the Government to say what measures it would take to ensure the safety of the Thai workers, all of whom Libya has reportedly threatened to expel if the Kingdom caves in to US pressure to recall those working at a controversial chemical factory at Al-Rabitah.

Government agencies are consulting on the problem. "We will have to protect our interests because we are caught in the middle" of the conflict between the United States and Libya, he said.

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila said that at present there is no need to evacuate Thai workers from Al-Rabitah.

Newspapers Comment on U.S. 'Pressure'

BK1705122589

[Editorial report] During 15-17 May, Thai-language dailies Bangkok THAI RAT, BAN MUANG, and SIAM RAT carry comments on the issue involving U.S. pressure for Thailand to recall its construction workers from the Al-Rabitah plant which is an alleged site of chemical weapons plant in Libya.

THAI RAT's 15 May editorial, on page 3, entitled: "Do Not Provoke Hatred of the Thai People," begins by warning that it is unwise to provoke hatred of the Thai people, saying: "If the United States wants to apply pressure against Thailand over a certain issue it should do so at the Thai Government, not the Thai people, because once the issue is resolved it will be difficult to erase the hatred in the minds of the Thai people." The daily points out that Thai construction workers in Libya are merely doing menial and manual work at the instructions of foreign supervisors, and are not knowledgeable enough to know that they are building a chemical weapons plant.

SIAM RAT's 16 May article, on page 16, entitled: "About America and Thai Workers in Libya," reasons that the U.S. threat against the Libyan plant has been exaggerated by "those competing for interest over the export of Thai workers and construction materials to Libya." It continues: "It would be strange for the United

States to tell Thai workers to leave before bombing the Libyan plant because the warning will reach Libya and enables it to prepare in advance to defend the plant against the U.S. long-range missiles. But if the United States is naive enough to inform Thai workers before its attack, we should be just as naive and ask it to delay the attack until after Thai workers collect their pay upon completion of the construction and leave the site; the plant will still be there as the target.

"In this way labor relations between Thailand and Libya and Thai-U.S. relations will not be harmed, and a group of Thai job placement firms will continue to be able to collect their fees from Thai workers heading for jobs in Libya."

BAN MUANG's 16 May editorial, on page 3, entitled: "Chemical Weapons Plant," notes that Thailand will encounter a big problem if it has to transport all Thai workers in Libya back home. But it concludes: "The Thai Government could try to negotiate with the Libyan Government to allow the some 300-400 Thai construction workers at the chemical weapons plant to return home. However, this will automatically halt the plant construction and, for this reason, the negotiation is likely to fail. What can we do with the risk Thai workers face from a threat of destruction by a foreign force?"

SIAM RAT's 17 May, page 3 editorial, entitled: "Concerning Compassion," relates: "It is common knowledge the United States and Libya have been mutual enemies since Colonel al-Qadhafi came to power. Al-Qadhafi feels that the United States supports Israeli intimidation of Palestinians and other Middle East nations, thus financing all forms of overt and covert terrorism against the United States.

"The United States retaliates by trying to limit Libya's military development and thus spies on the Libyan armory. It claims that the Al-Rabitah plant is a site for manufacturing of chemical weapons which are banned by international law, and it intends to destroy it. This tantamounts to declaring war against Libya. But it happens that Thai workers are among the construction crew at the plant, thus the problem.

"The Thai Government is facing a great dilemma; it could not rush any decision because of the open hostility between the United States and Libya.

"We should now realize the extent of the problem caused by allowing Thai workers to work in unsafe places abroad. With this lesson, Thai workers, most of whom are ignorant, should be warned about the risks of jobs in dangerous locations.

"We could only hope that the United States will not rush to destroy the Al-Rabitah plant and that Libya will think about good relations with Thailand and does not resort to using Thai workers as pawns in negotiations.

"May God give compassion to those involved and make them realize the value of life of Thai workers."

Diplomatic Channels for Settlement Sought
BK1705113989 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in Thai
1030 GMT 16 May 89

[Text] Thailand is trying its best to coordinate with Libya and the United States through diplomatic and other channels to prevent negative effects on Thai workers in Libya.

Yesterday, at the International Organizations Department a meeting was held among officials from the Foreign Ministry, Labor Department, National Security Council, and Defense Ministry to discuss ways to resolve the problem concerning the Thai workers in Libya in case they have to be evacuated from that country. The first part of the meeting was held at the International Organizations Department; the second part at the National Security Council.

Montri Danphaibun, secretary to the foreign minister, briefed the press about the outcome of the meeting. He said the meeting discussed two aspects of how to solve the problem. The first is how to provide safety for the Thai workers in Libya, and the second how to avoid pressure from both the United States and Libya. Montri said that the Foreign Ministry, in coordination with the National Security Council, Interior Ministry, and Defense Ministry, is carrying out diplomatic initiatives with the United States and Libya to come up with a final decision that would best benefit Thailand and all Thai workers in Libya and the Middle East. This is because the problem is so delicate that any wrong decision could have broad negative effects not only on Thai workers in Libya but also all the other Thai workers in the Middle East.

Montri said that the meeting also discussed how to prevent damage to the good relations that Thailand has with the United States and Libya. We hope that in their action, the United States and Libya will be fair to the Thai workers, based on humanitarian principle and personnel safety.

Montri added that as an initial solution to the problem, Thailand had assigned the Thai Embassy in Athens—which is responsible for the welfare of the Thai workers in Libya—to send its officials to study the problem and the latest developments concerning the Thai workers in Al-Rabitah, where the United States has alleged they will manufacture chemical weapons. The officials were dispatched there in July when the problem surfaced and United States threatened to bomb Libya.

In addition, as previously reported, local job placement firms have been asked to inform the Thai workers at Al-Rabitah because they are directly responsible for the workers. Also, officials of the Thai labor office in Greece

will be sent to inform the Thai workers of the latest situation so that they may decide for themselves whether to remain at the plant.

Pratyathawi Tawethikun, deputy director of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department, said if some Thai workers insist on remaining at the plant in Libya even after they have been informed of the situation, Thailand would then have to urge the United States to solve the problem rationally. We do not support the use of violent methods, and the method that the United States is using is not right. There are still diplomatic measures that could be used to make Libya stop producing chemical weapons. A U.S. bombing will damage its image. We also believe that Libya will not use the Thai workers as hostages. In any event, on 19 May the Libyan ambassador to the Philippines, whose responsibilities include Thailand, will call on Prime Minister General Chatchai Chunhawan to discuss on the matter.

Pratyathawi said the officials sent from the Thai Labor Office in Greece will also be assigned to check the total number of Thai workers in Libya because the Libyan figure of 75,000 has yet to be confirmed. Another way to calculate the number of Thai workers in Libya is through their income sent to Thailand, a low figure would indicate that there are less than 75,000 Thai workers in Libya.

Prime Minister To Visit Libya
BK1805090089 Hong Kong AFP in English
0841 GMT 18 May 89

[Text] Bangkok, May 18 (AFP)—Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan has accepted an invitation from Libyan leader Colonel Mu'ammur al-Qadhafi to visit Libya, a government spokesman said Thursday.

Suwit Yotmani said the visit was agreed in principle when Mr. Chatchai met Libyan Ambassador to Manila Salem Adem [name as received] here Thursday. No date has been fixed but the visit would take place soon, he said.

Libya has no ambassador residing in Bangkok though their ambassador to Kuala Lumpur is accredited here.

"We are very happy that the prime minister has accepted the invitation," Mr. Adem said after his half-hour talks with Mr. Chatchai.

The two men met amid controversy over Thai workers reported to be employed at a chemical plant in Libya which the United States has said is producing chemical weapons.

Reports last week said some 300 Thais worked at the Al-Rabitah plant, 80 kilometres (50 miles) from Tripoli, and that Libya had threatened to expel around 25,000 Thai workers from the country if Bangkok bowed to U.S. pressure and withdrew its workforce from the plant.

Tripoli says the plant produces only pharmaceutical goods and denies that Thais are employed there. But officials here have repeatedly confirmed the reports of Thai workers at the plant and a deputy foreign minister accused Libya earlier this week of producing chemical weapons there.

Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila told reporters here Monday [15 May] he had received a "warning" letter from Washington urging Bangkok to withdraw the workers.

A ministry official, who requested anonymity, said Washington had accused Thailand of supplying both manpower and equipment for the plant.

"The United States started all this fuss by asking us to pull our workers out of the Al-Rabitah factory in the first place," a senior Thai Government official said. "Naturally, getting such a direct request from Washington worried us."

Mr. Adem told Mr. Chatchai that Tripoli did not intend to expel Thai workers from Libya, Mr. Suwit said.

"We have no problems about the Thai workers, and they have been adjusting to the environmental and cultural conditions in Libya and to the Libyan people, and they are very very happy," Mr. Adem said.

Mr. Adem said there were no Thai workers at Al-Rabitah, and that press reports of some 300 thais there were "old figures."

"We formerly had Thai construction workers at Al-Rabitah, but after completion, the medicine factory has been run by Libyans," he said.

"News that you read about Al-Rabitah producing chemical weapons is absolutely baseless and total rubbish. It was propaganda created by the Reagan government and Zionists to create a very very bad image for the Libyan people."

Editorial on Issue

BK1805004589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
18 May 89 p 8

[Editorial: "Thais in Libyan Chemical Complex Staying at Own Risk"]

[Text] A large number of hardy Thais have gone overseas to find jobs. Many of them would go wherever their employment agents send them. A few hundreds of Thai workers have ended up working in the mysterious Libyan chemical complex in Al-Rabitah, which the US strongly suspects is capable of producing chemical weapons and has threatened to destroy it.

Libya, of course, has denied it has any intention of producing illegal chemical weapons. But the US threat remains.

The US has quietly urged Thailand to warn all the Thais working in the Al-Rabitah chemical complex to leave their jobs; for otherwise they could be hurt in an air-strike against the chemical complex if the US resorts to this military action. Thailand, through its embassy in Athens, which looks after Thai interests in Libya, has informed the Thais in Al-Rabitah about the US warning. But few, if any at all, of them took the warning seriously.

Libya, on the other hand, has urged Thailand not to recall the Thai workers. There were also reports that Libya hinted that it might expel all Thai workers in that country if Thailand acted on the US warning and ordered the Thais to leave the Al-Rabitah chemical complex.

However, no one seems to know for sure how many Thais are working in the Al-Rabitah chemical complex, or in Libya as a whole. The Thai Labour Department estimates that 300 Thais, mostly construction workers, are in the chemical complex, and about 25,000 Thais in Libya. Some reports quoted Libyan authorities as putting the total of Thais in Libya between 70,000 and 75,000.

Even if there are only about 25,000 Thais in Libya, recalling the 300 Thais from the Al-Rabitah chemical complex will not make much difference because there will still be 24,700 Thais in the country which the US considers an enemy in an undeclared war. All these Thais wouldn't be completely safe unless they all leave Libya.

The departure of the Thais from either the Al-Rabitah chemical complex or Libya will not make much difference in the long run either because poor workers from other countries will likely rush in to fill all vacancies left behind by the Thais. Poor people everywhere are all alike: they need to make ends meet first and they don't have the luxury of worrying about possible danger from a US air strike, which may or may not happen.

This is why most of the Thais in Al-Rabitah chemical complex stay put. And this is why Thailand is not going to order them to leave.

The US-Libyan controversy over the Al-Rabitah chemical complex puts Thailand in a difficult position. Thailand is on good terms with both the US and Libya. Calling for an evacuation of the Thais from the Al-Rabitah chemical complex will certainly offend Libya and might even jeopardize the job security of the other tens of thousands of Thais in that country.

Notifying the Thais in the chemical complex of the US air-strike threat is thus the best Thailand could do. They are staying at their own risk.

However, a more effective way to disrupt the project—in case the US can really prove beyond any reasonable doubts that chemical weapons will be produced in Al-Rabitah is to put more pressure on the Western countries

to pull out their experts and technicians, whose expertise and skill are necessary in running the chemical complex.

If the US can justify an air strike against the Al-Rabitah chemical complex under the belief that it will produce chemical weapons. Libya too can justifiably retaliate by attacking all American chemical plants *known* to be producing components of chemical weapons for the US

armed forces and factories producing the warplanes used in attacking Libya. The undeclared war will escalate. The Thais in Libya would then be in peril, like all innocent bystanders in any conflict elsewhere.

We could only hope that the US and Libya will be able to settle this dispute without resorting to military action.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff Queried on Pact Military Doctrine

AU1705070989 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 14 May 89 p 3

[Interview with Army General Vladimir Lobov, commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, by Khristo Marinchev: "Along the Path of Reasonable Sufficiency" on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact—dispatched through NOVOSTI—date, place not given]

[Text] [Marinchev] Comrade Army General, it is beyond any doubt that the Warsaw Pact organization has constantly developed since its establishment. Can you describe the political and military-technical foundations of its present military doctrine?

[Lobov] The military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states is determined by the peace-loving, foreign, and constructive domestic policy of the socialist states. Their peoples have never needed and do not need any wars; they are neither interested in the arms race nor in intensifying international tension. The historical task of socialism is to preserve and consolidate peace.

All this is reflected in the political aspects of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states and in the doctrine of each single member country. The socialist countries wholeheartedly reject war as a means of resolving interstate conflicts.

The Warsaw Pact member states committed themselves to never, and under no circumstances, start military action against any country as long as they are not attacked. They have no territorial claims against any state in Europe or outside Europe, and they do not regard any country or nation whatsoever as an enemy.

These postulates determine the defensive nature of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, as well as the military-technical aspect of this doctrine. In accordance with this doctrine, preventing war is the basic task of the allied states and of their Armed Forces. Under the circumstances of the existing military danger, however, the other task of the Warsaw Pact member states and of their Armed Forces is to repel aggression against any member state. For this reason, our member states maintain the number of their Armed Forces and their quality at the level required for defensive purposes.

[Marinchev] Can you describe the organizational principles of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces under the conditions of the new defense doctrine?

[Lobov] The principle of reasonable sufficiency is already applied in this respect. The first step toward its

implementation was a unilateral reduction of armed forces which was effectuated by all Warsaw Pact member states.

Along with this, the structure of our troops and forces is changing, the armaments are being redistributed in their general balance. The numerous systems of armaments for offensive action are being either totally withdrawn or reduced. The equipment of troops with arms assigned for antitank defense, for combat with other armored targets on the battlefield, and for anti-aircraft defense, namely for defense against basic offensive weapons, is increasing.

This also applies to our guidelines related to the recruitment and training of troops. These guidelines are presently mapped out in conformity with the requirement that in case of aggression against our countries, the basic actions of our Armed Forces at the beginning of the war should be defense operations. This means that in training our staffs and troops priority should be given to defensive actions on a strategic, operational, and tactical scale.

[Marinchev] Can you describe the requirements and new quality criteria related to the Armies of the fraternal countries in defending our countries' security, in guaranteeing a reliable defense of peace and socialism?

[Lobov] The new conditions in the development of the Armed Forces of our allied states and the tasks stemming from the military doctrine determine new requirements related to these Armed Forces and new criteria for the evaluation of their activities. In summing up all these criteria we can describe them as follows: The combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, despite the reduction of defense expenditures, should be sufficient to make us capable of resisting the aggressor.

These were the guidelines for the socialist countries in adapting their military organization to quality parameters. The essential meaning of this process is reflected in the establishment of real prerequisites for a considerable, quantitative reduction of armaments, technical equipment, and army personnel to the level of reasonable sufficiency, while the quality of the remaining forces, equipment, organizational institutions, and the training of the army personnel should be simultaneously improved.

I would like to call particular attention to the fact that priority treatment of quality criteria in military organization is not identical with striving for military superiority. Our goal is to maintain the combat power of the allied armed forces at a level guaranteeing the repelling of any aggression. These efforts should not be compared with the NATO plans for the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and for additional armaments and with their plans for compensating for reduced nuclear power resulting from the destruction of medium and smaller range missiles.

[Marinchev] Can you describe the attitude of the West to the policy of further reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe?

[Lobov] I would characterize this attitude as double-edged. On the one hand, we cannot fail to point out the concern of the West for the solution of such problems. It is this concern, in particular, and the understanding of the requirement of adopting specific measures for reducing the level of military confrontation that motivated the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states in meeting at the negotiating table in Vienna.

The results from the first stage of these negotiations show that the stands of the two sides on these questions contain identical views as well as differences. This is quite natural. The fears and mutual distrust accumulated over several decades will not be easily dissipated. We should strive for more mutual understanding, for mutual respect of one's partner's opinions; we should manifest political goodwill, readiness for compromise, patience, and foresight.

The striving to complicate the path toward mutual agreement, however, is unjustified. The stand of the NATO member countries at the Vienna negotiations is based on their view that the Warsaw Pact member states should be obliged to engage in new, unilateral disarmament, while the NATO partners, in turn, should not be involved in any steps leading toward the reduction of their own armed forces.

Certain other aspects in the Western approach to the problems of reducing armed forces and armaments cause us concern as well.

I would like to dwell on the problem of tactical nuclear arms, in a broad context. This includes tactical missiles, strike aircraft, and artillery equipped with nuclear components. These weapons are part of the subjects discussed at the Vienna talks. Nevertheless, their existence makes it impossible to guarantee security and stability in Europe, and prevents us from eliminating the threat of surprise attack. For this reason, the Warsaw Pact member states proposed to the NATO member countries to begin separate negotiations for the reduction and elimination of tactical, nuclear arms in Europe. This proposal, did not evoke any positive response.

There is a discrepancy between words and deeds on the Western side. This is a factor of serious concern in European and international policy, a factor which forces our countries to be more vigilant.

[Marinchev] Can you describe your own views on the methods for consolidating the unity and comradeship in arms among the soldiers of the fraternal armies?

[Lobov] In my opinion, these relations are based on our revolutionary traditions and on the current processes which are developing in the allied countries.

The adoption of the new military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member countries opens up vast opportunities for the further consolidation of our comradeship in arms. The implementation of the principles of this doctrine is unthinkable without the participation of the broad masses of the soldiers because combat readiness begins with the individual soldier, sergeant, and officer, who should be profoundly aware of their patriotic and international duties.

Naturally, we should not reject the experience in military cooperation among our countries that has accumulated over the years.

The process of the fraternal armies' drawing closer together is constantly developing. By no means does this process deny the specific features and the peculiar historical conditions of each army. The cooperation of our armies contributes to our joint efforts in overcoming the emerging difficulties.

As a result of this, the joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member countries reached a higher stage in their overall training in recent years. They have all available resources to guarantee the reliable protection of their peoples' socialist achievements and peaceful labor efforts.

BULGARIA

Army Daily Commentary Reviews First Round of Vienna CFE/CSBM Talks

AU0705161189 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 4 May 89 p 4

[Maj Gen Kamen Petrov article: "Similar Goals—Different Approaches"]

[Text] The second round of the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the talks on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures begins tomorrow in Vienna. The first round of these talks, which took place in March, afforded the opportunity to analyze the positions of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as the behavior of the diplomats and experts of East and West during the next stage of the talks.

Certain similar or close aspects in the positions of the socialist and Western countries emerged during the first round of the talks on conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The goals of the talks were defined in approximately the same manner, namely, to strengthen European stability and security through profound cuts in the conventional Armed Forces of the two military-political alliances, and achieving a balance at lower levels. The representatives of the two blocs share the opinion that steps aimed at eliminating the potential for inflicting a sudden strike or launching attacks must obtain priority. This produced the understanding that it is necessary to reduce the most destabilizing categories of weapons and

combat equipment. The necessity of creating an efficient control system also was pointed out.

Unfortunately, this almost completely exhausts the areas in which there is a unity of thought between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It is clear that the approximately similar goals do not mean that there is a similar opinion as to the ways in which they can be implemented.

The "Western" road leading toward reducing the conventional Armed Forces is hardly more direct, because it does not envisage a reduction of the Armed Forces personnel, the military expenditures, or military production. The NATO proposal does not mention the topic of creating a zone of decreased concentration along the line of contact between the two alliances, from which the most destabilizing weapons will be removed, reduced, or limited, and in which there will be restricted military activity.

It is hardly surprising, and yet indicative, that NATO does not envisage unilateral steps aimed at decreasing military confrontation and refrains from following the example of the socialist countries, which announced that in the next 2 years they will reduce their Armed Forces by 296,300 troops, their tanks by 11,901, fighters by 930, and armored personnel carriers by 195.

Analysis of the Western countries' positions clearly reveals NATO's approach, which leads toward unilateral advantages. The pretext is not too new or original: According to NATO's position, the tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers (in which the Warsaw Pact has an advantage), and some kinds of weapons must be reduced. Thus, strike air force and combat helicopters (areas in which NATO has an advantage) are not included.

The proposal of the Warsaw Pact member countries is much more constructive and reliable. According to it, during the first stage of the cuts (1991-1994), it is necessary to eliminate the imbalances and asymmetries in the quantity of armed forces, strike aircraft of the front (tactical) air force, tanks, combat helicopters, armored combat equipment and carriers, and artillery, including the reactive salvo systems [reaktivni sistemi zazalpov ogun] and mortars. These forces and means must be reduced to equal levels which are 10-15 percent lower than the lowest levels of the two military-political alliances.

According to the proposal of the socialist countries, during the second stage (1994-1997) it is necessary to cut the Armed Forces by a further 25 percent.

During the third stage (1997-2000), the cuts of conventional weapons will continue and these weapons will acquire a purely defensive character.

One does not have to be a great expert to understand that the proposal of the Warsaw Pact is much more comprehensive, that it includes all categories of destabilizing weapons, and that it clearly outlines the stage-by-stage approach in eliminating the imbalances and asymmetries and in reducing the weapons.

The first round of the talks on confidence- and security-building measures demonstrated that the 35 states that participate in the talks adhere to further expanding the scope of information exchange, including additional data on annual plans in information exchange, decreasing the level of observed military activity, expanding contacts, conducting various forums and discussions, comparing the military-technical and political aspects of the military doctrines, and so forth.

Simultaneously, the first round demonstrated that serious differences exist in the approaches of the NATO and Warsaw Pact member countries. It confirmed the opinion that NATO continues to adhere to its old position and stubbornly rejects the expansion of the confidence and security measures over the independent activity of the Air Force and the Navy. The West again stresses the importance of obtaining information significant in its scope and contents on the deployment, the organizational structure, state, and combat training of the socialist countries' ground forces.

NATO's proposal does not include any specific restriction measures, which evokes the thought that the Western countries do not intend to change the character of their annual military activity. The scope and intensity of this activity tends to increase. Annually, NATO conducts 200 joint and over 800 national maneuvers. This means that military activity is being conducted practically everyday. The tension, prompted by this activity, also continues everyday.

The major NATO maneuvers, which include a series of maneuvers by various military branches united under the same code name, are especially dangerous. Such maneuvers encompass 70 percent of the personnel of the combat units that exist in times of peace, and reserve forces also are recruited. In their character and scope these maneuvers do not differ at all from the preliminary deployment and concentration of combat troops for waging a war, under the disguise of maneuvers.

As known, in September 1988 NATO conducted five simultaneous operational-tactical maneuvers on the territory of the FRG, under the "Autumn Forge-88" code name. Some 10 divisions and the same number of brigades of the Armed Forces of the United States, the FRG, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, as well as several thousands of tanks, hundreds of combat aircraft, and a great deal of combat and service equipment took part in them. The maneuvers included various issues—transfer of troops from the United States and Canada to Europe, the massive advance of units toward the state borders of the GDR

and the CSSR, activating military management systems, mobilization, and so forth. Simultaneously, landing operations were conducted at the bloc's northern flank—in Norway and Denmark. To support the operations, strike air force and operational naval units with "cruise" missiles were deployed in the Atlantic. Thus, the autumn "Autumn Forge-88" maneuvers turned into a uniform military operation of a strategic character, which fundamentally aimed at comprehensively perfecting the training and conducting of the first stages of military actions in Europe.

It is the opinion of the socialist countries that it is necessary to work out mutually supplementing confidence measures, which must ensure the advance from dealing with separate spheres of military activity toward a comprehensive system, which will encompass ground, naval, and air force activity. The proposed measures on restricting the character of the maneuvers and the quantity of troops and combat equipment that participate in the maneuvers have a great importance. The proposal to reduce the scope of major maneuvers, including military activity, which must not be announced a priori, to 40,000 troops, is one of the most essential of such proposals. The level, proposed by the socialist countries, allows the restriction of one of the most dangerous kinds of military activity: large-scale activity. The number of troops envisaged in the proposal allows for training to be conducted not only at the tactical, but also at the operational level.

Thus, tomorrow in Vienna the second round of the parallel talks on Conventional Armed Forces and on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures begins—a unique structure of mutually supplementing and mutually assisting international forums for discussing military issues of all-European importance. The talks afford the opportunity to elevate security in the continent to a new and higher level by combining the reductions and cuts of military potential with greater openness [otkritost] and control of military activity.

Defense Ministry Aide on Soviet Initiatives, NATO SNF Modernization

*AU1605185089 Sofia OTECHESTVEN FRONT
in Bulgarian 12 May 89 p 6*

[Interview with Lieutenant General Radnyu Minchev, first deputy commander of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army and spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, by Tsvyatko Belenski, OTECHESTVEN FRONT correspondent: "Shield of the Longest Peace"—date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Belenski] What is the essence of the peace initiatives of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact member countries, and how are they greeted in Europe and the world and by the leading sociopolitical circles in the United States and NATO?

[Minchev] The USSR and the other fraternal countries proposed many initiatives. The most important among them are: the total and comprehensive ban on tests of nuclear weapons and preventing their proliferation; strict control of the elimination of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which must include on-the-spot inspections; elimination of the imbalances and asymmetries and reducing the armed forces and weapons in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals; creation of zones and corridors free of nuclear and chemical weapons; reduction of strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent in the first stage; relinquishment of the use of military force by the Warsaw Pact and NATO; elimination of the bases on foreign territory and withdrawal of the troops to their national borders; consultations at various levels on comparing the military doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; simultaneously disbandment of the existing military blocs, and so forth. [passage omitted]

[Belenski] What about the issue of the "modernization" of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, and what conclusions must be drawn by the peace-loving forces and the Warsaw Pact?

[Minchev] The "modernization" of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons is a dangerous step by the new U.S. administration, which in essence aims at pushing NATO and the Warsaw Pact toward a new race in the sphere of nuclear weapons, and thus obliterating the INF Treaty, signed by the USSR and the United States.

The United States, actively supported by the UK, Canada, and the higher military-political leadership of NATO, insists on quickly adopting a decision on beginning the "modernization." The adherents to "modernization" are motivated by the consideration that such a measure would strengthen the security of Western Europe. In essence, it is envisaged to replace the "Lance" tactical missile systems with a new model. As a result, the range of the tactical nuclear weapons will increase from 110-120 km to 480-500 km. It has been envisaged to modernize and introduce 600 of such missiles. [passage omitted]

Some NATO countries, and especially the FRG, Belgium, Norway, and others, openly oppose the modernization and adhere to the so-called "third zero," namely, the elimination of the short-range missiles. They are motivated by the consideration that such a decision would favorably influence the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe and on measures on strengthening confidence and security. This opinion was presented to the U.S. leadership by FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. Belgium and Norway also expressed interest in accelerating the beginning of talks between the East and West on tactical nuclear weapons. This position is supported by France, Spain, Greece, and others. The meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group also confirmed the serious differences among the Atlantic partners on the issue of modernizing

tactical nuclear weapons. The participants in the meeting could not agree on coordinated decisions and refrained from categorically supporting the idea of modernization. This was also confirmed by the communique, which was published at the end of the meeting. [passage omitted]

Perhaps at the end of May, when a special NATO summit will take place, the differences will be overcome, something which will conform to the United States and NATO's leading circles, rather than to the peoples' will.

As you see, confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has not been overcome yet. The military confrontation continues to exist. The arms race has been slowed down to a certain degree, but has not been eliminated. The United States and NATO are striving to achieve qualitatively new superiority. New and even more flexible efforts on the part of the peace-loving forces are needed, as well as increased vigilance and a constant combat readiness of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces in order to preserve peace in the world.

Editorial Article Praises Soviet Proposal for SNF Withdrawal

AU1605110289 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 13 May 89 p 5

[Editorial article: "Great Chance for Peace"]

[Text] The time when the West used to present every new Soviet peace initiative as a "new Moscow propaganda move" is over.

In our times the Soviet peace initiatives are at the center of all mankind's attention and inspire real hope that achieving a lasting peace is an attainable goal. The additional proposals of the Soviet Union at the Vienna talks on limiting conventional weapons and armed forces also strengthen this hope.

The proposals are a large-scale initiative, whose implementation would allow radical reductions to be made already before the end of the century, and thus reduce the Armed Forces and weapons of NATO and the Warsaw Pact that are subject of the Vienna talks to an equal level in the two alliances. The radical character of this new Soviet initiative in the area of disarmament is clearly reflected in the proposed reduction of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO by more than 1 million troops; NATO's combat aircraft and helicopters by approximately 2,500; the Warsaw Pact's tanks by 40,000; and so forth. The scope of the proposed reductions is determined by the just principle according to which the side that has more will reduce more, and the side that has less will reduce less.

The declared readiness of the USSR to withdraw all nuclear munition [boepripasi] from the territory of its allies during the period 1989-91, if the United States adopts an analogous step, reveals great prospects for a

lasting peace in the continent. The implementation of this very bold and radical proposal would practically mean turning large regions of Europe, including the most neuralgic ones, into zones free of nuclear weapons. Even now NATO and the leading states of this military bloc consider that nuclear weapons are a "means of ensuring peace." There cannot be a more correct and real road of guaranteeing peace and the peoples' security than removing the nuclear threat. The prospects revealed by the Soviet readiness are strong proof of this fact.

The USSR and the Warsaw Pact member countries are making great efforts, including effort along the road of unilateral disarmament, to move forward the historical process that began with the signing of the INF Treaty. The Soviet decision to withdraw 500 tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of its allies before the end of the year is another step along that road.

It must be clear to all that the possibilities for unilateral steps are limited and that developing the process of disarmament requires more than goodwill moves by only one of the sides. The additional USSR proposals submitted at the Vienna talks on limiting conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe are radical and realistic at the same time, they correspond to the interests of East and West alike, and thus represent a great chance for peace. It must not be ruined by the obsolete thinking and approach of those Western military and political figures for whom strengthening peace still means increasing the mountains of weapons.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Pentagon Plans Said To Include SDI for Attack

AU0805145389 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 3 May 89 p 5

[Jozef Janto commentary in the "Word on the Events" column: "Insidious 'Pupiform Insects'"]

[Text] At a time when not only Europe, but all nations on earth are hoping that the danger that threatens mankind as a result of nuclear weapons will be averted, when some of these dangerous combat devices (shorter- and medium-range missiles) are already being eliminated, when negotiations are under way to cut down the strengths of strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent, when negotiations have been opened in Vienna on conventional disarmament... at such a time the new plans hatched by the Pentagon cannot be called anything but insidious, insidious with regard to human civilization.

What is it all about?

The West German weekly DER SPIEGEL and, a few days ago, the DEUTSCHE PRESSE AGENTUR [DPA], published an article stating that "U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has given the SDI military research program ('Star Wars' program) a new orientation." The new project, allegedly based on miniaturized

computer chips and "other most modern military products," was born in the Lawrence Livermore Institute in California from plans worked out by Edward Teller's pupil Lowell Wood. Essentially, the project proceeds from the idea that in a few years' time (roughly by 1995), that means after the development is completed "within 2 years, some 10,000-100,000 small superfast missiles, 1 meter long, weighing 50 kilograms, and 40 centimeters in diameter, could already be revolving around the Earth." Moreover, this new, so-called defense concept named Brilliant Pebbles [English term used, followed by Czech translation], would be "very cheap": According to James Abrahamson, former director of the SDI program, it would cost merely \$10 billion; this is allegedly far cheaper than any other rival project within the framework of the SDI (Phase I), which was estimated at \$150 billion and which included 150 strike satellites each with 10 "interceptor" missiles.

These so-called Brilliant Pebbles would be launched into orbit by missile carriers, and would remain "parked" in space for up to 10 years. In critical situations these "pupiform insects" would awaken from their "sleep" and, with a velocity of 10,000 meters per second (i.e. ten times the velocity of a bullet from a gun) would allegedly destroy "at least one third of 4,700 hostile missiles".

Both the California institute and the armament firms are overjoyed—this project would provide the military-industrial complex with new opportunities for making profit. True, one can also hear voices raised in doubt; but some of them merely ask that the Brilliant Pebbles be further improved, and that the institutes and firms of the military-industrial complex be allowed to continue pursuing and implementing various ideas. For instance, the experts say that Brilliant Pebbles need a Life Jacket (to survive nuclear radiation), effective sensors to find precise thermal bearings of hostile missiles, a supercomputer for targeting purposes which could be squeezed onto a few chips, etc.

And what about space research? The fact is that, inter alia, those "Brilliant Pebbles" could bring about the destruction of a space shuttle on its way into orbit. However, here too the experts are ready with an "answer": One would have to keep them "under control for every second of the time." True, these experts also know that a missile attack on the United States is not one of the Soviet Union's goals, and they are familiar with the Soviet initiative to eliminate all nuclear arms by the year 2000, including intercontinental strategic missiles. But for this they have no ready answer. On the contrary, they are currently striving to modernize tactical nuclear devices (with a range of up to 500 km), although the Warsaw Pact member states have also proposed to immediately open talks on tactical nuclear weapons, side by side with the current talks on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic up to the Urals. But the experts are still stubbornly pushing through their own aims, even though several NATO states (such as the FRG, Norway,

Belgium, Holland, and Denmark) have stated that they are in favor of this sensible alternative.

It is impossible to say that the plans harbored by the Pentagon and by the institutions of the military-industrial complex related to it are anything other than war-oriented thinking and insidiousness. "This new brainchild of the SDI planners," DER SPIEGEL writes, "will inevitably have a most destabilizing influence on the balance between the superpowers." It goes on to say that, "in their enthusiasm for a war of miniaturized missiles, the Pentagon strategists have indicated that Brilliant Pebbles could be used not only for defensive, but also for offensive purposes, for a surprise attack." What can one add to this—Washington is not concerned with "defense," it is intent on an attack with the most surprising element ever...

Reportage on Opening of 2d Round of Vienna CFE/CSBM Talks

Ambassador Balcar on Prospects

*LD0505132689 Prague CTK in English
1231 GMT 5 May 89*

[Text] Vienna May 5 (CTK correspondent)—The Czechoslovak delegation is returning to the Vienna disarmament talks aware that "the first round showed political will of all participant states to realize the mandate agreed on at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe, which was proved by the dynamic start of the talks," Ambassador Ladislav Balcar told CTK here today.

The head of the Czechoslovak delegation said that the debates and proposals submitted in the first round of talks showed a number of points of contact. However, there are still many differences in views on the basic issues, e.g. the problem of tactical airforce, which NATO does not want to include in any agreement, the question of the creation of zones of confidence and security on the line of contact as envisaged in a proposal submitted by Czechoslovakia, and others.

As for the talks of the 35 CSCE signatories on measures to strengthen confidence and security, there also exists political will to reach progress in this sphere. The Warsaw Treaty seeks not only quantitative development of the results achieved in Stockholm but also adoption of qualitatively new measures that would include independent air and naval activity.

The Czechoslovak ambassador pointed out that the Warsaw Treaty foreign ministers at their recent session in Berlin appealed to NATO to agree to calling independent talks on tactical nuclear missiles in Europe, believing that opening of such talks would be a marked impulse for further progress of the Vienna talks on conventional weapons. "It is obvious that practical measures in the sphere of both conventional arms and tactical nuclear arms reductions would complement and strengthen each

other while the level of military confrontation will decrease. On the other hand it is obvious that modernization of tactical nuclear weapons as sought by some forces in NATO, the United States and Great Britain in particular, could complicate the Vienna talks," the Czechoslovak delegate said.

Addresses 10 May Session

*AU1205185189 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
11 May 89 p 7*

[CTK reporter dispatch: "L. Balcar's Speech at Vienna Negotiations; Third-Generation Measures"]

[Text] Vienna—Ladislav Balcar, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, spoke in the discussion at yesterday's [10 May] session of the Vienna negotiations of the 35 participating states of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security in Europe.

"After the follow-up CSCE meeting in Vienna, the process taking place throughout Europe is assuming a qualitatively new, higher level," the Czechoslovak ambassador stressed. That is why the results of our joint work will not be judged according to current approaches, either. They will be judged according to the more demanding criteria of a continent oriented toward building a common European home. This positive political climate is also favorably reflected in the course of our deliberations to date, as attested to by the fact that four proposals have already landed on our table. They contain certain concurrent or close elements, but naturally also diverging approaches. We are now entering a stage in which it is essential to create the best possible working structure for specifically assessing the individual elements of these, but naturally also other, proposals, L. Balcar stated.

In our view, it is necessary to concentrate primarily on those issues which we have failed to work out as broadly and profoundly as desirable in Stockholm. As for the so-called third generation of confidence-building and security measures, the development on our continent is oriented toward making these measures in particular the basis of a qualitatively better mechanism of confidence-building and security. It will undoubtedly represent an important connecting link with the process of conventional disarmament in Europe, L. Balcar said.

Bush Administration Said To Fear 'Third Zero' Proposal

*AU1205095189 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
10 May 89 p 6*

[Zdenek Porybny Washington dispatch in the "Note" column: "Reconciling the Irreconcilables..."]

[Text] Margaret Tutweiler, spokesman of the U.S. Department of State, has confirmed her government's firmly negative stand on the West German proposal to open negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on tactical

nuclear missiles in Europe. However, THE NEW YORK TIMES indicates that the Bush government wants to make use of the slightly less than 4 weeks remaining until the NATO summit to work out some kind of compromise, which would satisfy the West German demand, while at the same time retaining the unchanged plan to exchange Lance missiles for nuclear missiles with a far greater range and effect.

Supposedly, the main condition of this compromise is NATO's agreement on the modernization of missiles. Only then could the missile strengths and the nuclear artillery ammunition, which has become outdated anyway, be slightly and unilaterally reduced and the Soviet Union asked to reduce the number of its tactical nuclear missiles.

However, the American proposal cited by THE NEW YORK TIMES does not even mention opening negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. In other words, Washington would like to force Bonn to agree to the modernization of missiles in exchange for the promise that at some time in the future one could perhaps also start reducing them—but without any negotiations with the Warsaw Pact.

Actually, the Bush government fears that as soon as the NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations on tactical nuclear missiles in Europe are opened, one of the partners would come out with a proposal for a "third zero," i.e. for the elimination of all missiles, both Soviet and American, including the modernized ones.

The question is whether such an obviously imbalanced compromise would satisfy the FRG public as well as the public of the European countries of NATO.

Withdrawal of Soviet Transport Battalion Begins

*LD1305085489 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0800 GMT 13 May 89*

[Text] The withdrawal of the motor transport battalion of the central group of Soviet forces from our territory began in Olomouc today. This step is fully in harmony with the decision of the Soviet Government which was approved by the Warsaw Pact member states. It is also a part of the measures for a unilateral reduction of the number of Soviet Armed Forces as stated by Mikhail Gorbachev last December at the United Nations.

The soldiers were seen off at the barracks by Major General Anatoliy Zuyev, representative of the command of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, by representatives of the North Moravian region and of the town of Olomouc. The young pioneers from Frantisek Zubka school also came to see off their comrades. After a short meeting and a festive march, the members of the motor transport battalion entered their vehicles and shortly before 0900 the 11-km-long convoy set out for the eastern border of Czechoslovakia.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRG Short-Range Missile Controversy Viewed
*AU1605152389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 12 May 89 p 2*

["W.M." editorial: "Dam Against Reason and Willingness To Achieve Peace"]

[Text] While from Moscow we receive news that today the Soviet Union will present a new disarmament initiative to the international public which concerns the reduction of tactical nuclear ammunition in Europe, something completely different is heard from Bonn: According to press agencies, an open quarrel about short-range nuclear missiles has broken out there. The core of the heated conflict is the question of whether a new wave of arms buildup in the field of tactical nuclear weapons, which is poorly disguised as "modernization," will be started or not.

The quarrel has spread to the entire government coalition. It shows that a considerable portion of the Christian Social Union [CSU] and the Christian Democratic Union obviously wants to prevent, by all means, negotiations between the two military alliances on steps to eliminate this dangerous category of weapons. At the same time, in view of the clear rejection of the hellish nuclear devices by the great majority of the FRG citizens, they do not want to advertise their positive attitude toward "modernization." Minister Zimmermann, for instance, said that it is political suicide to decide this question before the Bundestag elections.

Genscher called the open quarrel about a question that is of vital importance to the FRG a very weighty matter. The determined opponents of negotiations obviously consider him, the foreign minister who belongs to the Free Democratic Party, their target. CSU Secretary General Huber complained that Genscher has not stated clearly enough that there must not be a third zero option.

Indeed, maintaining tactical nuclear weapons is a threat to the existence of the FRG and of all countries in the center of our continent. Replacing the Lance missiles, which are now stationed in the FRG, with new weapons system with a range that is four times greater would be an even greater threat. The FRG citizens understand this very well, as their clear attitude toward this issue shows. Four out of five people want nuclear weapons to completely disappear from their country.

However, this is exactly what frightens those in Bonn who not only want to station new tactical nuclear missiles but want to enforce a comprehensive program of arms buildup, as Bundeswehr Inspector General Admiral Wellershoff has recommended. These people want to make sure that the willingness of the population to achieve peace must not win. Therefore, the quarrel within the government coalition broke out. Therefore,

the attempt to erect a dam through rejecting negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on tactical nuclear weapons is being made. A dam against reason.

CDE Observers at Soviet-GDR 15-21 May Joint Exercises

Exercise Begins 15 May

*LD1505122189 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1203 GMT 15 May 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A joint troop exercise by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] and the National People's Army of the GDR began on Monday. It is to continue until 21 May 1989 in the Gardelegen, Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Neustrelitz, and Pritzwalk regions. It will involve up to 20,600 members of the fraternal armies and is led by Major General Stanislav Rumyantsev, commander of one of the GSFG armies.

According to the stipulations of the Stockholm document on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, observers from all the member states have been invited. According to information available, 40 generals, officers, and diplomats from these countries are expected on Tuesday [16 May] in the exercise area.

Joint Maneuvers Continue

*LD1605171289 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1450 GMT 16 May 89*

[Text] Potsdam (ADN)—The joint troop maneuvers by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG] and the National People's Army [NVA] of the GDR continued today. Motorized infantry, tank troops, and artillery troops dug into their positions and prepared for defensive action. Under the leadership of Major General Stanislav Rumyantsev, commanding officer of an army of the GSFG, up to 20,100 members of both fraternal armies are taking part in the maneuvers. There are 314 tanks, 311 artillery pieces, 393 launchers for anti-tank guided missiles, and 51 helicopters in use. This is 500 soldiers and 94 tanks fewer than were announced by the GDR Government.

In accordance with the documents of the Stockholm conference in Europe, 40 observers from 20 CSCE signatory states are taking part in this exercise. They come from Belgium, Bulgaria, the FRG, the CSSR, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Canada, Netherlands, and the United States. On behalf of the GDR Government and National Defense Minister Army General Heinz Kessler, the generals, officers, and diplomats were greeted in Potsdam by Major General Rudolf Magnitzke, deputy leader of the NVA main staff. The GDR has been consistently working to ensure that there is greater trust, security, and predictability in the military field, he said. Together with its alliance partners, the GDR hopes that, in the framework of the Vienna negotiations, important agreements

will be reached without delay, in particular relating to the reduction of armed forces and arms in Europe. The beginning of the disbanding of NVA tank regiments and the withdrawal of GSFG troops from GDR territory underline the seriousness and credibility of all our proposals, and prove that our words and deeds are in harmony. The GDR takes the view that verbal assurances today are no longer sufficient, and that there is a need for concrete action to achieve further detente, greater security, and disarmament, Major General Magnitzke stressed.

The foreign military personnel and diplomats were subsequently informed of the maneuvers and also the observation program. With the help of a map they were told of the additional possibility of having a close view of the exercise area of the staffs and troops from a helicopter.

Farewell Held for Departing Soviet Tank Division
*LD1705120189 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1134 GMT 17 May 89*

[Text] Jueterbog (ADN)—There was a farewell meeting in Jueterbog Wednesday for the members of the 32d Soviet tank division, which are returning home. The people of the town thanked the tank soldiers for their loyal military execution of duty for the protection of peace and socialism. The division earned fame in the struggle against Hitlerite fascism and is one of the best of the Soviet forces in the GDR. Within the framework of the USSR's unilateral disarmament initiative, announced at the United Nations by Mikhail Gorbachev, the 25th and 32d tank divisions, two independent tank regiments, and independent battalions will be transferred to the Soviet Union by August of this year.

The troop withdrawal was attended, among others, by Professor Stefan Dornberg, president of the GDR Committee for European Security and Cooperation; Lieutenant General Horst Zander, deputy chief of the land forces of the National People's Army; and Army General Boris Snetkov, commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

HUNGARY

Hungary Supports Western CSBM Proposal at Vienna Talks
*LD1205211489 Budapest MTI in English
1939 GMT 12 May 89*

[Text] Vienna, May 12 (MTI)—Hungary holds all elements of the Western confidence-building proposal to be acceptable. All measures proposed could form a useful part of the extensive agreement which should be created in the course of the talks, said Ambassador David Meiszter, leader of the Hungarian delegation, at the May 12 plenary session of the confidence-building talks in progress in Vienna with the participation of 35 countries.

Following, the Hungarian diplomat analysing the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty states and the NATO countries, noted they envisage numerous similar measures, or ones very near to each other. He termed it promising that a considerable common basis exists already in the initial stage of the talks to work out further measures. Ambassador Meiszter stressed the importance of military openness in the strengthening of confidence between the states, and that it should extend to all elements of the armed forces. Referring to the unilateral armed forces reductions determined in the socialist countries, and the prospects of the agreement to be worked out at the conventional disarmament talks between the two blocs, Mr Meiszter took a stand to restrict the military exercises and other large-scale military activities.

Foreign Minister Gyula Horn Comments on SNF Modernization

*LD1505230289 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1910 GMT 15 May 89*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Gyula Horn by unidentified correspondent in studio; from the "Panorama" program; date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Correspondent] This is the first time that I can greet Gyula Horn in this studio in his new capacity as foreign minister. What is your view of James Baker's negotiations in Moscow? Was it possible, in your view, to sense some kind of change in U.S. foreign policy, since there was discussion on the revision of this foreign policy?

[Horn] I do not believe that a kind of thorough, completely [words indistinct] thorough foreign policy change or entirely new foreign policy had been promulgated because this new U.S. foreign policy concept has not been completely formed yet, only its components exist. The administration is still working on it and in this it is very important that they should receive an incentive from the Soviet side and from their allies.

[Correspondent] According to news leaked out from Moscow, Bush's forthcoming European visit was mentioned, including the U.S. President stopping in Budapest and in Hungary too. [sentence as heard] How do the Soviets view this visit?

[Horn] This did not feature in the discussions as a separate agenda point, really it was only mentioned, but, after all, it is really the affair of the Hungarians and the Poles because the President will visit these two countries. I would underline that we have already begun preparations for this visit. We are trying to coordinate not only the visit's protocol aspect, but what is more important is that we want to strengthen, buttress the visit by concluding several significant bilateral agreements, accords, naturally both economic and commercial, which are very important, so the preparations of these have begun.

[Correspondent] How does the Soviet Union view this rapprochement, this new type of relationship, this new

kind of relationship which (?is evolving) between the United States and Poland and Hungary respectively?

[Horn] It definitely assesses it positively.

[Correspondent] Regarding the Soviet proposals, to what extent do they affect us? I have in mind the disarmament proposals.

[Horn] Well, the proposal was formulated in that the Soviet Union would withdraw 500 tactical and nuclear weapons from the Warsaw Pact member states but the countries were not specified. The elaboration of details will come at a later stage.

[Correspondent] Can it be expected that a favorable development will occur in the issue of modernizing European short-range missiles?

[Horn] Well, this will be decided by the NATO summit at the end of this month. In my view, it would be very bad—without wanting to interfere in the internal affairs of NATO—if they decide in favor of modernization. And this comes from two points of view: first, this would weaken, under any circumstances, the significance of the Soviet-U.S. agreement and it would also lessen the importance of the so-called INF agreement which ruled on the withdrawal of the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Europe. They weaken this because what would be at issue would be the deployment of new modern weapons with a 350-500-km range. Nobody can yet state exactly what kind of missiles these would be but, under any circumstances, they would reach member states of the Warsaw Pact. Secondly, it would be, in my view, negatively and unfavorably influencing the outcome of the Vienna disarmament talks on the reduction of conventional forces and military weaponry.

If I can advise, or express an opinion to my NATO colleagues, I would propose that they should not, just now, make a decision on the modernization, but that they should make the decision dependent on the result achieved in Vienna. Because, after all, the issue of tactical nuclear weapons cannot be separated indirectly—even if it is possible to do so directly—from the subject of conventional weapons, the military tools. [passage omitted]

POLAND

CDE Observers Invited To Attend 'Orion-89' Tactical Exercises in Jun

LD1105185589 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1730 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] In accordance with the training program calendar, unilateral divisional tactical exercises, codenamed "Orion-89," will take place in southwestern Poland on 27-30 June. Detachments of the 11th Jan III Sobieski tank division and assigned supporting units from the land and air forces will take part in the exercise. The aim

of the exercise, which will be conducted in three stages, is to perfect the troops and staffs in the organization and conduct of defensive operations. The exercise will be led by Lieutenant General Henryk Szumski, commander of the Silesian Military District. A total of 17,100 soldiers, 176 tanks, 60 artillery pieces, and 35 helicopters will be taking part in the exercise.

Information about the exercise has been passed on, in accordance with the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, to all signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Observers from 34 countries have been invited to the exercise.

Defense Ministry Aide: Soviet Troop Withdrawal To Begin 'Shortly'

LD1705123189 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1205 GMT 17 May 89

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland is to begin shortly, declared Lieutenant Colonel Ireneusz Czyzewski, spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, during today's news conference in Warsaw. The first to be withdrawn will be a regiment of tanks stationed in Strachow in Legnica voivodship and a motorized unit from Swidnica.

ROMANIA

Proposals at Geneva Disarmament Conference Viewed

AU1205133889 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1229 GMT 12 May 89

["Romania: Specific Proposals and Initiatives Founded on a Comprehensive Unitary Approach to Disarmament Issues"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 12/5/1989—Steadfast action was taken by the Romanian delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to promote the Romanian position. President Nicolae Ceausescu's initiatives on the cessation of the arms race, nuclear first of all, and the passage to disarmament, the elimination of the war threat and the ensurance of the foremost right of peoples and individuals to existence, to freedom and independence, to life and peace. Underscoring the importance and necessity of a comprehensive unitary approach to disarmament, the Romanian conception of a global disarmament programme was outlined with nuclear disarmament as its centrepiece complemented by measures for the elimination of chemical and other weapons of mass destruction along with conventional arms, troops and military budget cuts. Emphasis was placed on the idea that international peace and security cannot be ensured by isolated actions that put a ban only on some classes of nuclear or chemical weapons, or by the so-called nuclear deterrence or other strategies that further the arms race. Security, it was shown, can be

achieved only by disarmament on all fronts, by simultaneously banning and eliminating nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction as part of a coherent process.

Romania came with proposals and initiatives on all disarmament issues, on the directions of action that the states should take to find solutions through sustained efforts on all levels—multilaterally and bilaterally as well as regionally—and in all negotiation fora among which the Geneva conference stands out by its role and responsibility. The Romanian delegation to the conference insisted that the foundation should be laid to an effective nuclear and chemical disarmament process—to be carried on simultaneously—that measures should be negotiated and adopted for the complete removal of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, for a ban on them and for the destruction of the existing stockpiles.

In the specific context of the Geneva conference, the Romanian delegation underlined that a comprehensive unitary approach also calls for measures to put the conditions in place for appropriate negotiating structures for an in-depth examination and negotiation of all major problems on the session's agenda, of the nuclear disarmament ones above all.

Many delegations, including Romania's, underscored the urgency of a thorough examination by the conference of the question of the manufacture of classes and systems of weapons of mass destruction set on new principles such as lasers, wave propagation, particle emission and others, for the identification of the ways and means of keeping this dangerous course in check.

YUGOSLAVIA

Commentary Assesses Baker's Visit to Moscow
AU1405161789 Belgrade Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 14 May 89

[Branislav Canak commentary from the "Sunday at 10" program]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker paid a 2-day visit to Moscow last week. His visit was the reason for the Soviet side to put forward new disarmament initiatives. Here is a commentary by Branislav Canak:

There are two reasons for Baker's first visit to Moscow. First, it was high time to get acquainted with the partners with which the previous administration had concluded major political deals. Second, it was necessary to put an end to the phenomenon of asynchronic thinking about some disarmament, or rather, armaments issues in the ranks of one's own allies.

As for the first reason, it was necessary to dissuade the U.S. public that the idea that George Bush is hesitant in accepting the continuity of negotiations between the superpowers because he does not have anything to offer in the next round of talks is not true. In essence, however, it is correct, because the United States has not yet competently determined how the arms policy will be realized in the near future, nor how much it will cost, let alone how it will be received by its allies.

Disagreements with the FRG about the modernization of tactical nuclear missiles is neither the first nor the last disagreement, nor is, nor will it be with this country alone. Coupled with some unresolved issues at home, this does not offer much room for working out future relations with the other bloc. This is particularly burdened by the fact that a part of this set of problems with Europe is increasingly affected by the aspiration of this continent for greater autonomy in planning its future.

With this latest initiative, the USSR appears in fact to be playing the European card. The USSR's offer to the West of unilaterally eliminating 500 short range missiles is supposed to primarily make an impact on Europeans. These missiles in fact represent only a threat to the security of European countries and this proposal is sufficient to at least initiate a new way of thinking and changes which would have an effect on negotiations concerning other weapons.

Considering that that Mikhail Gorbachev is preparing to visit Bonn soon, it is clear that the latest Soviet offer is an indirect answer to the White House regarding Baker's visit to Moscow and preparations for a parallel agenda for the meetings with the United States' allies.

BRAZIL

Technical Problems Delay VLS Rocket Launching
PY1605031289 Brasilia Domestic Service
in Portuguese 2200 GMT 15 May 89

[Text] The Launch of the prototype of the Satellite Launching Vehicle from Barrera deo Inferno Launching Center, in Rio Grande do Norte, has been postponed until 1100 on 17 May due to technical problems. The launching of the reduced model of the Satellite Launching Vehicle had been scheduled for 16 May, before it was postponed. Technicians of the Barrera do Inferno Launching Center have not revealed what problems caused the delay.

INDIA

Prime Minister Gandhi Comments on Agni Missile Test Program

BK1605034489 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0240 GMT 16 May 89

[Text] The prime minister has called for greater participation of women in every sector of the economy. Mr Rajiv Gandhi said women are to be taken along with men in the effort to strengthen the country. Addressing the concluding session of the national convention of Mahila [women] Congress-I in Bhubaneswar, Mr Gandhi said that 30-percent reservation for women in democratic bodies will bring a radical change in our body politic.

Speaking to newsmen after addressing the concluding session, Mr Rajiv Gandhi said the Agni missile testing is a part of our research program, and our own defense projects have nothing to do with any other country. He said Baliapal in Orissa's Balasore District has been chosen for setting up a national test range, as it is the only suitable point available in the country.

PAKISTAN

Officials Express Concern over Indian Missile Programs

Foreign Office Spokesman on Agni

BK1105153489 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
1500 GMT 11 May 89

[Text] A Foreign Office spokesman has expressed deep concern over the proposed launching of India's intermediate-range ballistic missile "Agni." The spokesman stated in Islamabad today that India's massive arms buildup, its nuclear program, and the development of

long-range missiles cannot but strengthen the apprehensions and feelings of insecurity among other countries of the region.

The spokesman deplored the fact that India has embarked upon the development of new and lethal weapon systems in the region instead of responding positively to concrete proposals for reducing defense expenditures and for keeping South Asia free of nuclear weapons.

The launching of the missile would have serious repercussions for the region and would pose a threat to regional security and to international peace and stability, the spokesman added.

Army Chief of Staff on Kirti

BK1305163089 Islamabad Domestic Service in English
1600 GMT 13 May 89

[Text] The chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, has said Pakistan's concern over the Indian missile Agni is quite genuine. However, Pakistan has been able to acquire its own capability to counter such threats with the development of its series of missiles. Addressing officers of the School of Infantry and (?Tactics) in Quetta today, he said the threat to Pakistan from the Agni missile, which has a range of over 2,500 km, is not as relevant as the threat from [India's] Kirti missile having a range of over 300 km. He said Pakistan has a limited territorial gap and Kirti missile can reach targets in Pakistan, while Agni may be aimed at targets much beyond it, which could well be in China, Soviet Union, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the (?Gulf).

About Afghanistan, General Aslam Beg was confident that the (?will) of the Afghan people will triumph. Now that the war of liberation is reaching its final and logical conclusion, it is the people of Afghanistan who have to settle the problems, he added.

Proposals to Restructure Armed Forces for 'Sufficiency'

52000049 Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 4, Apr 89 pp 31-44

[Article by Aleksey Arbatov, doctor of historical sciences and chief of a department of the World Economy and International Relations Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences: "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?"; first two paragraphs on speech by Gorbachev]

[Text] "The problem is so acute that we will also have to take a look at our defence spending. A preliminary study has shown that we can reduce it without lowering the level of our national security or defence potential."—MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Speech at a meeting with members of the scientific and cultural community. (PRAVDA, January 8, 1989)

The plans we announced for a unilateral reduction in Soviet armed forces showed that the adoption of a defensive military doctrine and perestroika in the armed forces are not merely declarations, as the West had alleged, but a practical policy of the Soviet Union and its allies.

It is clear, however, that we have only just set out on a long and arduous journey to reshaping our doctrine, strategy and operational plans, the quantitative levels and structure of our armed forces, their deployment and training system, programmes for modernising their armaments and combat equipment. The army is part of the state and society. The negative processes and phenomena that struck deep root in every sphere in the decades of stagnation and put a huge country on the brink of national crisis could not have bypassed the army as a kind of natural reserve. Naturally the problem goes far beyond breaches of regulations by privates. The army is the most marked component of the whole command system with all its attributes: a rigid hierarchy, departmental interests and the absence of glasnost under the cover of all-embracing secrecy. This is explicable in part, for no army can exist without discipline nor do without guarding secrets against a probable enemy. But under an over-all command system these natural peculiarities took extreme forms, and defence became largely exempt from control by society, whose interests it must serve.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, speaking to the Foreign Ministry's Scientific and Practical Conference in July 1988, said: "...Any carelessness in the military sphere, which in the past was devoid of democratic control can, in the context of acute mistrust and universal suspicion, cost the country a great deal and have most severe economic side-effects.... Many losses of this kind could have been averted if interpretation of national security interests had not become the exclusive province of several departments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs included, which, moreover, were shielded from criticism, as was the case in the past."¹

The problem lies above all else in the lack of *glasnost* and unclassified information on military matters. Surely the fact that Soviet public opinion generally learns something about the country's armed forces only as a result of the Soviet side supplying the West with relevant information during talks cannot be regarded as normal. And surely Soviet people need this information much more than the West. Afterall, it is primarily a question of our security, of using our people's resources (and what resources!) for defence. This raises the question: whom is all that information really concealed from and to what end since the West has long been freely using an immense amount of data on both its own military potential and ours? The problem is also that of the lack of the democratic procedures which in the past could make it possible to discuss and oversee defence measures.

The army accumulates all the bad and the good from society and state. This means that perestroika in the armed forces is primarily a restructuring of the mechanism of developing and carrying on military policy and military programmes. The mainstay, in this social sphere as in all others is democratisation and glasnost, to be applied with due regard to the distinctive character of this sphere and hence to the real interests of national (as distinct from departmental) security. Perestroika in this area must obviously restore organic unity and an optimum relationship between the Soviet military potential and our economic potential and foreign policy interests. Both the economy and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union are undergoing an in-depth perestroika which military policy should contribute to and not hamper. The country's defences must certainly not be impaired in the process. Thus there is a need to take a fresh look at established directive principles and narrow departmental approaches and bring military theory and practice into greater harmony with the economic, foreign policy and military strategic realities of today. The economy being a subject for a separate talk, we shall confine ourselves to the last two points.

1. Foreign Political Realities

The need for cooperation and for the eventual formation of a comprehensive system of international security is the only way to avert in the long term a global military, environmental, financial and economic catastrophe, mass epidemics, the spread of drug addiction and hunger, the degradation of morality and rampant international terrorism. These threats overshadow and dwarf historically shortlived conflicts between states due to ideological intransigence, geopolitical rivalries, territorial disputes and the struggle for natural resources.

Since 1985, the world has been changing noticeably under the impact of the Soviet Union's vigorous foreign policy. There is progress at the disarmament talks and in settling bloody regional conflicts. Relations between the Soviet Union and its earlier adversaries and allies are changing, and so is the attitude of the world around to

us. Lord Palmerstone left history a valuable legacy by stating that Britain should have neither eternal enemies nor eternal friends, it should only have eternal interests. We can unhesitatingly adopt this approach provided that "eternal interests" mean strengthening international security, extending cooperation between countries and enhancing the role of international organisations in the settlement of global problems and conflicts.

But persistent military confrontation at the global and regional levels is clashing more and more with the imperatives of the new philosophy of security advanced by the Soviet Union. It fetters world politics, impeding a restructuring of relations between traditional adversaries, allies and partners on the basis of new political thinking. The present system of levels, pattern and geographic deployment of our military confrontation with other countries at the global and regional scale and the Soviet military presence abroad" took shape between the 1950s and 1970s under the influence of the specific conditions prevailing at the time."

The buildup of the Soviet Union's military potential at home and abroad was undoubtedly justified and necessary in many cases but unwarranted in others. But at present this system as a materialisation of confrontation and rivalry in three-odd decades of cold war, prevents us from reducing our direct military political overinvolvement in international conflicts, putting an excessive strain on our economy, handicapping our diplomatic flexibility (for all the efforts of our diplomats) and holding up the progress of Soviet initiatives aimed at forming a comprehensive system of international security.

This brings the arms reduction and limitation talks to the forefront of the struggle for security, something which in no way diminishes the need to reach agreement on regional conflicts and other burning problems.

It is on this point that considerations and objectives of military policy and military programmes often enter into conflict with the diplomatic dialogue. Unfortunately, this applies to both our negotiating partners and ourselves. Suffice it to say that in the early 1980s our defence requirements were estimated to include the need to keep at all costs a considerable number of intermediate-range missiles in the western and eastern parts of Soviet territory. As for the "zero option," we saw in it a bid to assure NATO double superiority in delivery vehicles and triple superiority in nuclear warheads. Among the barriers raised by our military policy to talks was our traditional objection to on-site inspection and forms of control other than the use of national means, such as satellites, radars, the inviolability of the structure of the nuclear triad and so on.

A historic breakthrough in this respect came with the signing of the INF Treaty, whose significance goes therefore much further than that of scrapping part of the world nuclear armoury and two classes of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons.

The idea that political means of safeguarding security, that is, primarily diplomacy and treaties, should be preferred to military means was proclaimed at top political level from the platform of the 27th CPSU Congress. In practice, however, strategic plans and armament programmes are still often regarded as something immutable and independent of external circumstances. These programmes are a strong obstacle to the efforts of diplomats seeking compromise and therefore set very tangible limits to the range of attainable accords.

It is perfectly logical that military institutions take the most active part in deciding on the line to be followed in talks since the object of the latter is what these agencies are responsible for. But is feedback effective enough? How great is the contribution of our politicians, diplomats, scientists and disarmament experts to the shaping of strategy, the specification of military plans, decision-making on new weapons systems, the assessment of defence requirements? Who can vouch and on what grounds, in the light of past experience (such as that of unrestrained tank-build-up in postwar years)², that all the provisions of our long-range military programmes and our strategic and operational concepts are really indispensable to our security?

Our defence potential and our plans for improving it are not a "thing in itself" existing outside political time and space. On the contrary, they are the most important factor in disarmament talks and in general political relations between the Soviet Union and other powers. This implies that people, agencies and research centres directly responsible for these talks and relations are in duty bound to contribute their share to the framing of our military policy. Otherwise they will be doomed to clear *ex post facto* the "mess" resulting from decisions they had nothing to do with.

Direct inclusion of the above considerations is likely to substantially widen the scope of feasible accords and eliminate collisions between our foreign policy plans and military measures. This is entirely in keeping with the new philosophy of security, with the orientation to political means of safeguarding it, to the renunciation of military power as a foundation of relations with the world around us.

2. Military Strategic Realities

Anyone who has concerned himself at all with strategic problems knows that the military requirements of a country (in terms of troops and armaments and their types and characteristics) cannot be directly deduced from the strength and resources of likely opponents. To specify these requirements, it is also necessary to ascertain in what manner the other side is capable of using its armed forces. Thereupon the country can decide what tasks its army and navy must fulfil accordingly. This is the only way to define its requirements as to the quantity, quality and deployment of armed forces and armaments.

Official documents adopted by the Soviet Union and the WTO in recent years as well as statements by political and military leaders contain key provisions offering a starting point for a revision of military doctrine and strategy. I refer, first of all, to the fact that victory in a world nuclear war is recognised as impossible (because the damage it would cause could not be reduced to an acceptable level) as is the waging of a limited and protracted nuclear war. Victory would also be out of the question in a large-scale conventional war in Europe between the WTO and NATO because of the disastrous consequences which even conventional hostilities would have for the population, economy and environment of the continent and in view of the practically inevitable nuclear escalation of such a conflict.

Apart from the foreign political and moral aspects of the problem, this leads even from the purely military point of view to the fundamental conclusion that it is necessary to regard the prevention of nuclear and conventional war as the chief task of the armed forces, pledge no-first-use of either nuclear or conventional weapons and revise strategy, operational plans and military capability on the principles of defence.

We can infer from the foregoing some further and more specific amendments to the strategy of defensive sufficiency without forgetting, of course, that generalisations of this nature are relative and inevitably open to question:

- until such time as all nuclear weapons are eliminated under relevant agreements, the combat task of offensive and defensive strategic forces will be not to limit damage in the event of nuclear war (which is impossible in any circumstances) nor to defeat the aggressor's armed forces, but to deliver a crushing blow against its life centres;
- the task of armed forces and conventional armaments is not to conduct offensive strategic operations in the main European and Asian theatres of war but to engage in defensive operations in order to frustrate offensive operations by the enemy;
- a protracted conventional war is impossible, and the task of the armed forces is to prevent the enemy from winning the upper hand in intensive short-term combat operations and from resorting to nuclear escalation with impunity;
- a war on two fronts simultaneously (that is, against the United States and its allies and against China) is very unlikely in the foreseeable future;
- no future use of limited Soviet forces in international conflicts or in internal conflicts in developing countries shall be envisaged.

Such analogies, though artificial, may be described in simplified terms as a transition from the strategy of two

and a half wars to a strategy of one war, or rather of the ability to stave it off on the basis of a reliable defence potential.

I can list another three general principles. First, the emphasis must be shifted from extensive to intensive means of ensuring defence. Second, the buildup of the possible enemies' military potential is not only an objective reality for our planning but a process directly influenced by our measures. Our activity is likely to lead to an intensification and extension of their programmes or, on the contrary, to these being slowed and wound down. Third, disarmament talks offer ample additional opportunities to strengthen our security at lower cost.

Colonel-General Vladimir Lobov told MOSCOW NEWS in commenting on the announced unilateral reduction in the Soviet military potential that from now on the task of safeguarding the security of the country and its allies would have to be fulfilled by smaller forces³. This approach is acceptable with the important proviso that the safeguarding of security as the most general goal does not explicitly answer the question of what armed forces are needed for this. The answer can vary depending on differences in the appraisal of political, economic and strategic realities, on the goals the country sets itself in a possible way, on its doctrine, strategy and concrete operational plans.

In line with the new approach to security, we must recognise that more missiles, aircraft, tanks and other weapons do not necessarily strengthen the country's defences. If these weapons and other resources are built up with a view to accomplishing unrealistic tasks, if too large production affects quality, and maintenance of equipment, the living conditions of servicemen and their families, and if resources are diverted from really important and reasonable objectives this may affect the defence potential. Limited strategic objectives and operational plans with smaller but efficient and well-supplied armed forces to match would be a much stronger guarantee of reliable defence.

Thus what we mean by reasonable or defensive sufficiency is not simply a reduction in troops and armaments but a thorough revision of strategy, operational plans and armed forces, in part by reducing them, revising modernisation programmes and redeploying forces, primarily with the aim of greatly strengthening the country's defences on a long-term basis.

3. Strategic Offensive and Defensive Weapons

Strategic nuclear forces and conventional armed forces differ fundamentally in tasks, the pattern of financing and requirements from the point of view of keeping up an acceptable military balance. Hence there can be no standard approach to assessing their sufficiency or cutting the costs involved.

The greater part of spending on strategic armaments is necessitated, with rare exceptions, by their development and testing and by investments in production capacities. This spending depends to a relatively lesser degree on the amount of serial production (that is, the number of produced models),^{***} and the maintenance costs of deployed forces. This is why expenditures for strategic offensive forces (SOFs) depend chiefly on the diversity of new systems put into service in place of or in addition to existing ones and not on the quantity of delivery vehicles or warheads.

It should be noted that Soviet and U.S. SOF delivery vehicles and warhead totals plainly tend to become stabilised (with the number of delivery vehicles even going down), and this irrespective of the course of talks on their reduction. The arms race in this sphere generally consists in replacing old by new and more effective weapons systems that are also costlier and are therefore manufactured in smaller quantities.

Consequently, the principle of sufficiency in this area demands a justified and consistent decision on not only how many delivery vehicles and warheads we need altogether but, more important, on how many and what new systems we need to introduce so as to counter the American ones. Our answers to these questions will be decisive for establishing how far we can cut economic costs in this sphere. A mere reduction in the total number of SOFs is unlikely to produce a large saving if in spite of lower numerical limits set to deliver vehicles and warheads the renewal of systems by introducing new generations goes on as intensively as before if in somewhat smaller series.

The task of our strategic offensive weapons is defined by the new military doctrine as preventing a U.S. nuclear attack, through the possibility of surviving a U.S. first strike and causing the enemy unacceptable losses by retaliation. A convincing capability for a devastating response is what constitutes our defensive potential and a guarantee of our security until nuclear weapons are destroyed completely and everywhere under international agreements.

The strategic and military-technological reality now is the following: it is impossible to reduce one's damage in a nuclear war by hitting the aggressor's strategic forces. Indeed, it implies delivering a first strike, that is, assuming the role of aggressor and responsibility for a holocaust. This is unacceptable either politically (in the light of our commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons) or technically (since from 30 to 70 per cent of U.S. weapons, such as those carried by submarines and bombers, are invulnerable to attack).

The idea of striking back at U.S. SOFs is evidently strategic nonsense, too. Why should the United States leave part of its forces as targets after it has delivered a first strike? In terms of reasonable sufficiency, targets suitable for retaliation are the aggressor's economic

facilities. A mere 400 nuclear warheads of the megaton class could destroy up to 70 per cent of the U.S. industrial potential. This number of warheads hardly exceeds 10-15 per cent of the Soviet Union's present strategic forces. Defence will be ensured if this many of them survive any attack and reach their targets. All further weapons and operations involving the use of SOFs would be doubtful in any respect and evidently unnecessary in terms of sufficiency.

Our current military programmes therefore raise certain questions from the point of view of the declared principle of reasonable sufficiency. To judge by the information published in foreign sources, we have responded to each SOF system deployed by the United States at this stage in the arms race with two new systems of our own simultaneously. We counter ICBMs of the MX type with land-mobile SS-25 and SS-24 ICBM systems (we call these missiles RS-12M and RS-22); submarines of the Ohio type and Trident I SLBMs, with new systems of the Typhoon type and what the West calls Delta 4s plus two corresponding types of SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 SLBMs; B-1B bombers, with TU-160 bombers and a new modification of TU-95; sea-based Tomahawk cruise missiles (SLCMs) carrying nuclear warheads, with SS-N-21 and SS-N-24 SLCMs. It is only air-launched cruise missiles that we counter 1:1.⁴

Aren't quantity-oriented mechanisms typical of other echelons of the command system at work here? Are such "asymmetric" responses inevitable? They suit those Americans who advocate wearing out the Soviet Union economically, encouraging them to carry on talks from "positions of strength." This is all the more so because counter-measures in the ratio of 2:1 will be even harder for us to adopt in the event of signing a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in SOFs and on a drastic lowering of strategic force levels and sublevels. We could probably effect a serious reduction in economic expenditures without undermining our security while strengthening and not weakening our negotiating positions if we followed a ratio of 1:1 or, better still, 1:2 with the emphasis on the qualitative aspect of new strategic systems and on the high efficiency of their commander-control-communication and early warning system.

The strategic task of the MX ICBM system and the new Trident-2 SLBM is admittedly to hit Soviet silo-based missiles. It follows that to maintain our capability for adequate retaliation, we could envisage as a counter-measure against both systems one new system (instead of the present two systems) of land-based mobile ICBMs with either a single-warhead or MIRV missile depending on the system's combat tasks and targets. Mobility in this case is the principal means of assuring the survival of deployed missiles, which is essential for our capability for retaliation. However, our second strike would not be aimed at the numerous protected targets of the aggressor's strategic forces, such as launch silos, for these would have fired their missiles in delivering a first strike. It is more likely that retaliation would be directed

against the enemy's few main unprotected administrative and industrial centres. This, it seems, should be taken into consideration, first of all, when deciding on the type of ICBM for mobile land-based deployment.

To reinforce land-based missile forces, it would apparently be enough for us to have one new long-range submarine missile system capable of hitting targets from near the Soviet coast and hence making it unnecessary to venture on to the high seas through enemy anti-submarine barriers. In the case of lower SOF levels, the Delta-4 submarine, which carries 16 SS-N-23 missiles tipped with 64 warheads in all, would apparently be more attractive than Typhoon with its 200 warheads mounted on 20 SS-N-20 missiles. The former makes it possible within the limits of the same number of warheads to distribute forces over a greater number of launching positions than the latter, thereby adding to the survivability of our missile-carrying submarine fleet. In the light of the expected lowering of SOF ceilings by treaty, parallel construction of two new types of submarines seems all the more questionable (the nuclear-powered missile submarine is the costliest single SOF system).

Furthermore, increasingly experts in the United States recognise that the B-1B bomber (280 billion dollars per item) is an ill-advised and unreliable system. And even stronger doubts are relevant to our analogous aircraft, TU 160, called Blackjack in the West. The U.S. bomber is intended to penetrate deep into our large-scale air defence system. But the United States practically lacks such a system, for it dismantled almost completely the one it had in the sixties. To support our ICBMs and SLBMs (if necessary at all, since they are redundant anyway), it would be quite enough to have one type of bomber carrying ALCMs (based on, say, TU-95s or new wide-bodied high-capacity aircraft) and capable of hitting targets over a long distance without entering deep into U.S. air space. Finally would it not be enough to have one type (instead of two) of sea-based cruise missiles?

In accordance with the principle of reasonable sufficiency, we could apparently save large resources by desisting from the manufacture of certain weapon systems. By way of taking reciprocal steps at the START talks, it is possible, of course, to take even more radical decisions.

With regard to strategic defensive weapons, it is time to reconsider at long last our apparently very costly air defences echeloned in depth. According to foreign sources, our air defence system comprises 8,600 anti-aircraft missile launching sites and 2,300 interceptor fighters. The United States has 290 fighters (including the National Guard forces) but no anti-aircraft missiles.³

Now what is wrong with that since defence strategy implies putting the emphasis on defence? The point is that while this is true of conventional armed forces and weapons, in the sphere of nuclear arms hopes of direct

military technological defence are a costly and counter-productive illusion, as the experience of the last 40 years has shown very well. The only defence against nuclear weapons in view of their fundamental difference from conventional arms is to prevent their use by maintaining a dependable capability for retaliation and ultimately to get rid of them by means of accords. Mikhail Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed that there neither is nor can be any defence against nuclear weapons and that it is high time "to recognise that there is no roof on earth or in space under which one could take shelter from a nuclear thunderstorm should it break out."⁶

It is evidently not only peace-loving foreign public, the Palme Commission or the Delhi Six that these words apply to. Surely statements by the head of our state and our Defence Council are a strategic guidance for all the military agencies concerned.

The country's system of air defence against strategic weapons is doubtful for at least three reasons. First, it could hardly intercept all U.S. airborne strategic weapons, especially with the deployment of cruise missiles on heavy bombers, that is, many thousands of "Rusts" carrying 200-kiloton warheads. After all, to intercept 60, 70 or 80 per cent of them would not mean more than intercepting none. The 20 or even 10 per cent of heavy bombers and cruise missiles that could break through, carrying 800-400 nuclear warheads with a yield ranging from 200 kilotons to nine megaton, would be able just the same to inflict disastrous, unsustainable damage. It is like a bridge reaching to the middle or spanning two-thirds of a river: no matter how wide, solid or fine, no matter how expensive, it would be as useless as if it had not been there at all. Nor is that all.

Second, radars, the launch sites of air defence missiles and the airfields of interceptors are in themselves entirely vulnerable to ballistic missiles. Incidentally, the United States actually plans in the event of war a "precursor" strike with sea-based missiles to open "corridors" for its bombers in air defence zones.

Third, land- and sea-based ballistic missiles (some 8,000 warheads in all) could, if necessary, hit practically all targets by themselves, without the aid of heavy bombers. The chief reason now given for preserving and renewing them in the United States (B-1B, Stealth) is that the Soviet Union will have to spend many times more on modernising its air defences, which means that this is seen as one of the most advantageous lines of economically exhausting the Soviet Union.

An argument put forward occasionally is that we could use our air defences in a conventional if not a nuclear war. But this is more like justifying a system already there than defining its real task. Is a conventional war between the Soviet Union and the United States—a war involving massive mutual air raids without using nuclear weapons—conceivable at all? If so, does this imply that the huge WTO and NATO forces in Europe and the

Soviet and U.S. forces in the Far East would stay out, doing nothing? It is very hard to imagine such a thing. However, we admit at the official level and it is part of our doctrine that a wide-ranging war in Europe even one fought with conventional arms, would lead to a catastrophe and develop almost inevitably into a nuclear holocaust. It follows that a conventional air war is still less likely. (The United States does envisage the possibility of using its strategic bombers carrying conventional weapons in a conventional war in Europe against WTO second echelons, communications and ships as well as for strikes against third countries. But official sources say nothing about using heavy bombers for non-nuclear attacks on the Soviet Union. If there are any secret plans for this they may be dismissed as a strategic absurdity responding to which would be as much of an absurdity.)

A far more modest air defence system is certainly necessary for an early warning of attack, controlling air space in peacetime and safeguarding the country against possible terrorists. Certain events have suggested that this is something to work on. We also need an air defence system at tactical non-nuclear level to shield troops from air strikes. As for the doctrine of averting nuclear war, military-technological and strategic realities demand admitting explicitly and without qualification that the concepts of "repulsing missile space attack" and "destroying the armed forces and military potential of the enemy" are hopelessly outdated. They are a typical instance of projecting prenuclear military thinking into the solution of the historically unprecedented problem of security in the nuclear and space age, which calls for fundamentally new approaches.

It would be useful to think once again whether it is advisable to maintain and modernise the ABM complex around Moscow. The 100 anti-missiles allowed under the ABM Treaty are clearly insufficient for defence against a dedicated strike by major U.S., Britain and French forces. Defence against strikes by terrorists or by other nuclear powers as well as against unauthorised and accidental missile launches necessitates cover, if only a "thin layer" of it, for the whole territory of the country, and this is something the Moscow ABM complex cannot provide in any circumstances. The defence of Moscow hardly justifies the expenditures it entails, since foreign ballistic missiles would still hold hostage Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk and other cities, not to mention the fact that for terrorists ballistic missiles are the most inconvenient system of delivering nuclear weapons and the hardest to acquire.

The possibility of nuclear arms and missile technology spreading to Third World countries, including their purchase by unstable and adventurist regimes, cannot be ruled out and will remain a serious threat in the foreseeable future. Even so, military-technological solutions are likely to prove rather counterproductive. What is needed is political measures, a common policy by many responsible powers and international organisations. Since we hope that in our relations with the mightiest power, the

United States, security can be safeguarded by political means, it should be all the easier to devise effective political means of doing away with less grandiose military threats. It is important that the interests of the whole civilised world fully coincide on this point.

Preventing a "decapitating" strike against the military and political leadership—a threat coming from the United States and third nuclear powers and not from terrorists—would probably cost less if we diverted at least part of the resources saved to raising survivability, efficiency and quality of our underground and air command and communications systems. Needless to say, Soviet-U.S. agreements must guarantee the inviolability of the ABM Treaty and the prevention of an arms race in space.

4. Conventional Armaments

In the area of armed forces and conventional armaments as distinct from SOFs, substantial cuts could be made in spending by lowering quantitative levels and reducing the series of weapons and combat equipment put out. As in the case of strategic forces, a great saving could be produced by building fewer types and modifications of systems while accentuating the qualitative aspect. This is particularly important because the greater part of military expenditures goes to conventional armed forces. The United States, for one, spends roughly 15 per cent of its military budget on strategic forces and over 60 per cent, on its conventional forces. True, personnel, whose share in conventional armed forces is much greater, costs considerably more in the United States than in the Soviet Union. But our conventional armed forces have a larger personnel than those of the United States, and we produce many more types and modifications of weapons systems than that country, doing it, moreover, in larger series and replacing combat equipment by new models more frequently than the United States.

According to foreign sources, Soviet ground troops total about 180 divisions equipped with and having reserves of, among others, 53,000 tanks. Ninety-nine of these divisions (55 per cent) are stationed in Europe and orientated to the European theatre of war, 23 (13 per cent) to the southern theatre (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) and 46 (26 per cent) to China and Japan; 11 divisions form the central reserve.⁷ (Other sources set Soviet ground troops at 200 divisions: 52 armoured, 150 motorised infantry and seven airborne, plus 55 divisions of our WTO allies.)⁸ Roughly 50 per cent of divisions have only about 20 per cent of statutory personnel and obsolete equipment and would take long to acquire combat readiness by drawing on reserves. Our tank fleet—the backbone of the combat power of our ground troops—is half made up of tanks designed in the fifties and early sixties (T 54/55, T 62).⁹

We declare officially that a protracted large-scale conventional war with NATO in Europe is impossible and unacceptable. This presumably applies also to the

United States and Japan in the Far East and in still greater measure, to China, a great Asian socialist power. In line with our new doctrine and strategy, we could apparently disband without detriment to our defences all divisions whose combat readiness is low, scrap the enormous stockpiles of obsolete arms and equipment and abolish the unwieldy system of mobilising industry for war with due regard to the realities of the quick pace and supertechnologisation of modern warfare. The new doctrine calls for a more compact, more combat-ready and well-paid army having the latest equipment.

As a protracted conventional war on two fronts is highly improbable, it is hardly right to keep major forces on a permanent basis for independent large-scale military operations in Europe, Asia and the Far East. We could, for instance, effect through demobilisation radical cuts in the number of divisions deployed along the frontier with China and in the Far East.

Generally speaking, the surest way to dissipate our resources and wear ourselves out economically is to build a sort of Chinese Wall (in the form of major forces) along all the greatly extended boundaries of the socialist community. The other way of safeguarding security, that is the intensive way, is apparently to set up a rear infrastructure, including facilities for storing arms, supplies and equipment plus proper ground and air communications (needed also for economic development, by the way), that would make it possible to quickly redeploy major forces to any threatened area.

How many divisions would be enough for defence, with the NATO forces unchanged? On the main front, in Central Europe, the West permanently keeps about 30 divisions whose number could be increased to some 50 in the event of mobilisation. Throughout the European zone NATO has about 100 divisions.¹⁰ To close the 800-kilometre Central European front, the WTO needs from 20 to 30 divisions. Defence echeloned in depth (including the troops stationed in the European part of Soviet territory, some of which are intended to close the southern and northern flanks) could evidently be ensured with the aid of 50 to 60 WTO divisions. This is organisationally roughly one-third of the forces now deployed on the extensive principle.

Comparison by divisions is quite approximate of course, for there are divisions and divisions. But we can fully rely on our military agencies in that an appropriate reorganisation of our divisions, armies and groups of armies would guarantee reliable defence with smaller forces. Such defence would also make it possible to counterattack, deliver flanking strikes and meeting engagements at tactical level in order to expel the invading enemy from our territory.

This approach could be applied also to air forces in view of their high mobility and multipurpose character. It is hardly advisable to have about 8,000 tactical aircraft¹¹ most of which are obsolete. (A modern U.S. fighter costs

30-40 million dollars per airplane.) Air force defence strategy obviously calls for stronger emphasis on reliable air defence of one's own ground troops, powerful air support for them and the attainment of superiority in one's air space coupled with a reduction in resources for offensive operations against targets in the deep enemy rear and airfields.

The accomplishment by 1991 of the unilateral cuts of Soviet armed forces in Europe as announced by Mikhail Gorbachev will in itself mark a big advance towards restructuring our ground troops and air forces. Still deeper-going reductions are possible on a reciprocal basis in the context of the WTO-NATO talks on armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Special mention should be made of naval forces in view of the high cost and complexity of modern surface ships and submarines and of the time it takes to build them. Logically, defence sufficiency in the case of these forces implies restricting their combat tasks to defending the Soviet coast against strikes from the sea by carrier task forces and amphibious landings of the West as well as to defending strategic submarines with long-range missiles in coastal seas against anti-submarine enemy forces.

Such functions as interdicting Atlantic and Pacific communications are hardly consonant with a defensive strategy, especially where ground troops and air forces dependably ensure defence in the main continental theatres.

An even more doubtful mission is that of searching for and destroying strategic submarines of the United States, Britain and France on the high seas, which are dominated by the hostile navy. As the range of modern SLBMs of the Trident 1 and Trident 2 type enables them to be launched from the coast of Uruguay and New Guinea, to chase strategic missile carriers there would be as absurd as sowing selected seeds in the Kara Kum desert. It would divert resources from important tasks to unattainable goals.

Defence against sea-based strategic and nuclear cruise missiles (as well as against ICBMs and heavy bombers) should be ensured by means of a capability for preventing nuclear aggression, i.e., for delivering a devastating retaliatory strike, and not through the ineffective and costly hunt to submarines.

The extension of naval confrontation with the United States in distant seas, in conflict areas involving developing countries—the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, the South Atlantic—is for objective geostrategic reasons the most disadvantageous sphere of rivalry for us, an extremely costly area¹² having no direct bearing on the security of the Soviet Union or its main allies. Even if we had a navy three times as large as that of the United States (something unthinkable for

economic reasons), the West would still retain its superiority in this field. Unlike our country, the United States has free access to the oceans of the world. Its fleets are in a position to rapidly reinforce each other and are supported by a vast network of bases on foreign soil. The United States has allies possessing impressive naval forces, and does not have to bear a burden comparable to ours in supporting defence on continental theatres.

Why enter into rivalry on a hostile field since all conditions at our own are favourable to us? The other side is superior to us in large surface ships (7.6 times over), aircraft carriers and naval aircraft and amphibious forces. We are superior to it in multipurpose submarines with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes (1.2 times over), land-based missile-carrying naval aircraft, small ships and boats for coastal operations (1.6 times over).¹² Trying to break this asymmetry would get us nowhere. It would be better for us to place it in the service of our strategy. We are capable of sinking all NATO aircraft carriers operating off our coast (this is admitted by impartial experts in Washington).¹³ As for exposing surface targets worth many millions to attack by carrier aircraft and cruise missiles in faraway seas and oceans, there is no point in that at all.

Hence it would be useful to seriously revise plans for the construction of a large surface fleet, including aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered cruisers and landing ships. The forces we have are plainly sufficient for defending our littoral and protecting our sea-based strategic forces equipped with long-range missiles in coastal seas. Henceforward we ought apparently to concentrate on building multipurpose submarines in smaller numbers and in smaller variety but with higher qualitative indices and armed with anti-ship missiles and torpedoes plus, if necessary, long-range sea-based nuclear cruise missiles. Land-based naval missile-carrying aircraft would within the range of escort fighters give powerful support to submarines and surface ships carrying out strictly defensive operations.

5. Military Production

Conventional armed forces—ground troops, air and naval forces—as well as strategic nuclear forces are faced with the pressing task of going over from extensive (quantity) to intensive military programmes, of putting the emphasis on quality. The point at issue is not only quantitative levels but modernisation programmes swallowing the lion's share of appropriations. Our party has called for a radical change in expenditure mechanism typical of the arms industry and construction bureaus which turn out diverse weapons systems duplicating each other and continuously develop new modifications of these systems that are introduced in more and more new large series although they only raise effectiveness by a negligible margin.

According to foreign sources, Soviet ground troops today deploy three types of tanks and three types of combat

vehicles and armoured carriers simultaneously (against one of each in the United States); non-strategic air and naval forces, seven models of fighters, strike planes and bombers (against three in the United States); naval forces, five different classes of warships and three multipurpose submarines (against four and one, respectively, in the United States).¹⁴ The same sources claim (while ours are silent) that from 1977 to 1986 the Soviet Union produced twice as many fighters and submarines as the United States, three times as many tanks and combat helicopters and nine times as many artillery pieces and anti-aircraft missiles. It was only in the construction of large warships that the United States found itself ahead of us (by 10 per cent). As far as nuclear weapons are concerned, the USSR produced four times as many ballistic missiles and thirteen times as many heavy and medium bombers.¹⁵

These data cannot be taken at face value. But if they reflect the actual state of affairs at least to some degree, then perestroika in this field should include a whole set of measures, such as broader discussion on key programmes from the standpoint of defence sufficiency and stricter selection of them on the principle of comparing cost and effectiveness. There is also the need to end unnecessary duplication and introduce healthy competition between construction bureaus and in industry, limit output series and effect renewal at longer intervals while taking bigger leaps in quality. Lastly, it is essential to encourage saving and capital productivity, fix realistic prices on skilled labour, raw materials, other resources and impose financial penalties for exceeding deadlines of expenditures and time limits.

Defence needs a sort of self-accounting like other fields. Security is invaluable to us but in the final analysis, whatever the military budget, it expresses itself in perfectly definite expenditures of labour and material resources. It is vitally important to us in every respect that these enormous investments should really produce the maximum by safeguarding the security of the Soviet people, who are engaged in perestroika.

With the acute deficit of information on our armed forces and military budget, it is very difficult to estimate the likely economic effect of the proposals I have set out. However, tentative calculations, indicate that their implementation in the next five-year plan period could reduce our defence spending by 40 to 50 per cent, and this, most important, not weakening but strengthening the country's defence, to say nothing of other security aspects, both economic and political.

These proposals certainly lay no claim to offering solutions for all problems or showing the only correct course of action. They merely suggest one of the possible approaches put in very general terms and requiring critical analysis by many experts in strategy, technology and economics, who should use our own authentic facts and figures and not foreign data.

It is occasionally said that the military has "no stake" in cutting armaments or military expenditures or in extending military glasnost. It is hard to accept this view. There is no reason whatever to deny that in this area as in other spheres of our society and state there are sincere supporters of perestroika just as there are staunch opponents and those who hold forth about perestroika yet would like to reduce it to cosmetic adjustments.

While processes typical of society as a whole are going on also in the military field, the latter has its peculiarities. Due to their profession and duty military men are responsible for the military aspect of security. Its other aspects and a more comprehensive approach to it are the prerogative of other people and bodies, both governmental and non-governmental. We need not fear alternative points of view. The task of perestroika is to assure every approach and every opinion adequate participation on the basis of democratisation and glasnost, of broad and constructive debates—as distinct from the decisions taken behind closed doors in the past—in the people's cause of keeping the defence potential at a level of reasonable sufficiency.

Footnotes

1. International Affairs, No. 10, 1988, pp 19-21.
2. See Vitaly Shiykov, "Strong Is the Armour... (Tank Asymmetry and Real Security)," International Affairs, No. 12, 1988, pp 35-48.
3. Moscow News, Dec. 18, 1988.
4. See The Military Balance, 1988-1989, pp 18, 33-34.
5. See The Military Balance, 1988-1989, pp 19, 35.
6. Mikhail Gorbachev, For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Humanism of International Relations, Moscow, 1987, p 23 (in Russian).
7. See J. Steinbrunner, L. Sigal, Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question, Washington, 1983, pp 52-53.
8. See The Military Balance, 1988-1989, p 34.
9. See V. Shlykov, op. cit., pp 39-52.
10. See The Military Balance, 1988-1989, p 237.
11. Pravda, Jan. 30, 1989.
12. Pravda, Sept. 5, 1988.
13. See W. Kaufmann, A Thoroughly Efficient Navy, Washington, 1987, pp 100-111.
14. See Soviet Military Power, 1988, pp 75-85.
15. See Soviet Military Power, 1987, p 121.

* The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates the permanent military presence of the United States abroad at 470,000 men and that of the Soviet Union, at 770,000 men. After the Soviet Union has withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan and reduced their strength in Eastern Europe and Mongolia, its presence will decrease to between 550,000 and 570,000 men. (See The Military Balance, 1988-1989, IISS, London, 1988, pp 25-29, 39-44).

** From what Western sources say—regrettably, we still publish no such information—Soviet arms deliveries go, apart from the WTO countries and Mongolia, to more than 20 other countries, Soviet military experts serve in upwards of 30 developing countries, and the Soviet Air Force and Navy have strongpoints in eight of them. (See Soviet Military Power, Washington, 1988, pp 132-133.

*** One exception is nuclear-powered BM submarines, which are very expensive (up to two billion dollars per submarine). The larger the series, the higher the cost—in direct proportion.

****A modern warship may cost at U.S. prices up to one billion dollars, an aircraft carrier without aircraft and escort ships, up to three billion, and a multipurpose submarine, up to 600 million dollars.

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1989

Defense Minister Yazov Interviewed on CFE, SNF During Visit to CSSR

LD1305192189 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak
1630 GMT 13 May 89

[Interview with USSR Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov with news editor Ivan Miertan; Yazov speaks in Russian with superimposed Slovak translation; date, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Miertan] Comrade Minister, at the end of visits it is usual to evaluate their aims and goals. How do you evaluate the results of the visit by your military delegation to our country?

[Yazov] We came to Czechoslovakia at the invitation of your minister of defense, Army General Milan Vaclavik, with the aim of becoming acquainted with the life and everyday combat training of members of the Czechoslovak people's Army. We visited units of the Western military district; we were invited to the Military Academy in Vyskov, and they showed us modern training machine technology and training for tank drivers and live firing of these battle vehicles and artillery. [passage omitted].

[Miertyan] Let us now look at some of the important current aspects of the present disarmament talks. Within their complex is also the unilateral reduction in the Soviet Armed Forces in the countries of Eastern Europe. Precisely today, for example, the transfer of the motorized battalion of the Central Group of Soviet Forces from Olomouc back to the Soviet Union began. How do you evaluate this process?

[Yazov] Naturally, cooperation between our fraternal parties, states, nations, and armies always had and will have as its point of departure the content of the words: building socialism. Above all, we would all jointly like to see above all peaceful socialism. Only during peaceful existence can we show its possibilities, its creative potential, to the full extent. I will put it even more simply. Only with peaceful existence and gradual disarmament can we build socialism which is worthy of its name, a system which gives a chance to fully implement the potential talent, capabilities, initiative, and creativity of the people and all of society.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces is a well-thought-out step. It comes from the logic of new political thinking, from the priority of all-human values and our joint effort to replace the word confrontation with the word cooperation in relations between East and West. At the same time, however, we must not forget that precisely at this time when the numbers of the armies of socialist countries are being reduced, vigilance and the reliability of the system of our defense must be increased. This responsibility is borne by us all. Look, many speculate that our present foreign-political line is not just temporary, that is, they cast doubt on the results and success of restructuring. But in our country, and as I saw also in yours, it is gaining tempo and new dimensions. Naturally, it is not without problems and shortcomings, they do exist. But we are fighting them precisely in the process of restructuring.

[Miertyan] Comrade Minister, you recalled some doubts which are so often spoken of in the West. Some observers allege that these are causing the excessive caution of the new U.S. Government in the disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker recently ended his first visit to the Soviet Union. During the time of his talks in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev came forward with a new peace initiative concerning the unilateral withdrawal of 500 tactical nuclear warheads from the territory of the allies of the Soviet Union within the Warsaw Pact. What is your opinion of this further disarmament proposal?

[Yazov] I think that similar steps in disarmament will also be taken by the Soviet Union in the future. Of course, not ad infinitum. Why I am saying not ad infinitum? It is because whatever we offer to the U.S. and NATO, they look at our every proposal for a very long time and generally will not accept it. They look first for every possible gain they can get from these proposals, gain just for themselves, that is. Within NATO there is an argument regarding the modernization of tactical nuclear missiles. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is known in Washington that according to the treaty on elimination of two types of nuclear missiles, the Soviet Union eliminates also missiles classified as AK, with the range up to 500 km. NATO, though, considers the possibility of the modernization of Lance missiles exactly of the same range. Where is the logic then?

We eliminate our weapons and they develop new ones. One should think that in signing the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the Americans have simply deceived us. A similar statement could seem undiplomatic, but facts are facts. I am mostly drawing on them when I state that we are not going to take steps in unilateral disarmament ad infinitum if we are not going to have a partner.

I do remember that George Bush very often speaks about his policy as one that continues the policy of Ronald Reagan. Nevertheless, as was shown by his latest statements as well as statements by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, the continuity is there only regarding the former attitude by Reagan that all questions linked with the Soviet Union will be dealt with by the United States from the position of strength.

By the way, according to my view, Baker's visit to Moscow also confirmed that Washington would in the future strive for unilateral concessions from our side, to be achieved through tactics, pressure, and rigidity.

But I ask once again, where is the logic here? On one side, the Americans and NATO cry that we are stronger, that we threaten them, that we have superiority in these and those weapons. On the other hand, they hold talks with us from the position of strength. Details from the first round of talks held by James Baker with Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Gorbachev will be available to me only at home. Only there we will be able to more precisely assess the talks' results. Let me allow at the end to thank for cordial and sincere welcome of our entire Army delegation in Czechoslovakia.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO Chief Speaks on Missile Rift, New Era
AU1205182689 Vienna DIE PRESSE
in German 12 May 89 p 3

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Otmar Lahodynsky; date and place not given: "Without NATO There Would Not Be Perestroika and Glasnost"]

[Text] DIE PRESSE: Just as it reaches its 40th birthday NATO is sliding into a serious internal crisis because of the controversy over short-range missiles. The chances for a harmonious family celebration at the NATO summit at the end of May are small. Can a compromise still be reached or will there be a family quarrel?

[Woerner] I see a chance for a compromise and hope that we will find a solution that will not just cover up the differences in opinion. However, one cannot speak of a crisis. We have differences of opinion, admittedly, on an important issue. NATO is an alliance of sovereign, free states which cannot be brought to one line by orders.

By the way, the summit is not a family celebration; rather it is to provide a political signal for the future. It is to answer the question of how the alliance is reacting to the changes in international politics to which it has contributed. NATO can claim an incredible success: Not only has it brought about the longest period of peace in Europe since the time of the Romans, but also the change in thinking in the Soviet Union has started not least because of this alliance. To exaggerate a bit: Without NATO there would not have been perestroika and glasnost.

[Lahodynsky] What is it that the United States and the British fear so much concerning negotiations on short-range missiles?

[Woerner] First, no one in the alliance excludes negotiations forever....

[Lahodynsky] Not even Mrs Thatcher?

[Woerner] Not even Mrs Thatcher. The idea of the "fire-protection wall," which might have existed in the past, has been given up. Now there is the question of when and under what conditions the West should start such negotiations. The actual security problem lies in conventional weapons.

The still existing capability of the Warsaw Pact to carry out surprise attacks and large-scale attacks has to be eliminated by negotiations. If Gorbachev is serious about his assurance that whoever has more also has to give up more, he should and must unilaterally reduce his 16-fold superiority in the field of short-range nuclear weapons.

[Lahodynsky] This is what one could negotiate with the Soviets.

[Woerner] The fear of the Americans or the British is that such negotiations would very quickly lead to a third zero option. And there is another concern—namely, that potential parallel negotiations might lead more quickly to results concerning short-range missiles because of the complicated nature of the conventional area. Then one thing could easily be played out against the other or could be used as a means of exerting pressure.

[Lahodynsky] A large number of Europeans would certainly be in favor of such a third zero option.

[Woerner] Governments are expected to guide public opinion and not to run after it. Of course, there is a mood in our countries which I understand very well. One does not want to have anything to do with nuclear weapons, which are terrible weapons. But in this connection many people overlook the fact that these weapons have brought about something which is unprecedented in human history: They have prevented wars, not only nuclear wars but also conventional wars. One needs a minimum amount of these weapons if one wants to stabilize the military situation in the long run and to make it seem impossible to wage wars in the future, too. Therefore, the alliance rejects a third zero option. But it is in favor of reducing these weapons to a minimum, which is below the current Western level. We are not enamored with nuclear weapons, but we believe that they promote the safeguarding of peace and the prevention of war.

[Lahodynsky] However, there are fears that part of the NATO leadership considers it possible to wage and win a nuclear war. At the latest "Wintex" maneuvers a conventional attack by the East was answered with limited nuclear strikes, which mainly took place in both German states.

[Woerner] I am very grateful for this question. I do not understand most of the entire discussion about the maneuvers, which I led for the first time from NATO headquarters here. It was a purely procedural exercise with innumerable artificial premises, not an operational scenario for waging war. From this, one cannot derive any conclusions about what would really happen in an emergency. I categorically reject any speculations which say that this is proof that it is planned to wage a nuclear war and even to limit it to central Europe or Germany.

[Lahodynsky] The United States has threatened to withdraw its troops from Europe. Is it not possible that, conversely, the pressure for a free withdrawal might increase?

[Woerner] Every sensible European knows that, in view of the enormous Soviet military machinery, which has in no way been tangibly reduced to date, the presence of the

U.S. troops is the firmest guarantee for the West Europeans' security and freedom. Europe is not yet able to defend itself with its own strength against the USSR superpower. One thing is sure: A denuclearization of Europe would end with a decoupling from the United States.

[Lahodinsky] Former FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt accused the NATO leadership of playing up a "third-rank" strategic problem in the form of the short-range missiles. A credible concept as a response to Gorbachev's disarmament initiatives would be much more important.

[Woerner] With all the respect that I still have for Helmut Schmidt, in this connection he is wrong. It is not NATO that is reacting to Mr Gorbachev, even though this is seen in this way here and there, but to date Gorbachev has still been reacting to NATO. There is no essential initiative in the field of arms control which does not come from the West. I will give you some examples: zero option, START reduction of intercontinental potentials by 50 percent, the total ban on chemical weapons, the entire CSCE process, the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament—all these were Western proposals.

Who was the first to put a concrete proposal based on figures for conventional disarmament on the table? The West, because we are still waiting for the East. Gorbachev proposes negotiations on one single issue, which is now being discussed by us.

Of course, Helmut Schmidt is correct that this is not the central problem of the alliance. However, these weapons are not unimportant. They are an essential part in the overall concept of nuclear deterrence.

[Lahodinsky] You have explained your vision of a new East-West relationship to overcome the division of Europe. Some NATO partners do not particularly like the issue of German reunification.

[Woerner] Visible movement has started in the East bloc. Whoever looks toward Hungary or Poland understands that prospects are opening up there which were considered impossible a decade ago. The West cannot observe this passively; in its own way it has to try to promote this development and guide it onto tracks that make Europe freer and safer.

This leads to our vision of a Europe in which the citizens enjoy their human rights, in which the borders are open and not cemented by walls, and in which the peoples have the right to self-determination—a Europe in which the artificial division is abolished and thus also the division of Germany. This is certainly the end of such a historical process, not because the West wants it, but because it will be the fruit of self-determination.

However, I have to add: We are interested in evolution and stability and naturally only in a peaceful change in

the system. We will use the opportunities we have through cooperation, political dialogue, and a military structure which continues to clearly show that we only—and really only—want to observe our own security interests and are willing to respect those of the Soviet Union.

[Lahodinsky] Consideration is being given to strengthening the Western European Union [WEU]. Could this organization develop into an independent defense body of the EC?

[Woerner] In your question I do not like the term "independent." The WEU has always considered itself an outgrowth of West European defense identity, but within the framework of NATO. Therefore, I consider a strengthening of the WEU correct and possible under two preconditions: openness toward the accession of others and transparency toward the rest of the alliance.

[Lahodinsky] Intensified military cooperation among EC countries would certainly not make the accession of a neutral country like Austria any easier.

[Woerner] I am not willing to discuss the issue of neutrality. This is a decision that has to be made among the Europeans themselves. NATO will not have to decide on this.

CANADA

Editorial Sees 'Opportunity' in Gorbachev Initiatives During UK Visit

42200009 Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN in English
10 Apr 89 p A8

[Editorial: "Gorbachev Offer—More Soviet Arms Pressure"]

[Text] Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev turned up the arms control pressure on the West again last week.

While visiting Britain, he announced that the Soviet Union will phase out a second and third reactor that produces weapons-grade plutonium; reiterated his commitment to deep reductions in Soviet military power; and challenged the Western contention that the nuclear deterrent in Europe is required to keep the peace. Gorbachev proposed eliminating all nuclear weapons. And he warned that the arms-control process will falter if we don't reciprocate. The barb was clearly directed at the Bush administration's drawn-out foreign policy review, which is now searching for an approach to proposed arms-control talks on strategic nuclear weapons and whether or not to modernize NATO's European-based short-range nuclear arms.

If Gorbachev seems like a man in a hurry, it's due in part to his domestic agenda. He wants to rechannel Soviet military resources into economic development. And substantive arms-control agreements would undermine

those in Moscow who fear Gorbachev is giving away the country's military caches in return for very little.

We should not make security decisions based on speculation about Gorbachev's domestic fortunes. We should, however, indicate a willingness to meet him part-way by not modernizing the short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Aside from the message it would send to the Soviets, modernization would alienate the West Germans and yield little appreciable military advantage.

Gorbachev's decision to dismantle the reactors shouldn't be dismissed; it should be explored as an opportunity to seek an agreement verifying the production of fissionable materials by both sides. And finally, we should be pressing for an agreement allowing the verification of unilateral arms cuts—a confidence-building measure that would ensure each side is keeping its promises.

The broader disagreement on whether or not nuclear weapons deter or threaten isn't of vital importance now. We first need substantial reductions in the arsenals that can kill us all many times over. Then we can discuss whether they're even necessary.

Soviet Envoy on Nuclear Submarine Plan, Demilitarized Arctic

52200008 Toronto *THE SATURDAY STAR* in English
15 Apr 89 p A8

[Article by Tim Harper]

[Excerpt] Ottawa—A top Soviet official here has appealed to Canada's "common sense" to realize its proposal to buy nuclear-powered submarines runs counter to the global trend of improving East-West relations.

Alexey Makarov, the second-ranking official in the Soviet embassy, yesterday in an interview pushed the Soviet proposal of a demilitarized Arctic, expected to be a topic of discussion at Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev this summer.

"We are appealing to common sense, we are suggesting the limitation or decrease of military activities in the North," Makarov said. "The submarines will be built it goes against the trend of reducing armaments."

Makarov jokingly suggested the Soviet Union should give Canada some of its nuclear fleet because the USSR is cutting back and doesn't need them.

He added, however, that the proposed submarine purchase is an internal Canadian matter, but "we would have our own approach."

Makarov, who ranks below only Ambassador Alexey Rodionov at the Soviets' Ottawa mission, said later he spoke out on the submarine question "only to express our opinion."

He also reiterated an earlier Soviet offer to put its huge military bases at the Kola Peninsula, north of the Arctic circle, on the negotiating block.

Canada has said it will not move bilaterally with Moscow on any matter which could weaken the security of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

A decision on the purchase of a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of \$8 billion is believed to be imminent. A signal is expected in this month's federal budget.

Makarov also joined the external affairs department yesterday in praising the Canada-Soviet Arctic treaty which is awaiting the signature of Mulroney and Gorbachev.

It covers areas like the sharing of scientific knowledge on the environment, construction projects in the North and cultural exchanges.

'Very Pleased'

"This treaty is a good legal foundation for further development of co-operation between the Soviet Union and Canada involving all aspects of development in the Arctic," Makarov said.

Paul Frazer, a spokesman for External Affairs Minister Joe Clark, said Canada is "very pleased" with the treaty. [passage omitted]

Demonstrators Call for Vancouver Nuclear-Free Zone

52200010 Vancouver *THE SUN* in English
24 Apr 89 p A3

[Article by Glenn Bohn]

[Excerpts] Thousands of British Columbians heard a "dedication for peace and disarmament" at the weekend's peace walk, but the words were aimed at Ottawa.

The dedication, read by End the Arms Race president Frank Kennedy, called on all nations to stop wasting resources on tools of destruction, then zeroed in on the Progressive Conservative government.

"At home, we call upon the Canadian government to make the Port of Vancouver a nuclear weapons-free zone, so that visiting warships will no longer be able to bring their nuclear weapons into the heart of our city," Kennedy said.

The cheers were deafening from the crowd at Sunset Beach. Nearby in English Bay was a "peace flotilla" of 30-odd sailing boats, yachts, canoes and kayaks.

Vancouver council this month passed a resolution that asks Ottawa to declare the port nuclear-free, as local governments have declared Greater Vancouver municipalities, but Ottawa hasn't officially responded.

The dedication slammed the federal cabinet's plan to buy nuclear submarines, the costliest military acquisition in Canadian history. The defence department claims the subs will cost \$8 billion, but the Canadian Centre for Arms Controls predicts they could cost almost \$15 billion.

"We also appeal to our government to abandon the ill-conceived nuclear sub program," Kennedy said.

The dedication criticized low-level military aircraft flights over both Labrador and B.C.

"We express our sorrow for the plight of the Innu people in Labrador, who presently live under the siege of low-level flight training over their homeland. We express our solidarity with their struggle to protect their homeland and way of life.

"And we express our alarm at our government's plans to conduct low-level flight training over B.C."

Finally, it voiced hope for successful strategic arms reduction talks between the Soviet Union and United States, and for the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts.

End the Arms Race, a coalition of 230 organizations, estimated that 60,000 people joined the eighth annual peace walk, while police estimates were 30,000 or 40,000. It took about a half-hour for the army of pacifists to march across Burrard Street bridge. [Passage omitted]

"Contrast that to the idea in Vancouver today...A peace walk beats the hell out of an arms race any day."

Carroll [Retired U.S. Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, now deputy director of the Centre for Defence Information in Washington, D.C.] suggested Vancouver should join next year with its five sister cities in other nations in an international walk for peace—"a celebration of the common bond that unites all humans who believe in peace."

"Vancouver, with the energy and enthusiasm you have here, could lead the whole world on a peace walk in April," the former admiral said.

Mayor Gordon Campbell said the participants were showing their "commitment to peace and the future not just of the city, but the country and the planet."

The mayor read out written comments from children, which he said showed "we're going to be successful in this drive for a peaceful world." [Passage omitted]

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Reportage on Visit to Bonn by USSR's Shevardnadze

Kohl 'Voices Optimism'

LD1205164989 Hamburg DPA in German 1613 GMT
12 May 89

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl sees signs of movement in East-West relations. After talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in the chancellor's office in Bonn on Friday afternoon, the Chancellor voiced optimism concerning further developments between Washington and Moscow. The Soviet foreign minister, who is in Bonn on a 24-hour working visit, explained to the chancellor during the talks the results of the recent visit to Moscow by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as well as the new disarmament proposals from state and party chief Mikhail Gorbachev.

Kohl did not wish to be pinned down later on whether this proposal improves prospects for the German demand for negotiations on a reduction in short-range missiles on both sides. He said that Gorbachev's proposals point in the right direction but they must be examined calmly. However, present developments show that Bonn's ideas in the talks within NATO are not wrong.

The Gorbachev visit to Bonn in exactly 4 weeks occupied much of the talks, in which Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher also took part. The work on the planned joint statement is progressing, and he is convinced that a new chapter in relations between the two countries would be opened with this document and that this would be recognizable to everyone. The chancellor admitted that there are still difficulties concerning the agreements to be signed. For example, he is not sure whether the German-Soviet shipping agreement, which is still giving problems on account of the incorporation of Berlin, is acceptable. Kohl underlined Bonn's interest in a lasting settlement for Berlin. This is also useful for the deepening of relations. [passage omitted]

Kohl Post-Talks News Conference

AU1205183489 Vienna Domestic Service in German
1600 GMT 12 May 89

[Report on news conference given by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn on 12 May, by Kurt Rammersdorfer]

[Text] The talks between Kohl and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Shevardnadze mainly focused on two issues. The most important was, without any doubt, the question of disarmament 1 day after the Soviet disarmament proposal.

Concerning the Soviet proposal, Kohl said that, on principle, this shows that the right path is being followed, a path which he, Kohl, has repeatedly called for. At the same time, the FRG chancellor pointed out that NATO, too, has already made unilateral advance moves in disarmament—for instance, in the case of Pershing IA missiles. Summarizing the disarmament discussion, Kohl drew up the following balance sheet:

[Begin Kohl recording] I am sure that the reduction of the Warsaw Pact's great superiority concerning short-range nuclear missiles improves the preconditions for coming closer—in the negotiations that we are striving for—to clear and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons, of short-range missiles, by the Soviet and the American side, with equal ceilings. I have also welcomed the fact that for the first time the Soviet side has cited figures for the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, in particular since the NATO alliance had already done this before the beginning of the Vienna negotiations.

I think that this has certainly increased the chances of the mutual idea of bringing some types of weapons to a common denominator. Of course, we will thoroughly examine these proposals—and this was also a topic of our talks. The foreign minister announced that the general secretary has ordered that these proposals be immediately presented by the Soviet side in Vienna.

I, for my part, would like to point out that I think that this is a good step. However, at the same time—and this shows a considerable change in the overall climate—there is the proposal made by President Bush to open up the skies, to make the skies more open. I hope that the Soviet Union, for its own part, will deal with these proposals.

In general, movement has started and we, as Germans, can only be very satisfied with this. [end recording]

In addition to disarmament issues, today's talk also broached a second topic, which will dominate the international headlines in exactly 2 weeks [as heard]. Gorbachev will visit Bonn, and Kohl is, as he expressly stressed today, confident that this visit by the Soviet party chief will definitely be a success—for both sides.

Shevardnadze Warning on SNF Modernization

*LD1305132189 Hamburg DPA in German 1258 GMT
13 May 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has emphatically warned the West not to decide in favor of modernizing short-range missiles. Should modernization proceed then his country might consider stopping the announced unilateral withdrawal of short-range missiles or even develop a new missile system, Shevardnadze said on Saturday at the end of his 2 days of talks in Bonn.

At the same time the Soviet foreign minister renewed his government's preparedness to negotiate on all issues. He did not exclude in principle a solution in stages for short-range missiles.

Shevardnadze expressed the Soviet leadership's willingness to arrive at an equilibrium also for conventional weapons. This could take place over a period of 5 to 7 years.

Shevardnadze announced at the same time that during his talks with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher a series of existing difficulties on the agreements to be signed during the visit by head of state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Bonn in July were overcome. A solution for including Berlin was also found. Without mentioning details Shevardnadze spoke of a "good formula" which is to be worked into the joint statement for the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to the Federal Republic.

Further on Warning, Arms Limit Proposals

*LD1305163989 Hamburg DPA in German 1506 GMT
13 May 89*

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—The USSR is considering the development of a new missile system in reply to a possible Western decision concerning short-range missiles. This was announced by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on Saturday at the end of his 24-hour working visit to Bonn. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze announced that his country is to propose to the participants in the Vienna negotiations within the next few weeks that within the next 2 years they set the following identical upper limits for NATO and Warsaw Pact troops and armaments: 1.35 million men each; 1,500 fighter aircraft of the tactical airforces each; 1,700 helicopter gunships; 20,000 tanks each; 24,000 artillery guns, mortars, and rocket launchers each; and 28,000 infantry combat vehicles each.

The supervision of such disarmament steps would have to take place under the strictest international controls, including permanent control posts, on-the-spot inspections and "surprise inspections".

Shevardnadze also said it is necessary to begin serious talks concerning tactical nuclear weapons. Moscow's offer to withdraw 500 warheads from the territory of its allies, including 166 air and 50 artillery-based warheads, as well as 284 missile warheads from Eastern Europe, serves this objective.

Shevardnadze announced for the first time that Moscow is also prepared to agree to the destruction of these warheads. Hitherto there was only talk of a withdrawal to Soviet territory. He told newsmen in Bonn that an agreement "on the method of destruction is being sought" with the other socialist countries.

Shevardnadze did not exclude a solution in stages between East and West for short-range missiles. All the arguments advised by the West in favor of modernization, from the Soviet viewpoint, are wrong. Admittedly there is an Eastern superiority in conventional weapons. However, his country is prepared to establish "total equilibrium of troops and armaments." This would take from 6 to 7 years.

The Western demand to withdraw and destroy 40,000 tanks in 1 or 2 years, he said, was "not serious and was even physically impossible." Concerning the negotiations on the reduction and destruction of tactical nuclear armaments, a result could be achieved in a much shorter time. Likewise, the Western objection that the USSR is constantly modernizing its missiles is not valid. Admittedly these systems were replaced in the early eighties, but the range has remained unchanged. According to him the Western missile modernization would also jeopardize a number of international agreements to which the Federal Republic and other European countries have contributed.

Shevardnadze also called for negotiations with the United States on the NATO strategy of flexible deterrence. This doctrine contradicts today's realities. The Soviet leadership also hopes that the new U.S. Government, in its still continuing examination of its policy, (?) would also pay attention to the issue of tactical nuclear armament. He is confident that overcoming the lull in Soviet-U.S. dialogue would have a beneficial effect on the development of the negotiations on European disarmament.

According to the Soviet foreign minister, the Soviet leadership has considerable expectations concerning Gorbachev's visit to Bonn. The necessary preconditions for this were created in his talks. The agreed statement, which is to be submitted to Gorbachev and Kohl for approval, also contains arrangements in principle.

Genscher also spoke of good and productive results. He announced that the planned agreements on the initial and further training of cadres, on joint efforts in fighting drugs and the investment protection agreement are ready for signing. Work is still continuing on the agreements on the exchange of youth, teachers and pupils, and concerning colleges, as well the agreements on cultural institutes and cooperation in space. Experts have been asked to work on the two shipping agreements which are still posing difficulties, above all because of the Berlin arrangement.

The Federal foreign minister said that the Berlin formula found for the joint statement is satisfactory. Shevardnadze went so far as to speak of a "good solution." Genscher said he assumes that the formula now found for including Berlin "covers all possibilities." He did not give details. Another topic between the two foreign ministers was the situation of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union.

CDU's Dregger Rejects Threat on INF

AU1605181789 Mainz ZDF Television Network
in German 1700 GMT 16 May 89

[Text] The chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag group, Dregger, has rejected the most recent threat by the Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The latter had stated in Bonn that Moscow might be forced to stop the agreed withdrawal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles if new short-range nuclear missiles are deployed in Western Europe. Dregger called on the Soviet and state and party leader to correct his foreign minister.

Security Concerns of Missile Issue Stressed

AU1205152389 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 12 May 89 p 1

[Guenther Gillesen editorial: "New Thinking With Consequences"]

[Text] The dispute with Washington, which has taken on a sharper note, is about short-range weapons, elections, and domestic policy, as well as—as the federal foreign minister says—about overcoming "old thinking" in the alliance which he confronts with the "new thinking" in the Soviet Union.

Whether Bonn's analysis of Soviet development tendencies is more correct than the skeptical judgments in Washington, London, and Paris, cannot, at present, be ascertained with certainty. If one must act in an uncertain situation, it is advisable to proceed on dual tracks. Initial changes for the better in the Soviet Union will be utilized; however, failures will have to be considered. One must continue to take care of one's own security. At any rate, that is correct thinking, no matter whether it is "old" or "new".

The most important of these security provisions is the cultivation of mutual confidence in the Western alliance. It is the security network of the Western countries in dealing with the Soviet Union in both good times and bad. As long as this network remains politically and militarily solid, no temporary misjudgment about the Soviet Union could have fatal consequences.

However, if for domestic policy calculations—the correctness of which is dubious, or based on the idea that it has to fulfill a special mission in terms of Ostpolitik—Bonn is deliberately heading for a clash with Washington, and believes that it can risk the alienation of the main ally, this will provoke the question within the entire alliance of whether the Federal Republic is about to change its foreign policy orientation. The allies are asking themselves: What would become of NATO, and what would become of the Federal Republic, if it were to disassociate itself in order to play the role of mediator between the East and West? The United States, Britain, and France do not need a German mediator in dealing with Moscow. However, the Federal Republic needs firm

allies for its own security, for the protection of West Berlin, and as a support for a future Germany policy.

Serious mistakes were made by the alliance in planning nuclear disarmament. The first mistake was made by President Reagan when he conceded to the Soviet Union the total removal of longer-range intermediate-range weapons, the first "zero solution." The second mistake was made by Mrs Thatcher when she let Bonn down when it attempted to prevent the second "zero solution" in 1987. However, if this wrong development were to be continued, and the Federal Republic were to bring about a third zero solution, no nuclear weapons would be left on the territory of the nonnuclear states in West Europe. If the United States and Britain were to yield to Bonn's urgent demand, the Federal Government would have won a Pyrrhic victory. The Vienna negotiations on the reduction of Soviet conventional superiority would become even more difficult than they are anyway. The Federal Republic's market value in Moscow would fall to the extent that Bonn's standing in the alliance weakened. Would the U.S. troops stay in West Europe if they could no longer rely on short-range weapons? If they were to be pulled out, NATO would have to totally reorganize itself, or it would, in essence, disintegrate. Even if that were not to happen, it would have to be expected that by giving up the U.S. nuclear weapons on German territory, the Federal Republic would also give up the basis of nuclear policy codetermination. All Federal Governments since Adenauer have viewed membership in the alliance and the acceptance of U.S. nuclear weapons as a source of influence.

Ten years after World War II, the Federal Republic joined an alliance system which was supposed to protect West Europe not only from the Soviet Union but also from German uncertainties. Adenauer himself shared the concern about whether it would endure. That was not an issue as long as Bonn was actively committed to the alliance. It could become an issue, if the allies were to arrive at the conclusion that they had to protect themselves from German sleepwalking between the two different worlds in Europe. The temptation to interpret West German policy this way has not always been resisted. There are shrill notes of criticism. Excessive criticism contributes to provoking public opinion in the Federal Republic against the Western allies.

If the Federal Republic lived in security, such alienations could be temporarily tolerated. However, that is not the case. In addition, the Federal Republic has a great, unfulfilled national interest: reunification. This demand, which under Adenauer was included in the Germany treaty with the three Western allies, specifies as a condition of its fulfillment that the politicians show the Federal Republic a degree of confidence within the alliance, so that the persistent shadows of two European wars may dissolve.

If German politicians were to continue this unnecessary quarrel within NATO, or if Bonn were to be rebuffed by

Washington and London—equally great harm would be done. It would penetrate people's minds in the form of anti-Americanism, particularly the young generation. What will be its future attitude? At variance with the West, unprotected from the continental power in the East, dissatisfied with the national problem? Politically frustrated, forever restless, afraid of everyone, and feared by many?

Press Views Gorbachev Unilateral SNF Reduction Announcement

*AU1205164689 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 0505 GMT 12 May 89*

[From the Press Review]

[Text] Today some editorial writers discuss Soviet party and state leader Gorbachev's offer to unilaterally reduce the number of short-range missiles and tactical nuclear missiles of his country.

The Dortmund daily WESTFAELISCHE RUND-SCHAU writes: It is not yet known to what conditions, if any at all, Mikhail Gorbachev links his offer to unilaterally reduce the number of Soviet short-range missiles and tactical nuclear missiles. However, it may be considered certain that the Soviet party leader, who took the initiative once again yesterday, thereby intends to stress his wish for a third zero solution. The farther he goes with his offer, the more difficult it will be for Washington to summarily reject the demand for negotiations which are supposed to stop at an agreement on common upper ceilings, and the stronger the position of those alliance partners rallied around Bonn will be in the alliance who want to replace a binding decision on deployment of the Lance successor model with a negotiation offer to Moscow. Under these circumstances, the petty criticism within the coalition about the Kohl-Genscher line is becoming increasingly incomprehensible. It harms the FRG's cause regarding not only the modernization issue, but also its foreign-political prestige.

NEUE OSNABRUECKER ZEITUNG makes the following critical remarks: That Baker, contrary to initial statements, rejected the offer even before having briefed the allies, was not good style, because here the interests of the Europeans—in particular the Germans—are directly affected. A common, differentiated reaction would have served the cause of the West better than prejudicing an assessment. In any case, two things must be said. First, owing to its consistency, the United States can be rightly proud of having caused the rigid fronts in the discussion on short-range missiles to move. Second, Gorbachev's initiative demonstrates the realization, if limited, that it is up to the Soviet Union to make a move. No government would be more relieved than the Bonn government if tensions in the missile quarrel were to ease. For the time being, however, scepticism is greater than optimism.

Political Figures Continue SNF Modernization Debate

LD1305164989 Hamburg DPA in German 1522 GMT
13 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—The domestic political debate on modernization of U.S. short-range weapons is continuing. Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg said in an interview with the WELT AM SONTAG newspaper that he is confident of reaching a joint position in the alliance at the NATO summit at the end of May. He stressed Bonn's attitude of including land-based short-range missiles in disarmament negotiations as well. A dispute over a third zero solution, however, is "not in our interest". The immediate objective is to make progress on conventional disarmament in the Warsaw Pact.

Criticism of Foreign Minister Genscher came from the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] again. CDU Bundestag Deputy Juergen Todenhoefer demanded that Genscher should in issues "finally respect the overall policy authority of Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl once again" in defense and disarmament policy. Michaela Geiger, foreign policy spokeswoman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Group, told the BILD AM SONNTAG paper: "Progress should have been made in a more diplomatic manner in the debate on the modernization of short-range missiles. I accuse the foreign minister of not taking adequate account of the situation of the United States, our alliance partner". Mrs Geiger stressed that the CSU "is absolutely against a third zero solution at this moment in time".

SPD [Social Democratic Party] Deputy Chairman Oskar Lafontaine spoke in favor of entering a second phase of detente policy by studying Gorbachev's disarmament proposals. "We must grasp this outstretched hand and use this world political opportunity in the interests of securing peace," he said on Saturday in the first joint interview with the Soviet NOVOSTI news agency and Radio Saarland. Lafontaine backed a restructuring of NATO strategy. The strategy of the flexible response, aimed both at tactical theater nuclear forces and, for example, short-range missiles, must be [word indistinct]. The SPD backs a defense policy concept based more heavily on conventional weapons systems.

Genscher: Success for Insistence on Talks on 'All Weapons Categories'

LD1405132389 Hamburg DPA in German 1250 GMT
14 May 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher sees initial successes for the German insistence on negotiations on all weapons categories. He said on Sunday in the ZDF [second German television] program "Bonn Direkt" that German foreign policy has succeeded in directing attention, at first in the Western alliance and then in the east as well, to the core problem of European security.

What is required is the achievement of conventional stability, the elimination of the capability (to mount) a surprise attack or a territorial offensive. Bonn has also brought the problem of the short-range missiles, where there was a large eastern superiority, "to the attention of the world." The most recent proposals from state and party head Mikhail Gorbachev were the first true step from the eastern side toward the dismantling of this superiority.

In Genscher's words, the NATO summit at the end of May in Brussels must develop the perspectives for the future East-West relationship and a joint strategy for the alliance. He is sure that this will be achieved. He has no doubts about NATO's capability to take action.

Serving Officer Hits NATO Nuclear Doctrine

36200162 Bonn TRUPPENDIENST in German
Mar/Apr 89 pp 129-136

[Article by Capt Juergen Rose: "Defense or Self-Annihilation. A Critique of NATO's Flexible Response Strategy"]

[Text] The author of the following article, a staff member of the Academy for Psychological Defense, presents a critique of NATO's flexible response strategy which to him has lacked credibility for some time. Although Capt Rose's views are in contrast with unanimously agreed upon alliance strategy, we do not wish to withhold his article from our readers—particularly in these times of fast changing East-West security policy parameters.

As long ago as 1795, Immanuel Kant characterized the misery of arms races and their consequences in the following definitive manner: "Standing armies," he wrote, "should cease to exist with the passage of time because they threaten other states continually with war by giving the appearance of eternally being prepared for it. They provoke the latter to surpass each other in the number of armed men without limit. And as the costs expended on their behalf at length become even heavier to bear than those of a brief war, they are themselves the cause of wars of aggression waged in order to cast off this burden...."¹

The disarmament imperative thus is not a specific feature of the nuclear age. The "bomb" merely serves to provide the ultimate, the so to speak technological argument for disarmament. Disarmament is a precondition of peace which should not merely be viewed as a state of silenced weapons. In fact, compliance with the disarmament imperative is the acid test of the will and capacity of homo sapiens and his social groupings. As for Kant, he was optimistic with regard to "human progress toward the good." The events that followed, including two world wars the atom bombs dropped on Japan, the Cold War, the senseless arms race and the futile arms control efforts which merely led to agreements between

the two protagonists on ever higher limits on their overkill arsenals appeared to confound this optimistic view.

When that idealist² from the "evil empire" began speaking of "glasnost" and "perestroyka" in April 1985 and showering the West with a series of disarmaments proposals, hope began to stir anew. Initial evidence of the fact that these hopes were not unfounded was provided by the signing of the INF Treaty by the President of the United States and the Soviet general secretary in Washington on 8 December 1987. For the first time in the history of the arms race an entire category of weapons was to be removed from the arsenals of destruction.

One upshot of this initial, though hopefully not unique, step on the road to disarmament is the renewed debate about the role of nuclear weapons within the framework of flexible response and the possible consequences of progressive denuclearization of the alliance.

Role of Nuclear Weapons as Part of Flexible Response

MC 14/3 [expansion unknown] defines NATO's military strategy goals as follows:

- prevention of crisis situations and war in peacetime;
- crisis control in times of crisis;
- in case of conflict, termination of hostilities and restoration of territorial integrity of North Atlantic area.

This list of priorities points up the defensive and reactive orientation of flexible response strategy which is primarily designed to ensure the security of the members of the alliance by deterring a potential aggressor from attack. Deterrence is both credible and effective, if the capability and readiness for defense exists and if a balance of strategic options can be maintained and the existing geostrategic asymmetries can be neutralized. Crisis control and rapid termination of hostilities, accompanied by maximum damage control, are to be assured with the help of contingency planning; the capability for controlled, flexible and selective political and military response and the capability to escalate or deescalate the conflict.

It follows therefore that safeguarding peace through deterrence is a political task in the first instance and that the flexible response doctrine is a strategy primarily designed to prevent war. But in order to make this strategy credible in the enemy's eyes, it must provide for realistic, i.e., realizable, options for the eventuality that deterrence may fail for whatever reason. In this sense, a strategy designed to prevent war is always intricately linked to a strategy designed to wage war.

This means that although nuclear weapons may serve primarily as political weapons for the purpose of deterrence and thus of the prevention of war in the context of

flexible response their role also is to provide operational military options as part of warfare strategy.

Nuclear weapons play the following role on the different levels of the NATO posture:

- On the strategic level, they threaten to the enemy's survival and neutralize the enemy's overall capability to wage war. This role may be defined as "deterrence by punishment" or deterrence by devastation. It represents the role of the first order.
- On the operational level, they prevent the enemy from realizing his military objectives in the theater of war. This may be defined as deterrence of warfare or "deterrence by denial." It represents the role of the second order.
- On the tactical level, they implement operational plans on the battlefield by means of characteristic capabilities, e.g., survivability, penetrability, precision, etc. This represents the role of the third order.

Critique of Strategy

In order to gain points of reference and arguments about whether and if so how nuclear disarmament is to proceed from this point forward, it is necessary to conduct a critical analysis of existing strategy with an eye to its nuclear component. In sifting through the wealth of material at hand, I would like to focus my critique on five issues which seem of particular importance to me.

1. Faulty Implementation of Nuclear Posture

The decisive reason for the 1968 switch from massive retaliation to flexible response was the loss of U.S. escalation dominance. Escalation dominance in this context refers to the "ability to dictate the level and intensity as well as the spatial limits and duration of military conflict to the other side, i.e., to determine combat conditions on every level and to impose untenable and unavoidable risks on the enemy's decision to broaden or escalate hostilities...Escalation dominance also includes the capability to terminate an armed conflict to one's own relative advantage, i.e., to dictate the conditions for bringing hostilities to an end to the enemy. It is theoretically impossible to determine whether the concept as such allows for control over the entire escalation process in a conflict situation. In real-life situations, escalation dominance is tied to both military and/or strategic superiority in any given war situation and favorable circumstances."³

The ability to escalate calls for the appropriate quantitative and qualitative potential. Thus far, however, it has not been possible to marshal the conventional and nuclear weapons deemed necessary for flexible warfare. Although the weapons in the U.S. intercontinental arsenal provide for the target accuracy required in counterforce options, the still powerful detonation values involve the risk of incalculable collateral damage so that the necessary selectivity cannot be achieved.

Nor was the TNF [Tactical Nuclear Forces] potential brought up to required technological standards. Neither the existing NATO tactical delivery systems and weapons, nor the available reconnaissance and command systems allow for effective and politically acceptable nuclear support for conventional defense. Inadequate target accuracy and weaknesses in reconnaissance and operational command have to be compensated for by correspondingly higher detonation values which cause correspondingly greater, undesirable collateral damage.

Defense by such means is bound to have devastating consequences for Central Europe and above all for the FRG. It therefore is not a realistic option.⁴

To illustrate the above, let me list the detonation values of selected nuclear weapons:

- Minuteman II—1.5 megatons;
- Minuteman III/1/2—170-335 kilotons;
- Polaris A3—200 kilotons;
- Poseidon—40 kilotons
- Trident I—100 kilotons
- MX—300 kilotons
- Lance-CEP 150-375 m, 1-150 kilotons⁵

2. Vulnerability of NATO Nuclear Arsenal

Another factor serving to undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence in Europe is the grave danger of disarming attack faced by the NATO TNF arsenal in its peacetime deployment mode. Because of the short flight times of Warsaw Pact nuclear attack resources and the length of time NATO would need in a total surprise situation positively to identify the attack, alert the political leadership and obtain clearance to resort to nuclear weapons, NATO's land-based nuclear arsenal would probably be completely destroyed by an attack out of the blue before it could actually be committed.⁶

NATO's reaction to such an attack would have disastrous consequences. The reluctance of the American leadership to resort to indiscriminate area fire would diminish in direct proportion to the massiveness and destruction of the prior Soviet nuclear strike. If the West European nations' political-administrative potential for action had already been paralyzed, reducing the latter to a mere object of strategic warfare, they could no longer be expected to offer effective resistance to massive American nuclear strikes aimed at the Warsaw Pact's offensive potential concentrated in Eastern Europe.⁷

A nuclear conflict waged in this manner would have self-destructive consequences for NATO in Western Europe.

In case of the first use of nuclear weapons by NATO, an intensive nuclear conflict would scarcely be avoidable—even from the point of view of Warsaw Pact planners.

In fact, there is no reason to assume that the Warsaw Pact would not respond to first use of nuclear weapons by NATO with massive nuclear strikes of its own now that it has an arsenal of tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons which are at least comparable to those in the NATO arsenal. In all probability, Soviet nuclear strikes would be directed primarily against NATO's capability to wage nuclear war, i.e., against command and communications centers, nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapon capable aircraft, missiles and artillery. Other priority targets would be ports and air bases which serve to support nuclear forces. As a consequence, war would spread from the battlefield to all of Europe.⁸

Michael Legge, a British defense ministry official, has found that it would surely be irrational for NATO to cross the nuclear threshold even in case of an imminent conventional defeat because the alliance could be certain that the response to first use would be a nuclear counterstrike of equal or greater strength which would result either in possible defeat for NATO accompanied by far greater loss of life and material damage or in escalation and ultimately in mutual annihilation.⁹

3. Lack of Controllability of Nuclear Conflict

Flexible response strategy stands and falls with the possibility of political control over escalation.

Political escalation control in nuclear war presupposes an inordinately high degree of rationality among those involved in the conflict. And yet, in the case of an act triggered by the irrationality of one or both of the parties to a conflict, it seems paradoxical to expect these very adversaries to behave rationally. [FRG] Foreign Minister [Hans-Dietrich] Genscher underscored this very point in an address in Potsdam on 11 June 1988. "There is an odd contradiction here," he said. "We believe we must always assume the worst in our relationship with the Soviet Union but at the same time we base our confidence in the effectiveness of deterrence on the assumption that the other side, i.e., first of all the Soviet Union, will react in a rational and responsible manner."¹⁰

What is more, the nature and deployment of the nuclear arsenals in East and West Europe and the nuclear doctrine of the Warsaw Pact raise fears of a rapid transition to theater nuclear war in case a first strike by NATO failed to succeed.

NATO plans dealing with flexible response strategy also call for taking advantage of the risk of possible loss of political control over nuclear operations and the danger of escalation into an all-out nuclear war in order to achieve its war aims, i.e., the restoration of the status quo, which is synonymous with the defeat of the Soviet Union. According to military strategy expert Karl-Peter Stratmann (Ebenhausen), this problem of the political controllability of a nuclear conflict points up the inner contradictions of NATO strategy. "The assumption that

NATO would be forced to escalate rapidly because of military weakness in case of war," Stratmann writes, "and that both sides would then probably become embroiled in a catastrophic nuclear war under the pressure of operational constraints and all-powerful automatic processes is incompatible with the objectives and premises of NATO's flexible response strategy. In short, from the Soviet vantage point the deterrent power of the NATO posture is based above all on assumptions which are synonymous with the probable failure of NATO strategy in case of war. In the democracies of the Western alliance, however, this cannot serve as the psychological basis for confidence in stable security or in the rationality and legitimacy of their own defense policies."¹¹

The three critical arguments outlined above may be summarized under the heading of self-deterrence. Robert McNamara and Helmut Schmidt, two prominent members of the "strategic community" have drawn the following conclusions:

"Our present nuclear strategy is bankrupt," McNamara, the defense secretary under President Kennedy, writes. "I know of no plan which offers a reasonable guarantee that nuclear weapons could be used to NATO's advantage." McNamara believes "that nuclear weapons do not serve any military purpose whatever. They are utterly useless—except to deter the enemy prior to their use." He therefore calls for a strict ban on the possibility of nuclear escalation as a result of first use of nuclear weapons. "That is my opinion just as it was in the early sixties. At that time, I had lengthy personal conversations with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, urging both never to resort to first use of nuclear weapons no matter what the circumstances."¹²

Helmut Schmidt, the former FRG defense minister and chancellor, also deals with this issue on no uncertain terms. "The flexible response strategy developed in 1962 and approved by the alliance in 1967 serves decisively to cripple the combat effectiveness of Bundeswehr in defense," Schmidt writes. "The truth is that all military plans and maneuvers since 1967 did not call for genuine flexibility. The NATO command always went on the assumption of a rapid escalation of hostilities. It assumed and rehearsed in its maneuvers the early first use even of nuclear weapons by the West. When I became defense minister in 1969, it was clear to me that in a national emergency this strategy could result in the death of millions of people in both parts of Germany in a matter of days. I thought it was utterly unrealistic to assume that our soldiers would continue fighting in a national emergency once nuclear weapons had exploded on German soil. I thought it absurd to believe, as NATO did, that our soldiers would continue to fight in such a situation in a more fanatical and suicidal fashion than the Japanese who capitulated immediately when the two atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 although not a single American soldier

had yet set foot on the Japanese mainland. As commander in chief, I was therefore resolved not to lend any support whatever to any Western escalation to nuclear warfare in the (unlikely) event of a Soviet conventional attack...Today, it is time to replace the flexible response strategy with a new concept."¹³

4. Uncoupling Europe from U.S. Strategic Arsenal

NATO's geostrategic situation is responsible for the problem of the interfacing of U.S. intercontinental and European conventional and nuclear arsenals. The implied U.S. nuclear guarantee for Western Europe which is based on the continuous scale of escalation options represents the very crux of the alliance. It is meant to demonstrate the political and strategic unity of North America and Western Europe.

But when the Soviet Union succeeded in attaining strategic parity, the United States and NATO were faced with a dilemma which put the nuclear guarantee into question.

The United States fears nuclear escalation because there is no assurance that the process of escalation can be halted at any given point. If this proved impossible, then every use of nuclear weapons in Europe would entail the loss of the advantageous strategic position of the United States and place its very existence at risk.

The Europeans for their part are aware that extended conventional war would prove no less destructive for Europe than nuclear war. For this reason, it is in the European and particularly in the German interest to threaten the use nuclear weapons at the earliest possible stage of an armed conflict and to carry that threat out, if need be, in order both to stabilize the precarious conventional direct defense posture by means of selective but effective use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield and to alert the aggressor to the danger of escalation into an all-out war.

In other words, the United States and the West European members of NATO are motivated by different sets of interests.

The situation becomes even more complicated in view of the fact that the different sets of interests of the two sides are ambivalent.

Western Europe hopes to use its own strategy to get the Soviet Union to accept the proposition that a European war would inevitably assume catastrophic dimensions. This, it is hoped, would serve as the greatest possible deterrent to war. But on the other hand, this position places a burden on the inner acceptance above all of conventional forces. What is more, the governments of Western Europe in particular might wish to distance themselves from issuing the threat of nuclear escalation in case of war in the expectation of devastating nuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union.

American ambivalence is based on the fact that although Western Europe is an area of paramount geopolitical importance in the global political conflict with the Soviet Union, it is not indispensable for America's own security. For this reason, it would not pay for the United States to risk nuclear war with the Soviet Union over Western Europe, since such a war would endanger America's own existence. But on the other hand, the United States, in its own interest, could not afford to allow Western Europe to fall into Soviet hands without a fight.¹⁴

This conflict of interest does contain the possibility for a sufficient measure of agreement among the participants on first use of nuclear weapons so as to work out common operational plans and guidelines, thus at least establishing the capability for a nuclear opening.

In the debate on subsequent use, however, the vital interest of the FRG in making the American partner comply with a strategy which seeks to instrument the use of nuclear weapons on the strategic level early enough to prevent the destruction of Central Europe through the intensified use of tactical nuclear weapons is directly confronted with the vital interest of the United States to use its own judgment on the conditions under which nuclear strikes on Soviet territory would be carried out.

In case of a large-scale Soviet aggression in Central Europe, one must therefore go on the plausible assumption that the United States will subordinate the existential interest in its own survival to its interest in preserving its European glacis. As Colin Gray has said, in terms of "psychological geography," the distance from Europe is sufficiently great to allow for accepting military defeat there if need be, if the risk of a destruction of the United States could not otherwise be avoided.¹⁵

This latent conflict within NATO has not been and, in fact, cannot be resolved. In this context, flexible response merely represents a compromise between the United States and Western Europe. The "uncalculable risk" formula is a compromise formula which states that the enemy will succumb in case he decides to attack NATO. This is a way of killing two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it makes it harder for the Warsaw Pact to draw up plans for a conflict and on the other, it allows each NATO member to interpret the strategy in accordance with his own interests. But the fact remains that in an emergency NATO is forced first to negotiate the decisions on nuclear warfare and then to improvise on the basis of these decisions. As former President [Richard M.] Nixon once put it: "There is a difference between uncertainty in the mind of the enemy and muddle in one's own thinking."¹⁶

Summarizing the "uncoupling debate," we can therefore say that SALT served to neutralize the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, the Europeans must go on the assumption that the United States, if at all prepared to engage in nuclear escalation, will do so only at the least possible

risk to itself. This goal dictates bypassing Soviet territory in the hope that any Soviet nuclear reaction would likewise restrict retaliatory strikes, i.e., that they would not be directed against the United States but against Western Europe. As a result, the essential basis for the NATO alliance has been nullified and NATO's flexible response strategy has long since lost its credibility.¹⁷

This assessment is supported by statements by former leading members of the American administration. In a speech on the future of NATO in Brussels on 1 September 1979, for example, former Secretary of State [Henry] Kissinger said: "The Europeans should stop asking us to reiterate military assurances which we cannot really mean or, if we did, could not honor because we would then risk the destruction of civilization."¹⁸

Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, whom we cited earlier, said: "Since the surviving strategic forces of the USSR could cause catastrophic destruction in my country, it is hard to believe that a President of the United States would ever give the order for a strategic strike—except in retaliation for a Soviet nuclear strike. As already indicated, an attack on Soviet territory using strategic nuclear weapons would almost certainly elicit an equal response which would cause unacceptable damage in Europe and in the United States. It would be suicide pure and simple. The threat of such action has therefore lost all credibility as a deterrent against a conventional aggression by the Soviet Union. This means that the last of the sanctions provided for under the flexible response strategy has been rendered invalid. Credible deterrence cannot be founded on incredible actions."¹⁹

5. The Permanent Arms Race

In a situation in which the only guarantee for deterrence lies in mutual assured destruction there is no need for an arms race.

But the situation is different, if, as things stand at present, deterrence is based on realistic military options. Counterforce strategy is aimed in the first instance at the enemy's military arsenals. If both sides adopt such a strategy, a bipolar trend exists toward first strike capability. Each side then aims to neutralize the war potential of the other and/or to thwart the available options as skillfully as possible. In an overall situation characterized by an arms race, however, such an obvious strategy of deterrence and armaments is scarcely realizable. It could only be successful, if one of the two adversaries opted out of the arms race. But in world politics this would be interpreted as an expression of political surrender.

The situation outlined above defines the hard core of the nuclear strategic relationship between the two world powers. At this point, both nations possess virtually equal destruction potentials which neutralize each other and are thus useless from a military point of view. In following the logic of deterrence against war, both nations try to evade the threat of political paralysis as a consequence of such

self-deterrence by restructuring and expanding their arsenals. The result is that they put each other in the position of having to match each other's moves. Deterrence and arms buildup are fueled primarily by hypothetical duel scenarios and equally hypothetical analyses regarding the political consequences of such duels.²⁰

Denuclearization

In speaking of denuclearization, one must differentiate between two fundamental options: overall denuclearization and partial denuclearization, i.e., a regional nuclear weapons ban or a ban limited to specific categories of weapons.

Let us turn to overall denuclearization first. In the debate about the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence its advocates always point to the system's capacity to prevent war and/or mitigate conflict. Aside from the fact that this argument logically unverifiable, it is fairly plausible to assume that it may indeed be correct.

The actual problem, however, is not that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is unverifiable but that it entails the risks outlined above.

Under the circumstances, the solution to the problem would seem to lie in relinquishing the MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) concept. This option has gained worldwide acceptance. Even President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the leaders of the two superpowers, feel an obligation to the utopian promise of a world free of nuclear weapons. The proposed ban on the inhuman mutual threat of destruction surely deserves to be welcomed and yet we must also focus on the question of how a truce or, better still, peace can be brought about. "The invention of nuclear weapons has taught us a lesson we must never forget but must only apply to conventional weapons," Carl-Friedrich von Weizsaecker has said. "Our task is not to win victories but to prevent war."²¹

The solution to the problem of suspending the latent threat of destruction while preserving the necessary levels of mutual deterrence could be part of a treaty based on the know-how acquired in the production of nuclear weapons. The know-how necessary to produce the weapons would make the weapons ban possible because that know-how would keep deterrence in place. The key to a nuclear weapons ban on the basis of deterrence lies in the fact that this know-how cannot be lost. On the basis of this know-how every state of disarmament would always continue to be a state of armament and as such retain its deterrent value.²² The INF Treaty of 8 December 1987 which provided for far-reaching verification procedures, e.g., the right to inspect production facilities, the creation of surveillance systems and the exposure of strategically significant weapon systems to satellite inspection, demonstrates that these ideas are perfectly realizable and that the provisions of such agreements are in fact verifiable.

Any agreement on the establishment of a nuclear-free world would have to be guaranteed by means of defensive arms measures. The protection afforded by the deterrent potential would not be left to chance because the agreement on a ban would not only expressly allow for the resources needed for renewed production of nuclear weapons but also for defense systems to protect against nuclear attack and for conventional forces equipped for defensive operations.²³

In addition to this global denuclearization option which will doubtless not be realized for some time to come there are various partial denuclearization options, the first of which was realized with the signing of the INF Treaty.

At first glance, the INF Treaty appears to be advantageous for NATO from a quantitative point of view. The United States is required to scrap 859 missiles while the Soviet Union must scrap 1,752. Looking at the relative reductions in total European arsenals capable of threatening European targets, however, the picture does not appear quite as bright, i.e., the Soviet Union is required to give up about 11 percent of the pertinent nuclear systems whereas the United States must give up some 34 percent of its systems.

But from a qualitative, i.e., strategic, point of view the treaty is extremely advantageous for NATO. By establishing parity in intercontinental weapons while maintaining its continental and regional nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union had succeeded in breaking the strategic escalation dominance of the United States and in building up an effective counter-deterrent. The Soviet Union also succeeded in modernizing its TNF arsenal in such a way that it held on to its superiority in continental and regional nuclear weapons. This counter-deterrent was bound to hamper NATO's readiness to use TNF weapons to counter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. This, in turn, helped the Soviet Union to achieve escalation dominance in Europe. By signing the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union relinquished this strategic advantage in favor of a reestablishment of parity in the nuclear field—although the increased relevancy of conventional potentials achieved thereby (which surely is not disadvantageous to the Soviet Union) needs to be taken into account.²⁴

For another thing, NATO strategy as a whole gains credibility in that self-deterrence is reduced. The ban on continental-range weapon systems creates a clear division between regional and intercontinental nuclear weapons both on the U.S. and the Soviet side. This increases the likelihood that a conflict which is escalated to the level of regional nuclear exchanges can be contained before it escalates into an irrational, uncontrollable intercontinental nuclear war. As long as denuclearization is not extended to the less than 500-km SRINF [short range intermediate nuclear force] range and the SNF [short range nuclear force], such a solution will of course be at the expense of the Europeans in East and West, since the crossing of the nuclear threshold by the

superpowers in case of conflict will pose less of a risk and is therefore likely to occur, thus exacerbating the already mentioned decoupling problems. But then the LRINF [long range intermediate nuclear force] modernization by NATO did not succeed in overcoming these problems either.

Another major advantage of the INF Treaty is that it serves as a model for successful arms control because this treaty succeeded for the first time ever in banning an entire category of weapon systems and the whole range of political and military options linked to them. Thus there is hope that additional arms control and disarmament agreements will make it possible to slow down the worrisome trend toward a world of military nuclear war strategies in favor of a situation in which the political deterrent function of the opposing strategies attains supremacy.

Outlines of a Total Security Policy Concept

To assist the process leading to the establishment of cooperative security structures in Europe and the world, NATO should initially concentrate on three approaches:

First, it should renounce first use of nuclear weapons because such a step would at least not decisively reduce deterrence to war but would slightly enhance crisis stability, make deterrence in war less risky, increase

acceptancy, strengthen alliance cohesion and facilitate arms agreements with the Soviet Union without calling for an unacceptable rise in resource requirements.

Secondly, it should resolutely pursue the restructuring of conventional arsenals in the direction of structural non-offensive capability and/or reciprocal defense superiority—if possible in conjunction with the Warsaw Pact which has already made pertinent proposals of its own along these lines.

Thirdly, the transformation of the Atlantic alliance from an "American Treaty Organization" into an "European Treaty Organization" seems imperative. This implies the categorical injunction addressed to the West Europeans to take over the leadership role in the Western alliance. The indispensable condition for this will have to consist in intensive Franco-German cooperation which would be called upon to create and shape the foundation of a future European security system.

Immanuel Kant referred to peace as the beautiful dream of philosophers. Perhaps that dream will then become reality one day. "It is a moot point," Kant wrote, "whether 'Eternal Peace,' the satirical inscription on a Dutch innkeeper's sign picturing a graveyard, is addressed to people in general or to heads of state in particular who can never get enough of war or perhaps only to philosophers."²⁵

NATO Strategy

Peace	War Prevention Strategy	
	Deterrence through assured destruction	Deterrence through flexible response
	Threat of uncalculable escalation	
Case of tension	Policy of strategic and military balance makes military blackmail impossible. Preservation of freedom of action of political leadership. Deterrence strategy may be a means of preventing war with great likelihood of success but it cannot serve to resolve conflicts	
National emergency	Conduct of war strategy	
	Flexible response strategy. Instrument: Triad	
	Intrawar deterrence, i.e. deterrence by threat of escalation during war	
	Conventional forces	Euronuclear weapons
	Forward defense strategy	Intercontinental weapon systems
		Threat and use against military targets in Europe
		Selective target planning strategy
	Sequence and dimension of Triad are determined by enemy attack	

Footnotes

1. Kant, Immanuel, "Zum ewigen Frieden" [On Eternal Peace], Koenigsberg, 1785; new edition, Stuttgart, 1979, p 17f.
2. This is the view of George F. Kennan, one of the most knowledgeable Western experts on the Soviet Union, as expressed in his review of Mikhail Gorbachev's book "Perestroika—The Second Russian Revolution" in DIE ZEIT, No. 5, 29 Jan 89, p 34. Kennan characterizes the Soviet general secretary as follows: "No one who reads this book can doubt the fact (or so it appears to this reviewer at least) that Gorbachev is an idealist in the depths of his soul. He is a sincere believer—in a dream which he calls socialism...But as compared with what took place before him...his vision of socialism is...relatively humane. He is not joking when he says 'whatever values one defends, the most important thing is to be concerned about the fate and the future of the people.' His book also shows he is a man who would like to see Soviet-American relations develop in a peaceful, businesslike, and generally constructive direction...because he has come to realize earlier than some of his Western colleagues that such objectives cannot be attained through military competition in the nuclear age."
3. Ruehl, Lothar, "Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa" [Medium-Range Weapons in Europe], Baden-Baden, 1987, p 62f.
4. Stratmann, Karl-Peter, "NATO-Strategie in der Krise?" [Crisis in NATO Strategy?], Baden-Baden, 1981, p 66; Ruehl, op. cit., p 107.
5. SIPRI, ed., "SIPRI Ruestungsjahrbuch 6" [SIPRI Arms Yearbook 6], Reinbek, 1986, p 35 and 1985, p 49; World Defence Almanac 1987/88 in MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, No 1/1988, p 347ff.
6. Stratmann, op. cit., p 158; Krakau, Anton, "Die sowjetische Preferenz fuer konventionelle Kriegsfuehrung in Europa (I & II)" [Soviet Preference for Conventional Warfare in Europe] in BERICHT DES BUNDESINSTITUTS FUER OSTWISSENSCHAFTLICHE UND INTERNATIONALE STUDIEN [Annals of the FRG Institute for Eastern and International Studies], No. 4/1988 & No. 8/1988, p 35.
7. Stratmann, op. cit., p 167.
8. McNamara, Robert, "Blindlings ins Verderben" [Blindfolded into Disaster], Reinbek, 1987, p 36f.; Luebke, Eckhard, "NATO-Strategie—modifiziert angewandt" [Modified Applications of NATO Strategy] in Buehl, Hartmut (moderator), "Strategiediskussion" [Strategy Debate], Munich, 1987, p 138; Krakau, op. cit., p 17.
9. Legge, J Michael, Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response, Santa Monica, 1983, p 45.
10. FRG foreign ministry press release No. 1140/88: "Neue Perspektiven der West-Ost-Sicherheitsproblematik" [New Perspectives on West-East Security Problems]. Address by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 11 June 1988 on the occasion of the meeting of the Institute for East-West Security Studies in Potsdam, p 7.
11. Stratmann, op. cit., p 232.
12. McNamara, op. cit., p 133.
13. Schmidt, Helmut, "Menschen und Maechte" [People and Powers], Berlin, 1987, p 143f.
14. Luebke, op. cit., p 141; Legge, op. cit., p 10.
15. Stratmann, op. cit., p 230, footnote 4.
16. President Richard Nixon statement in his 1972 report on U.S. foreign policy cited in Martin, Laurence, Strategic Parity and Its Implications, p 167 in Osgood, Robert E., ed., Retreat from Empire? The First Nixon Administration, Baltimore, 1973, pp 137-171 quoted by Stratmann, p 65f.
17. Luebke, op. cit., p 141; Afheldt, Horst, "Atomkrieg" [Nuclear War], Munich, 1987, p 176f.
18. Kissinger, Henry A., The Future of NATO in Myers, Kenneth A., ed., NATO—The Next Thirty Years, Boulder and London, 1980, p 8; Luebke, op. cit., p 141.
19. McNamara, op. cit., p 33, p 111f.
20. Senghaas, Dieter, "Der harte Kern der gegenwaertigen Ruestungskontrollproblematik" [The Hard Core of Present Arms Control Problems], (Working paper), Ebenhausen, 1986, p 7ff.
21. von Weizsaecker, Karl-Friedrich, "Die Deutschen haben Angst, die Angst ist berechtigt" [The Germans Are Afraid; Their Fears Are Justified] in Schroeder, Diethelm, ed., "Krieg oder was sonst?" [War or What Else?], Reinbek, 1984, p 134.
22. Schell, Jonathan, "Die Abschaffung" [The Ban], Munich, 1984, p 148.
23. Schell, op. cit., p 165.
24. Ruehl, op. cit., p 370.
25. Kant, op. cit., p 15.

ITALY

Council of Ministers Discusses Atlantic Summit SNF, CFE

*LD0505205589 Rome International Service
in Italian 1730 GMT 5 May 89*

[Excerpts] Prime Minister De Mita chaired a Council of Ministers meeting at the Chigi Palace. [passage omitted]

The Council of Ministers also discussed foreign policy, with special reference to De Mita's talks with British Prime Minister Thatcher and German Chancellor Kohl. Concerning the Atlantic summit, Foreign Minister Andreotti underlined the position of the Italian Government: Validity for cohesion of the NATO countries, negotiations for short-range missiles, adjustment of the imbalance of conventional forces with the Warsaw Pact and no urgency for the deployment of updated short-range nuclear systems. [passage omitted]

NETHERLANDS

Netherlands Rejects FRG's Call for SNF Talks

*AU1705064889 Paris AFP in English 0129 GMT
17 May 89*

[Excerpts] The Hague, May 17 (AFP)—Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek on Tuesday rejected West Germany's call for early East-West talks on reducing the short-range nuclear (SNF) arsenal in Europe.

Hosting a banquet for his Polish counterpart Tadeusz Olechowski he welcomed Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral withdrawal of 500 SNF warheads from Warsaw Pact countries but called it a "modest step when compared to the impressive size of Soviet stockpile notably in SNF."

He said: "We will continue to urge the Soviet Union to bring down unilaterally its 14-fold preponderance in SNF missile systems to the current NATO level."

"At present there is no realistic basis for negotiations on mutual reductions to equal ceilings in land-based missiles.

"What would NATO be able to offer given the huge discrepancies between the two sides, the marginal size of NATO's SNF arsenal and its significance as part of a credible defensive posture?"

The outcome of two sets of East-West conventional disarmament talks in Vienna would "to a certain degree" influence "the level of NATO's minimum requirements on SNF," he said. [passage omitted]

If the Vienna talks eventually produced "a conventional balance in Europe" then "the fixing together with the Soviet Union of equal SNF ceilings at even lower levels than NATO's present posture could come within reach," Mr. van den Broek said. [passage omitted]

SPAIN

Foreign Minister States Spain's Position on SNF

*LD1205150189 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish
1200 GMT 12 May 89*

[Excerpts] [Announcer] In the Belgian capital U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has briefed his NATO counterparts on his recent visit to Moscow, whose proposals would seem to be introducing a new element into the dispute in the Atlantic Alliance on whether or not to negotiate with the Soviets on the reduction of short-range missiles. Luz Rodriguez reports from Brussels:

[Rodriguez] A compromise is taking shape in NATO in order to reach an agreement on short-range missiles. Certain delegations—among them the Spanish delegation and Federal Germany itself—are interested in settling this matter before the summit of the 16 NATO heads of government at the end of the month. [passage omitted] Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez summed up our country's position:

[Begin Fernandez Ordonez recording] That we should not undertake a hasty modernization of tactical missiles. Second, that we should undertake a drastic reduction of short-range nuclear weapons. Third, that we should basically try to study this problem within the context of negotiations. [end recording]

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